JX 1946 
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L'wisioQ 


CTXI946 


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Section 


AND  OTHER  INTERNATIONAL  ESSAYS 


IMMANUEL  KANT 

0 

TRANSLATED  BY 

W.  HASTIE,  B.D. 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

EDWIN  D.  MEAD 


BOSTON 

THE  WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

1914 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION,  BY  EDWIN  D.  MEAD . V 

I.  THE  NATURAL  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER  ...  1 

II.  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT . 27 

III.  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS . 55 

IV.  ETERNAL  PEACE  :  A  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAY . 67 

V.  PUBLIC  LAW,  FROM  THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  MORALS  ...  129 


NOTES  TO  "ETERNAL  PEACE” 


169 


INTRODUCTION 


In  1795,  during  Washington’s  administration,  just  as  our 
great  American  experiment  in  self-government  had  been 
inaugurated,  Immanuel  Kant  published  in  Konigsberg  liis 
memorable  tractate  on  "  Eternal  Peace.”  It  was  in  many  re¬ 
spects  the  most  remarkable  prophecy  and  program  ever  made 
of  the  day  when  the  war  drum  shall  throb  no  longer,  and 
the  battle  Hags  shall  be  furled  in  "  the  parliament  of  man, 
the  federation  of  the  world.”  The  prophecy  is  never  for¬ 
gotten  by  those  who  are  in  earnest  about  having  it  fulfilled. 
The  name  of  Immanuel  Kant,  greatest  of  modern  philoso¬ 
phers,  is  honored  in  Europe  and  America  alike  as  that 
of  the  preeminent  philosopher  of  the  peace  movement. 
But  few  perhaps  remember  the  words  in  his  immortal  essay 
which  seem  a  special  prophecy  of  the  part  which  our  re¬ 
public  seems  destined  to  take  in  the  promotion  of  the  cause 
in  which  the  great  philosopher  was  a  pioneer.  ”  If  happy 
circumstances  bring  it  about,”  wrote  Kant,  ”  that  a  powerful 
and  enlightened  people  form  themselves  into  a  republic, — 
which  by  its  very  nature  must  be  disposed  in  favor  of  per¬ 
petual  peace,  —  this  will  furnish  a  center  of  federative  union 
for  other  States  to  attach,  themselves  to,  and  thus  to  secure 
the  conditions  of  liberty  among  all  States,  according  to  the 
idea  of  the  right  of  nations  ;  and  such  a  union  would  extend 
wider  and  wider,  in  the  course  of  time,  by  the  addition  of 
further  connections  of  this  kind.” 

It  was  a  remarkable  insight  of  Kant’s  that  universal  peace 
could  come  only  with  the  universal  republic.  The  republican 


VI 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


constitution,  he  said,  founded  on  the  principle  of  the  liberty 
and  equality  of  its  citizens  and  the  dependence  of  all  on  a 
common  legislation,  is  “  the  only  one  which  arises  out  of  the 
idea  of  the  original  compact  upon  which  all  the  rightful 
legislation  of  a  people  is  founded.  As  regards  public  right, 
the  republican  principles,  therefore,  lie  originally  and  essen¬ 
tially  at  the  basis  of  the  civil  constitution  in  all  its  forms ; 
and  the  only  question  for  us  now  is  as  to  whether  it  is  also 
the  only  constitution  that  can  lead  to  a  perpetual  peace.” 
Kant  declares  that  the  republican  constitution,  having  its 
original  source  in  the  conception  of  right,  does  include  the 
prospect  of  realizing  perpetual  peace ;  and  the  reason  of 
this,  he  says,  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

"According  to  the  republican  constitution,  the  consent  of 
the  citizens  as  members  of  the  State  is  required  to  determine 
at  any  time  the  question  whether  there  shall  be  war  or  not. 
Hence  nothing  is  more  natural  than  that  they  should  be 
very  loath  to  enter  upon  so  very  undesirable  an  undertak¬ 
ing  ;  for  in  decreeing  it  they  would  necessarily  be  resolving 
to  bring  upon  themselves  all  the  horrors  of  war.  And  in 
their  case  this  implies  such  consequences  as  these :  to  have 
to  fight  in  their  own  persons ;  to  supply  the  costs  of  the 
war  out  of  their  own  property ;  to  have  sorrowfully  to  re¬ 
pair  the  devastation  which  it  leaves  behind ;  and,  as  a 
crowning  evil,  to  have  to  take  upon  themselves  at  the  end 
a  burden  of  debt  which  will  go  on  embittering  peace  itseif. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  a  constitution  where  the  subject  is  not 
a  voting  member  of  the  State,  resolution  to  go  to  war  is  a 
matter  of  the  smallest  concern  in  the  world.  For  in  this 
case  the  ruler,  who  as  such  is  not  a  mere  citizen,  but  the 
owner  of  the  State,  need  not  in  the  least  suffer  personally 
by  war,  nor  has  he  to  sacrifice  his  pleasures  of  the  table  or 
of  the  chase,  or  his  palaces.  He  can  therefore  resolve  for 


INTRODUCTION 


Vll 


war  from  insignificant  reasons,  as  if  it  were  but  a  hunting 
expedition  5  and  he  may  leave  the  justification  of  it  without 
concern  to  the  diplomatic  body.” 

It  is  certainly  true  that  the  development  of  the  idea  of  in¬ 
ternational  arbitration  has  been  coincident  with  the  growth 
of  modern  democracy.  The  peace  movement  altogether  is 
strong  in  precisely  those  nations  where  freedom  obtains  and 
self-government  is  stable.  The  founders  of  our  republic, 
Washington,  Jefferson,  Franklin,  were  the  most  illustrious 
group  of  men  in  their  day  who  condemned  the  war  system 
and  urged  its  supplanting  by  the  methods  of  law  and  peace. 
The  peace  movement  as  an  organized  movement  naturally 
began  here,  in  1815.  It  was  no  accident  which  made  the 
United  States  and  England  the  leaders  of  the  nations  in  the 
preaching  and  the  practice  of  arbitration.  With  Jay’s  Treaty, 
in  1794,  the  history  of  modern  arbitration  may  fairly  be  said 
to  begin ;  and  it  was  no  accident  which  brought  about  the 
conference  at  Washington  in  1896,  looking  to  a  permanent 
system  of  arbitration  between  these  two  greatest  republics 
in  the  world.  It  was  the  logic  of  Kant’s  philosophy  and  of 
the  nature  of  political  things.  Such  a  union  as  it  was  the 
object  of  that  memorable  Washington  conference  to  bring 
about  should  logically  extend  by  the  addition,  first,  of  those 
nations  which  have  advanced  farthest  in  self-government  or 
have  become  republics  in  the  sense  in  which  Kant  uses  that 
term.  It  was  natural  for  the  French  republic  to  unite  with 
Great  Britain  in  the  arbitration  treaty  of  1903,  which  has 
prompted  so  many  similar  treaties.  The  contributions  of 
Switzerland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  Scandinavian  repub¬ 
lics  (for  republics  all  are)  to  the  movement  for  broader  arbi¬ 
tration  have  been  notable ;  and  any  baitings  on  our  own 
part  have  been  at  times  when  imperialist  temptations  have 
prejudiced  our  real  democracy. 


Vlll 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Tlie  republican  constitution  of  Kant’s  thought  is  not  of 
course  to  be  confounded  with  the  democratic  constitution. 
Self-government  is  often  better  realized  under  monarchical 
than  under  democratic  forms.  ”  Republicanism  regarded  as 
the  constitutive  principle  of  a  State  is  the  political  severance 
of  the  executive  power  of  the  government  from  the  legisla¬ 
tive  power.  Despotism  is  in  principle  the  irresponsible  ex¬ 
ecutive  administration  of  the  State  by  laws  laid  down  and 
enacted  by  the  same  power  that  administers  them,  the  ruler 
exercising  his  own  private  will  as  if  it  were  the  public  will. 
If  the  mode  of  government  is  to  conform  to  the  idea  of 
right,  it  must  embody  the  representative  system ;  for  in 
this  system  alone  is  a  really  republican  government  possible. 
Without  representation,  no  government  can  possibly  be  any 
other  than  despotic  and  arbitrary.”  Great  Britain  is  to-day 
among  the  leading  nations  of  the  world  the  truest  republic, 
according  to  Kant’s  definition,  after  our  own  republic,  if  we 
may  venture  to  claim  preeminence,  because  her  people  are 
most  truly  and  completely  self-governed.  There  was  never  a 
more  conspicuous  instance  of  failure  to  distinguish  between 
names  and  realities  than  that  of  our  Secretary  of  State’s  char¬ 
acterization  of  the  issue  between  England  and  V enezuela,  in 
his  correspondence  with  the  English  government  in  1895,  as 
a  collision  between  monarchical  institutions  and  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  self-government.  England  and  the  United  States, 
one  hemmed  and  hampered  still  by  the  specter  of  a  crown 
and  the  social  power  of  a  hereditary  aristocracy,  the  other 
shackled  and  encumbered  in  so  high  degree  by  a  lawless 
plutocracy  and  consuming  mammonism,  nevertheless  stand 
side  by  side  as  the  leading  exemplars  of  representative 
government  in  the  modern  world ;  and  the  logic  of  history 
and  of  the  profoundest  political  philosophy  decrees  the  es¬ 
tablishment  between  these  republics  of  a  permanent  system 


INTRODUCTION 


IX 


of  unreserved  international  arbitration,  with  the  sure  pledge 
and  prospect  that  such  a  union  will  extend  wider  and  wider 
until  it  eventuates  in  the  ”  universal  cosmopolitical  institu¬ 
tion  ”  of  Kant’s  prophecy. 

It  was  in  1784,  almost  a  dozen  years  before  the  publi¬ 
cation  of  "  Eternal  Peace,”  that  Kant  used  this  prophetic 
term  and  confidently  foretold  the  end  of  wars  and  the  reign 
of  international  law,  in  his  essay  here  published  under  the 
title  of  "  The  Natural  Principle  of  the  Political  Order,  con¬ 
sidered  in  connection  with  the  Idea  of  a  Universal  Cosmo¬ 
political  History.”  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  this  essay 
appeared  five  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  one  year  after  the  Treaty  of  Paris  recog¬ 
nized  the  success  of  the  American  Revolution,  in  which 
Kant  had  taken  so  deep  an  interest.  "  Eternal  Peace  ” 
was  published  just  after  the  peace  of  Basel  had  recog- 
.  nized  the  French  Republic,  seeming  to  inaugurate  a  new 
era  of  peace  in  Europe.  The  later  essay  was  received  with 
far  the  greater  interest  at  the  time,  fifteen  hundred  copies, 
we  read,  being  sold  in  a  few  weeks,  and  a  second  edition 
appearing  the  following  year ;  and  it  is  a  celebrated  essay, 
while  the  former  essay  is  but  little  known  save  by  special 
students  of  Kant.  Yet  this  former  essay  is  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  works  ever  written ;  and  in  the  revival  of 
interest  in  political  speculation  which  we  are  now  happily 
witnessing,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  at  last  receive 
that  attention  among  ourselves  which  it  deserves.  The 
work  is  much  more  than  a  political  essay.  It  is  a  work 
which  may  be  compared,  on  one  important  side,  with  such 
an  American  treatise  as  Fiske’s  "  Destiny  of  Man.”  It  is  a 
survey  of  the  whole  movement  of  nature  and  of  human 
history,  with  a  view  to  determine  the  final  end ;  and  its 
spirit  and  outcome  are  singularly  like  those  of  Mr.  Fiske’s 


X 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


treatise,  which  it  preceded  by  a  hundred  years.  It  sees 
clearly  that  a  serious  study  of  evolution  tends  to  the  tele¬ 
ological  principle ;  a  study  of  the  character  and  destiny  of 
man,  to  the  idea  of  God.  Nothing  is  more  needed  at  this 
time  than  the  inculcation  of  precisely  this  philosophy  in  the 
field  of  our  politics,  as  well  as  of  our  natural  science.  It  is 
a  question  whether  our  modern  doctrines  of  evolution  have 
not  in  both  fields  done  as  much  harm  as  good  through  hav¬ 
ing  come  in  predominantly,  in  Germany  as  well  as  in  Eng¬ 
land  and  America,  upon  the  saddle  of  a  shallow  philosophy 
of  secondary  cause. 

The  following  are  the  principal  of  the  nine  propositions 
which  Kant  lays  down,  and  to  the  unfolding  and  defense  of 
which  his  essay  is  devoted :  "All  the  capacities  implanted 
in  a  creature  by  nature  are  destined  to  unfold  themselves, 
completely  and  conformably  to  their  end,  in  the  course  of 
time.”  "  In  man,  as  the  only  rational  creature  on  earth, 
those  natural  capacities  which  are  directed  toward  the  use 
of  his  reason  could  be  completely  developed  only  in  the 
species,  and  not  in  the  individual.”  "  The  means  which 
nature  employs  to  bring  about  the  development  of  all  the 
capacities  implanted  in  men  is  their  mutual  antagonism  in 
society,  but  only  so  far  as  this  antagonism  becomes  at  length 
the  cause  of  an  order  among  them  that  is  regulated  by  law.” 
"  The  greatest  practical  problem  for  the  human  race,  to  the 
solution  of  which  it  is  compelled  by  nature,  is  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  a  civil  society  universally  administering  right  ac¬ 
cording  to  law.”  "  The  problem  of  the  establishment  of  a 
perfect  civil  constitution  is  dependent  on  the  problem  of 
the  regulation  of  the  external  relations  between  the  States 
conformably  to  law ;  and  without  the  solution  of  this  latter 
problem  it  cannot  be  solved.”  "  The  history  of  the  human 
race,  viewed  as  a  whole,  may  be  regarded  as  the  realization 


INTRODUCTION 


xi 


of  a  hidden  plan  of  nature  to  bring  about  a  political  consti¬ 
tution  internally  and,  for  tliis  purpose,  also  externally  per¬ 
fect,  as  the  only  status  in  which  all  the  capacities  implanted 
by  her  in  mankind  can  be  fully  developed.” 

This  is  a  remarkable  body  of  doctrine ;  and  the  careful 
study  of  this  essay  is  commended  to  every  inquirer  for  the 
central  philosophical  principles  of  the  peace  movement, 
which  at  bottom  is  the  movement  toward  the  World  State, 
the  organization  of  the  family  of  nations  as  we  have  meas¬ 
urably  organized  the  nation.  The  essay  throughout  is  in¬ 
stinct  with  the  principle  of  progress  as  the  cardinal  principle 
for  the  interpretation  of  history,  a  subject  to  which  Kant 
a  few  years  afterward  devoted  a  special  essay.  "  The  idea 
of  human  history,”  he  says,  "  viewed  as  founded  upon  the 
assumption  of  a  universal  plan  in  nature,  gives  us  a  new 
ground  of  hope,  opening  to  us  a  consoling  view  of  the  future, 
in  which  the  human  race  appears  in  the  far  distance  as  hav¬ 
ing  worked  itself  up  to  a  condition  in  which  all  the  germs 
implanted  in  it  by  nature  will  be  fully  developed  and  its 
destiny  here  on  earth  fulfilled.  Such  a  justifica  tion  of  nature 
—  or  rather,  let  us  say,  of  Providence  —  is  no  insignificant 
motive  for  choosing  a  particular  point  of  view  in  contemplat¬ 
ing  the  course  of  the  world.  For  what  avails  it  to  magnify 
the  glory  and  wisdom  of  the  creation  in  the  irrational  do¬ 
main  of  nature,  and  to  recommend  it  to  devout  contempla¬ 
tion,  if  that  part  of  the  great  display  of  the  supreme  wisdom 
which  presents  the  end  of  it  all  in  the  history  of  the  human 
race  is  to  be  viewed  as  only  furnishing  perpetual  objections 
to  that  glory  and  wisdom  ?  The  spectacle  of  history,  if  thus 
viewed,  would  compel  us  to  turn  away  our  eyes  from  it 
against  our  will ;  and  the  despair  of  ever  finding  a  perfect 
rational  purpose  in  its  movement  would  reduce  us  to  hope 
for  it,  if  at  all,  only  in  another  world.” 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


*  • 

Xll 

This  is  precisely  in  the  spirit  of  the  glowing  final  pages 
of  those  most  modern  books,  Mr.  Fiske’s  "  Destiny  of  Man  ” 
and  "  The  Idea  of  God,”  which  proved  the  precursors  of 
many  salutary  popular  presentations  of  evolutionary  biology 
and  sociology  in  the  terms  of  a  comprehensive  and  solvent 
idealism.  Kant  believes  in  Providence,  in  God,  in  nature 
and  in  history  informed  by  divine  purpose,  in  the  omnipo¬ 
tence  of  the  right;  he  believes  that  the  fact  that  a  thing  ought 
to  be  is  the  sure  reason  that  it  will  be,  that  "  what  is  valid 
on  rational  grounds  as  a  theory  is  also  valid  and  good  for 
practice,”  is  the  only  thing  that  is  ultimately  good  for  prac¬ 
tice,  and  is  inevitably  bound  to  be  reduced  to  practice  in 
due  order. 

The  consideration  of  the  rational  law  of  progress  here 
stated  brings  Kant,  in  his  essay  here  published  under  the 
title  of  "  The  Principle  of  Progress,”  to  the  idea  of  inter¬ 
nationalism.  He  shows  how  the  lawlessness  and  caprice  of 
individuals  involve  evils  which  alone  are  sufficient  to  compel 
the  establishment  of  the  State ;  "  and  in  like  manner,”  he 
says,  "  the  evils  arising  from  constant  wars  by  which  the 
States  seek  to  reduce  or  subdue  each  other  must  bring  them 
at  last,  even  against  their  will,  also  to  enter  into  a  universal 
or  cosmop  o  lit  leal  constitution .”  This  may  not,  he  held,  as¬ 
sume  the  form  of  a  universal  commonwealth  or  empire 
under  one  head,  but  of  "  a  federation  regulated  by  law  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  right  of  nations  as  concerted  in  common.” 
In  this  essay  as  powerfully  as  in  the  earlier  essay  on  "  The 
Natural  Principle  of  the  Political  Order  ”  and  in  "  Eternal 
Peace  ”  does  he  picture  the  irrationality  and  monstrosity  of 
war  and  assure  himself  that,  just  so  surely  as  the  world 
becomes  republican,  so  surely  will  war  yield  to  arbitration 
and  to  federation.  "  When  the  decision  of  the  question  of 
war  falls  to  the  people  [it  is  essentially  the  same  word 


INTRODUCTION 


xiii 

as  that  already  quoted  from  "  Eternal  Peace  ”],  neither 
will  the  desire  of  aggrandizement  nor  mere  verbal  injuries 
be  likely  to  induce  them  to  put  themselves  in  danger  of 
personal  privation  and  want  by  inflicting  upon  themselves 
the  calamities  of  war,  which  the  sovereign  in  his  own  per¬ 
son  escapes.  And  thus  posterity,  no  longer  oppressed  by 
undeserved  burdens,  and  owing  not  to  the  direct  love  of 
others  for  them,  but  only  to  the  rational  self-love  of  each 
age  for  itself,  will  be  able  to  make  progress  in  moral  rela¬ 
tions.  For  each  commonwealth,  now  become  unable  to  injure 
any  other  by  violence,  must  maintain  itself  by  right  alone ; 
and  it  may  hope  on  real  grounds  that  the  others,  being  con¬ 
stituted  like  itself,  will  then  come,  on  occasions  of  need,  to 
its  aid.” 

It  was  but  yesterday,  we  remember  as  we  read  this  firm 
prophecy  of  a  century  ago,  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  predicted 
the  early  coming  of  the  time  when  nations  would  run  to¬ 
gether  to  stop  a  war  as  readily  and  naturally  as  neighbors 
run  to  put  out  a  fire ;  and  is  not  the  disarmament  of  the 
nations  likely  to  come  —  Kant’s  declaration  makes  us  ask 
the  question  with  more  definite  confidence  —  through  some 
sort  of  League  of  Peace  between  a  few  great  powers  insur¬ 
ing  each  other  against  disaster  through  any  possible  attack 
upon  any  of  them  as  a  result  of  brave  and  trustful  ventures 
in  the  reduction  of  its  armaments  ? 

There  is  no  possible  remedy  against  the  evils  of  war, 
Kant  declares,  but  "  a  system  of  international  right  founded 
upon  public  laws  conjoined  with  power,  to  which  every  State 
must  submit,  according  to  the  analogy  of  the  civil  or  polit¬ 
ical  right  of  individuals  in  any  one  State.”  To  all  skepti¬ 
cism  about  this  program  and  to  the  allegation  that  it  has 
always  been  laughed  at  by  statesmen  and  still  more  by 
sovereigns,  as  an  idea  fit  only  for  the  schools  from  which 


XIV 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


it  takes  its  rise,  Kant  answers  roundly :  "I  trust  to  a  theory 
which  is  based  upon  the  principle  of  right  as  determining 
what  the  relation  between  men  and  States  ought  to  he ,  and 
which  lays  down  to  these  earthly  gods  the  maxim  that  they 
ought  so  to  proceed  in  their  disputes  that  such  a  universal 
International  State  may  be  introduced,  and  to  assume  it 
therefore  as  not  only  possible  in  practice,  but  such  as  may 
yet  be  presented  in  reality.” 

Thus  everywhere  that  Kant  discusses  political  relations 
does  the  great  vision  of  internationalism  and  of  universal 
peace  secured  by  law,  just  as  peace  is  secured  in  the  State 
because  justice  is  dependent  on  the  court  and  not  on  the  fist, 
hover  before  him.  Leaving  the  essay  on  "  Progress,”  we  must, 
before  returning  to  "Eternal  Peace,”  revert  once  more  to  the 
pages  of  "  The  Natural  Principle  of  the  Political  Order,” 
for  the  sake  of  citing  a  noteworthy  passage  already  hinted 
at,  following  one  of  Kant’s  powerful  arraignments  of  war 
as  wasting  so  ruthlessly  the  treasures  which  might  be 
applied  to  the  advancement  of  enlightenment  and  the 
highest  good  of  the  world,  as  burdening  peoples  with  debts 
almost  impossible  to  extinguish,  and  as  settling  nothing 
finally  and  reliably,  since  might  never  makes  right  and 
every  unjust  issue  in  war  is  the  sure  seed  of  future  war. 
Here  again,  in  his  consideration  of  the  economic  issues  of 
the  war  system,  does  he  come  to  the  ground  given  such 
peculiar  attention  by  the  founders  of  our  republic,  especially 
Jefferson  and  Franklin.  So  intimate  have  the  political  and 
trade  relations  of  nations  become,  he  urges,  —  and  how 
vastly  truer  has  the  intervening  century  made  it!  —  that 
every  political  disturbance  of  any  State  becomes  a  disturb¬ 
ance  of  all,  which  are  thus  more  and  more  forced  by  the 
common  danger  to  offer  themselves  as  arbiters.  "  In  doing 
so,”  says  Kant,  with  marvelous  insight  and  impressiveness, 


INTRODUCTION 


xv 


"  they  are  beginning  to  arrange  for  a  great  future  political 
body,  such  as  the  world  has  never  yet  seen.  Although  this 
political  body  may  as  yet  exist  only  in  a  rough  outline, 
nevertheless  a  feeling  begins,  as  it  were,  to  stir  in  all  its 
members,  each  of  which  has  a  common  interest  in  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  the  whole.  And  this  may  well  inspire  the  hope 
that,  after  many  political  revolutions  and  transformations, 
the  highest  purpose  of  nature  will  be  at  last  realized  in  the 
establishment  of  a  universal  cosniopolitical  institution,  in  the 
bosom  of  which  all  the  original  capacities  and  endowments 
of  the  human  race  will  be  unfolded  and  developed.” 

Kant’s  "Eternal  Peace,”  which  has  a  somewhat  scholastic 
form,  opens  with  a  section  containing  several  preliminary 
articles  of  peace  between  States,  such  as :  "  Ko  conclusion 
of  peace  shall  be  held  to  be  valid  when  it  has  been  made 
with  the  secret  reservation  of  the  material  for  a  future  war.” 
"  Standing  armies  shall  be  entirely  abolished  in  the  course 
of  time.”  "  No  national  debts  shall  be  contracted  in  connec¬ 
tion  with  the  external  affairs  of  the  States.”  "  No  State 
shall  intermeddle  by  force  with  the  constitution  or  govern¬ 
ment  of  another  State.”  The  reasons  for  these  articles, 
touching  the  principal  causes  of  war  in  his  own  time  as 
well  as  in  ours,  he  elaborates  at  length. 

As  touching  especially  Kant’s  sharp  exposure  of  the  men¬ 
ace  of  secret  treaties  and  diplomacy,  we  Americans  may 
dwell  with  pride  upon  the  spirit  and  practice  which  have 
ever,  and  with  growing  influence,  marked  our  own  diplo¬ 
macy,  and  upon  the  strong  demands  for  the  utmost  publicity 
in  international  action  made  by  such  leaders  as  President 
Eliot. 

The  menacing  condition  following  the  war  of  1 894  between 
China  and  Japan,  with  the  interposition  of  the  European 
powers  which  ensued,  illustrated  the  evil  of  secrecy  which 


XY1 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Kant  condemned,  and  out  of  it  in  some  measure  grew  the 
war  between  Japan  and  Russia  ten  years  later.  The  Alsace- 
Lorraine  situation,  created  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  in 
1871,  still  disturbs  Europe.  The  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  in 
1905  contained  clauses  dangerous  to  future  peace,  happily 
removed  by  subsequent  agreements.  The  Treaty  of  Lausanne 
in  1912  was  largely  occupied  in  removing  material  for  future 
war ;  and  European  diplomacy  is  striving  for  similar  ends 
in  the  Balkans  to-day.  The  world’s  leaders  in  statesmanship 
and  finance  alike  are  coming  to  Kant’s  position  concerning 
war  loans,  to  which  subject  the  third  Hague  Conference  is 
likely  to  devote  more  explicit  attention  than  has  ever  before 
been  given  it  by  an  international  conference.  Kant’s  im¬ 
peachment  of  treacherous  and  inhuman  practices  in  war 
finds  impressive  and  detailed  indorsement  in  the  provisions 
of  the  Hague  conventions  regulating  war;  and  in  other  ways 
it  might  strikingly  be  shown  how  the  theory  and  practice  of 
nations  are  gradually  catching  up  with  the  insight  and  mo¬ 
rality  of  the  Konigsberg  prophet.  Every  one  of  his  specific 
injunctions  has  either  been  practically  realized  or  recognized 
as  obligatory  in  principle  by  modern  international  action. 

But  it  is  in  the  second  section  of  "  Eternal  Peace,”  devoted 
to  the  definitive  articles  of  a  perpetual  peace  between  States, 
That  Kant’s  three  great  constructive  principles  are  stated. 
(T1  lose  principles  are  (1)  that  the  civil  constitution  of  every 
State  shall  be  republican ;  (2)  that  all  international  right 
must  be  grounded  upon  a  federation  of  free  States;  and  (3) 
that  right  between  nations  must  be  limited  to  the  conditions 
of  universal  hospitality.  The  balance  of  the  essay  is  devoted 
to  discussions  of  the  guarantee  of  perpetual  peace,  the  pres¬ 
ent  discordance  between  morals  and  politics,  and  the  accord¬ 
ance  of  politics  with  morals  according  to  the  transcendental 
conception  of  public  right.  The  guarantee  of  perpetual  peace 


INTRODUCTION 


XYll 


is  furnished,  Kant  maintains,  "  by  no  less  a  power  than  the 
great  artist  Nature  herself  ” ;  and  he  surveys  again  the  course 
of  evolution,  with  all  its  struggles  and  antagonisms,  to  show 
that  just  as  individual  men,  with  all  their  conflicting  interests 
and  inclinations,  are  forced  out  of  a  condition  of  aloofness 
and  lawlessness  into  the  condition  of  a  State,  so  individual 
nations  are  being  gradually  forced  toward  arbitration  and 
federation  by  the  sheer  dangers  and  evils  of  the  present 
disorder,  self-interest  itself  pointing  the  same  way  which 
morality  commands.  To  the  objection  of  the  practical  poli¬ 
tician,  that  great  reforms  theoretically  admirable  cannot  be 
realized  because  men  are  what  they  are,  Kant  wisely  answers 
that  many  have  large  knowledge  of  men  without  yet  truly 
knowing  the  nature  of  man.  The  process  of  creation  cannot 
be  justified  if  we  assume  that  the  human  race  never  will 
or  can  be  better.  Kant’s  cardinal  position  is  that  the 
pure  principles  of  right  and  justice  have  objective  reality 
and  can  be  realized  in  fact,  that  it  is  precisely  our  vocation 
to  proceed  about  their  realization  as  fast  as  we  apprehend 
them,  and  that  failure  to  do  this  is  really  opposed  to  nature 
and  is  dangerous  politics.  "A  true  political  philosophy  can¬ 
not  advance  a  step  without  first  paying  homage  to  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  morals.  The  union  of  politics  with  morals  cuts  in 
two  the  knots  which  politics  alone  cannot  untie.”  When 
men  and  States  once  make  up  their  minds  to  do  their  clear 
duty  instead  of  being  selfish  and  specious,  then  things  which 
seem  hard  will  rapidly  become  simple.  "  Seek  ye  first  the 
kingdom  of  pure  practical  reason  and  its  righteousness ,”  is 
Kant’s  exhortation,  "  and  then  will  your  object,  the  benefit 
of  perpetual  peace,  be  added  unto  you.” 

Self-government,  a  federation  of  free  States,  universal  hos¬ 
pitality,  —  these  are  the  features  of  Kant’s  great  program. 
"Every  form  of  government  which  is  not  representative,” 


XV111 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


he  declares,  "  is  a  spurious  form  of  government.”  "  For 
States  viewed  in  relation  to  each  other  [thus  he  concludes 
his  discussion  of  federation]  there  can  be  only  one  way, 
according  to  reason,  of  emerging  from  that  lawless  condition 
which  contains  nothing  but  occasions  of  war.  Just  as  in  the 
case  of  individual  men,  reason  would  drive  them  to  give  up 
their  savage,  lawless  freedom,  to  accommodate  themselves  to 
public  coercive  laws,  and  thus  to  form  an  ever-growing  State 
of  Nations,  such  as  would  at  last  embrace  all  the  nations  of 
the  earth.”  His  final  words  in  the  section  upon  universal 
hospitality  are  these :  "  The  social  relations  between  the 
various  peoples  of  the  world  have  now  advanced  every¬ 
where  so  far  that  a  violation  of  right  in  one  place  of  the 
earth  is  felt  all  over  it.  Hence  the  idea  of  a  cosmopolitical 
right  of  the  whole  human  race  is  no  fantastic  or  overstrained 
mode  of  representing  right,  but  is  a  necessary  completion  of 
the  unwritten  code  which  carries  national  and  international 
right  to  a  consummation  in  the  public  law  of  mankind.” 

The  (British)  Peace  Society  published  a  translation  of 
"  Eternal  Peace  ”  by  J.  H.  Morell  some  twenty  years  ago ; 
and  later  the  American  Peace  Society  published  a  translation 
of  the  same  by  Dr.  Benjamin  F.  Trueblood.  In  1891  the 
essay  was  translated,  along  with  Kant’s  other  popular  politi¬ 
cal  essays,  by  W.  Hastie  of  Edinburgh,  who  had  previously 
translated  Kant’s  "  Philosophy  of  Law,”  and  it  was  issued 
in  a  little  volume  (Edinburgh  :  T.  &  T.  Clark)  entitled  Kant’s 
"  Principles  of  Politics,”  with  a  scholarly  and  valuable  in¬ 
troduction.  Besides  "  Eternal  Peace,”  "  The  Principles  of 
the  Political  Order,”  and  "  The  Principle  of  Progress,”  al¬ 
ready  referred  to,  this  volume  also  contains  the  essay  on 
"Principles  of  Political  Right,”  written  in  1793,  which  the 
translator  properly  characterizes  as  the  philosophical  counter¬ 
part  and  ultimate  expression  of  the  American  Declaration  of 


INTRODUCTION 


xix 


Independence  and  the  French  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of 
Man.  "  The  one  thinker,”  says  Mr.  Hastie,  "  who  completely 
understood  the  purpose  and  end  of  the  whole  movement 
[of  the  eighteenth-century  revolutions,  viewed  as  the  culmi¬ 
nation  of  the  political  science  of  the  centuries]  and  who  was 
capable  of  giving  it  its  profoundest  and  largest  expression 
was  Immanuel  Kant.”  The  obligations  of  English  readers 
of  Kant  to  Mr.  Hastie,  who  also  published  a  volume  of  trans¬ 
lations  of  Kant’s  papers  on  cosmogony,  is  very  great.  The 
present  volume  is  made  up  from  the  translations  published 
in  his  little  volume  on  Kant’s  "Principles  of  Politics,”  to¬ 
gether  with  a  brief  section  from  his  translation  of  Kant’s 
"  Philosophy  of  Law.”  His  titles  are  sometimes  free  and  pop¬ 
ular,  but  have  here  usually  been  respected.  A  few  changes 
have  been  made  in  his  text ;  and  certain  notes,  which  he 
did  not  translate,  have  been  taken  from  the  translation 
of  "  Perpetual  Peace  ”  by  Miss  Mary  Campbell  Smith  (Swan 
Sonnenschein  and  Co.,  1903),  which  was  the  first  complete 
English  translation  of  that  famous  essay  to  include  all  the 
notes.  Miss  Smith’s  translation  is  accompanied  by  an  intro¬ 
duction  longer  than  the  essay  itself ;  and  this  introduction  is 
distinctly  worth  the  attention  of  the  student  of  Kant  and  of 
the  peace  movement,  on  account  of  its  careful  survey  of  the 
advance  of  that  movement  in  history  and  the  varied  factors 
in  evolution  which  have  contributed  to  it.  An  entirely  new 
industrial  and  political  status  has  come  in  international  re¬ 
lations  through  the  steady  development  of  those  forces  which 
Kant  outlined.  Once  war  had  its  profits  for  victors  ;  but  to¬ 
day,  the  writer  well  emphasizes,  "war  is  death  to  the  indus¬ 
trial  interests  of  a  nation.  It  is  vain  to  talk,  in  the  language 
of  past  centuries,  of  trade  between  civilized  countries  being 
advanced  and  markets  opened  up  or  enlarged  by  its  means.” 
Our  age  sets  a  higher  value  upon  human  life,  in  this  respect 


XX 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


coming  closer  to  that  "feeling  for  humanity”  which  domi¬ 
nated  Kant’s  heart  and  his  political  philosophy.  Interna¬ 
tional  law  has  developed  amazingly  since  Kant  wrote,  and 
the  First  Hague  Conference  marked  an  epoch.  "  The  federa¬ 
tion  of  Europe  will  follow  the  federation  of  Germany  and 
of  Italy,”  because  thinkers  and  bodies  of  thinkers  are  more 
and  more  being  stirred  by  Kant’s  penetrating  and  pervasive 
conception  of  the  federation  of  the  world,  the  imperative  of 
justice,  and  the  unity  of  mankind.  One  danger  our  writer 
points  out  —  as  others  in  this  day  have  frequently  been 
obliged  solemnly  to  emphasize  —  which  Kant  perhaps  did 
not  adequately  foresee.  With  the  passing  of  military  power 
from  kings  to  people  and  the  cessation  of  dynastic  wars, 
something  of  the  passion  for  war  has  also  passed  from 
kings  to  people,  and  repeatedly  governments  are  now  found 
more  lawful,  self-controlled  and  just  than  the  populace. 
"  In  the  people  the  love  of  peace  is  strong,  but  so  too  is 
the  love  of  a  fight,  the  love  of  victory.”  Just  here  is  the 
field  for  education  in  international  relations  and  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  peace. 

It  was  Kant’s  intention  to  crown  his  philosophical 
achievements  by  a  "  System  of  Politics,”  worked  out  in 
accordance  with  the  general  principles  of  his  philosophy ; 
but  he  was  reluctantly  compelled  in  his  seventy-seventh 
year  to  abandon  this  long-cherished  intention.  But  the 
political  essays  which  he  wrote,  and  which  Mr.  Hastie 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  English  reader  in  such  admirable 
form,  indicate  sufficiently  what  the  lines  of  his  system  of 
politics  would  have  been.  It  is  an  impressive  fact  that  the 
interests  of  social  and  political  reconstruction  were  those 
which  in  the  closing  period  of  his  full  life  chiefly  engaged 
the  greatest  thinker  of  the  modern  world.  For  that  Im¬ 
manuel  Kant  was.  He  revolutionized  philosophy.  His 


INTRODUCTION 


xxi 


contributions  to  physical  science  were  hardly  less  brilliant 
and  fruitful  than  his  contributions  to  metaphysics.  He  was 
one  of  the  greatest  mathematicians  and  astronomers  of  all 
time.  To  him,  and  not  to  Laplace,  belongs  the  merit  of  the 
origin  of  the  nebular  theory.  Mr.  Hastie  is  not  extravagant 
in  saying  that,  had  he  never  written  anything  but  his  "Uni¬ 
versal  History  of  Nature  and  Theory  of  the  Heavens,”  he 
would  have  ranked  as  the  first  of  the  modern  evolutionists 
and  the  founder  of  scientific  cosmology.  His  work  in  ethics 
was  yet  greater  and  more  far-reaching  in  its  results  than 
his  work  in  physics.  To  quote  Mr.  Hastie  again,  referring 
to  Kant’s  later,  practical  works  :  "In  all  these  works  he 
shows  himself  to  be  the  universal  philosopher  of  humanity, 
the  greatest  of  the  modern  moralists,  and  the  initiator  of 
a  new  era  of  political  science.” 

It  is  to  Kant’s  greatness  on  this  side  that  men  are  now 
awaking  as  never  before.  The  philosophers  have  long  been 
shouting,  "  Back  to  Kant !  ”  This  now  begins  to  be  the  cry 
of  the  politician  and  the  humanitarian.  "  I  have  not  yet 
lost  my  feeling  for  humanity,”  were  the  great  philosopher’s 
last  words.  It  was  to  humanity,  to  the  State,  to  the  peace 
and  federation  of  the  world,  that  his  last  labors  were  given. 
"  By  inclination,”  he  once  said,  "  I  am  an  inquirer.  I  feel 
all  the  thirst  for  knowledge  and  the  eager  unrest  of  striving 
to  advance,  as  well  as  satisfaction  with  every  kind  of  prog¬ 
ress.  There  was  a  time  when  I  thought  all  this  could  form 
the  glory  of  mankind ;  and  I  despised  the  rabble  who  know 
nothing.  Rousseau  brought  me  to  the  right  view.  This 
blinding  superiority  vanished.  I  learned  to  honor  men  ;  and 
I  should  regard  myself  as  much  more  useless  than  the  com¬ 
mon  laborers,  did  I  not  believe  that  this  way  of  thinking 
could  communicate  a  value  to  all  others  in  establishing  the 
rights  of  mankind.” 


XXII 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


It  is  the  logic  of  events,  of  history  and  progress,  which 
has  now  brought  the  world  to  the  necessity  and  the  deter¬ 
mination  of  practically  and  definitely  establishing  the  reign 
of  peace  and  international  law.  But  it  should  be  an  inspira¬ 
tion  and  a  reassurance  to  all  who  are  working  for  this  high 
end  to  know  that  this  is  the  logic,  the  prophecy  and  the 
program  of  the  greatest  philosopher  of  modern  times. 
"  England,”  says  the  English  translator  of  these  political 
essays  of  Kant,  "  has  acted  out  the  principles  which  Kant 
has  thought  out  and  held  up  for  universal  imitation  and 
embodiment ;  and  this  holds  even  more  literally  of  the  New 
England  of  America.  In  Kant  the  student  will  find  the 
fundamental  principles  of  all  the  best  political  and  social 
science  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  soundest  exposition 
of  constitutional  government,  and  the  first  clear  adumbra¬ 
tion  of  the  great  doctrines  of  federation  and  universal  law, 
which  are  now  stirring  in  the  hearts  of  the  peoples.” 

It  is  because  this  last  is  so  true,  and  because  the  writer 
was  undoubtedly  correct  in  his  belief  that  "  the  New  Eng¬ 
land  of  America,” — by  which  he  meant  the  United  States,— 
had  preeminently  acted  out  the  political  principles  of  Kant, 
that  this  collection  of  his  international  writings  should  here 
receive  a  peculiar  welcome.  The  principles  of  our  founders 
and  the  principles  of  our  federal  organization  are  alike  a 
prophecy  and  a  preparation  for  the  international  polity,  the 
universal  peace  and  order  and  cooperation,  of  Kant’s  phi¬ 
losophy.  Our  family  of  states  anticipates  the  family  of  na¬ 
tions,  and  the  supreme  court  of  our  federation  anticipates 
the  supreme  court  of  the  world.  A  Congress  of  Nations  to 
create  a  Court  of  the  Nations  to  interpret  and  administer 
the  law  of  the  nations  Avas  the  program  and  demand  of  our 
American  delegates  at  the  great  International  Peace  Con¬ 
gresses  in  Europe  two  generations  ago;  and  this  "American 


INTRODUCTION 


XXlll 


way,”  as  our  European  friends  then  popularly  called  it, 
simply  emphasized  thus  long  in  advance  the  cardinal  fea¬ 
tures  of  The  Hague  programs  of  to-day.  But  these  American 
international  leaders  of  1850  knew  well  their  obligations  for 
their  doctrine.  "  The  name  of  Immanuel  Kant,”  said  Eliliu 
Burritt  at  the  Frankfort  Congress  in  that  year,  "is  identified 
with  it,  and  it  would  be  an  act  of  injustice  to  the  memory 
of  that  remarkable  man  to  ascribe  to  the  American  mind  a 
plan  which  he  had  presented  to  the  world  with  such  clear¬ 
ness  and  force  before  it  was  ever  mentioned  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Atlantic.”  He  cpiotes  Kant’s  statement  as  to  the 
kind  of  world  federation  which  at  that  writing  the  great 
thinker  had  in  mind,  however  closer  and  more  organic  was 
the  "  universal  cosmopolitical  institution  ”  contemplated  in 
other  passages :  "  What  we  mean  to  propose  is  a  General  N 
Congress  of  Nations  of  which  both  the  meeting  and  dura¬ 
tion  are  to  depend  entirely  upon  the  sovereign  wills  of  the 
League,  and  not  an  indissoluble  union,  like  that  which  ex¬ 
ists  among  the  several  states  of  North  America,  founded 
upon  a  political  covenant.  Such  a  Congress  and  such  a 
League  are  the  only  means  of  realizing  the  idea  of  a  true 
public  law,  according  to  which  the  differences  between 
nations  would  be  determined  by  civil  proceedings,  as  those 
between  individuals  are  determined  by  civil  judicature  in¬ 
stead  of  resorting  to  war,  a  means  of  redress  worthy  only 
of  barbarians.”  % 

Such  a  cooperative  union  of  independent  and  sovereign 
nations  was  all  that  was  contemplated  in  the  "  American 
plan”  of  the  second  quarter  of  the  last  century,  the  program 
proposed  by  Burritt  in  the  European  congresses  and  earlier 
here  by  William  Ladd ;  and  such  only  is  the  form  of 
union  we  may  wisely  work  for  at  The  Hague  to-day,  leav¬ 
ing  the  future  to  determine  the  ultimate  organization  and 


XXIV 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


character  of  the  World  State.  But  whatever  the  genesis  and 
history,  through  Kant’s  inspiration  and  all  inspirations,  the 
inspirations  chiefly  of  our  own  free  and  federal  national 
life,  the  idea  of  international  federation  and  the  World 
State  is  here  among  ourselves  to-day  most  native,  most  com¬ 
mon  and  most  dynamic.  Here  writings  upon  world  organiza¬ 
tion  and  world  law  multiply  fastest ;  and  the  doctrine  of 
Kant  becomes  at  last  the  teaching  of  our  schools.  "  The 
World  State  ”  finds  place  as  the  closing  chapter  in  one  of 
the  most  scholarly  and  popular  textbooks  of  modern  history 
in  our  schools,  showing  the  youthful  student  how  the  long 
processes,  collisions  and  struggles  which  crowd  the  pages 
of  the  past  find  their  justification  and  interpretation  only 
as  we  see  that  they  have  all  been  informed  by  the  increas¬ 
ing  purpose  and  have  been  preparations  for  the  fraternity 
and  cooperation  of  peoples  and  a  true  world  order.  Such 
chapters  will  find  place  to-morrow  in  all  school  histories 
and  in  the  common  books  of  the  people.  Germany,  with  the 
deeper  understanding  born  of  new  experience,  harking  back 
to  her  great  prophet,  will  put  his  truth  into  her  life  and 
into  her  education,  with  that  thoroughness  and  power  which 
made  her  in  the  age  of  her  sovereign  idealism  the  teacher 
and  inspirer  of  the  nations.  In  that  better  and  hastening 
time  of  trust  in  justice,  vision  and  the  broadening  thoughts 
of  men,  to-day’s  reliance  upon  materialism  and  force  will 
appear  to  all  men  as  the  deadly  and  the  futile  thing  it  is, 
and  Immanuel  Kant  will  come  into  his  own. 


Boston,  1914 


EDWIN  D.  MEAD 


I 


THE  NATURAL  PRINCIPLE  OF 
THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 

CONSIDERED  IN  CONNECTION  WITH 

THE  IDEA  OF  A  UNIVERSAL  COSMO- 
POLITICAL  HISTORY 


1784 


I 


' 


. 


. 


THE  NATURAL  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE 
POLITICAL  ORDER 


Whatever  metaphysical  theory  may  be  formed  regard¬ 
ing  the  freedom  of  the  will,  it  holds  equally  true  that 
the  manifestations  of  the  will  in  human  actions  are  de¬ 
termined,  like  all  other  external  events,  by  universal 
natural  laws.  Now  history  is  occupied  with  the  narra¬ 
tion  of  these  manifestations  as  facts,  however  deeply 
their  causes  may  lie  concealed.  Hence  in  view  of  this 
natural  principle  of  regulation,  it  may  be  hoped  that 
when  the  play  of  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  is  ex¬ 
amined  on  the  great  scale  of  universal  history  a  regular 
march  will  be  discovered  in  its  movements ;  and  that,  in 
this  way,  what  appears  to  be  tangled  and  unregulated  in 
the  case  of  individuals  will  be  recognized  in  the  history 
of  the  whole  species  as  a  continually  advancing,  though 
slow,  development  of  its  original  capacities  and  endow¬ 
ments.  Thus  marriages,  births  and  deaths  appear  to  be 
incapable  of  being  reduced  to  any  rule  by  which  their 
numbers  might  be  calculated  beforehand,  on  account  of 
the  great  influence  which  the  free  will  of  man  exercises 
upon  them;  and  yet  the  annual  statistics  of  great  coun¬ 
tries  prove  that  these  events  take  place  according  to 
constant  natural  laws.  In  this  respect  they  may  be  com¬ 
pared  with  the  very  inconstant  changes  of  the  weather, 
which  cannot  be  determined  beforehand  in  detail,  but 

3 


4 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


which  yet,  on  the  whole,  do  not  fail  to  maintain  the 
growth  of  plants,  the  flow  of  rivers  and  other  natural 
processes,  in  a  uniform  uninterrupted  course.  Individual 
men,  and  even  whole  nations,  little  think,  while  they  are 
pursuing  their  own  purposes — each  in  his  own  way  and 
often  one  in  direct  opposition  to  another — that  they  are 
advancing  unconsciously  under  the  guidance  of  a  pur¬ 
pose  of  nature  which  is  unknown  to  them,  and  that  they 
are  toiling  for  the  realization  of  an  end  which,  even  if 
it  were  known  to  them,  might  be  regarded  as  of  little 
importance. 

Men,  viewed  as  a  whole,  are  not  guided  in  their  efforts 
merely  by  instinct,  like  the  lower  animals ;  nor  do  they 
proceed  in  their  actions,  like  the  citizens  of  a  purely 
rational  world,  according  to  a  preconcerted  plan.  And 
so  it  appears  a§  if  no  regular  systematic  history  of 
mankind  would  be  possible,  as  in  the  case,  for  instance, 
of  bees  and  beavers.  Nor  can  one  help  feeling  a  certain 
repugnance  in  looking  at  the  conduct  of  men  as  it  is  ex¬ 
hibited  on  the  great  stage  of  the  world.  With  glimpses 
of  wisdom  appearing  in  individuals  here  and  there,  it 
seems,  on  examining  it  externally  as  if  the  whole  web 
of  human  history  were  woven  out  of  folly  and  childish 
vanity  and  the  frenzy  of  destruction,  so  that  at  the  end 
one  hardly  knows  what  idea  to  form  of  our  race,  albeit 
so  proud  of  its  prerogatives.  In  such  circumstances 
there  is  no  resource  for  the  philosopher  but,  while 
recognizing  the  fact  that  a  rational  conscious  purpose 
cannot  be  supposed  to  determine  mankind  in  the  play 
of  their  actions  as  a  whole,  to  try  whether  he  cannot  dis¬ 
cover  a  universal  purpose  of  nature  in  this  paradoxical 
movement  of  human  things,  and  whether  in  view  of  this 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


5 


purpose  a  history  of  creatures  who  proceed  without  a 
plan  of  their  own  may  nevertheless  be  possible  according 
to  a  determinate  plan  of  nature.  We  will  accordingly 
see  whether  we  can  succeed  in  finding  a  clew  to  such 
a  history  ^  and,  in  the  event  of  doing  so,  we  shall  then 
leave  it  to  nature  to  bring  forth  the  man  who  will  be  tit 
to  compose  it.  Thus  did  she  bring  forth  a  Kepler,  who, 
in  an  unexpected  way,  reduced  the  eccentric  paths  of  the 
planets  to  definite  laws ;  and  then  she  brought  forth 
a  Newton,  who  explained  those  laws  by  a  universal 
natural  cause. 


FIRST  PROPOSITION 

All  the  capacities  implanted  in  a  creature  by  nature 
are  destined  to  unfold  themselves,  completely  and  con¬ 
formably  to  their  end,  in  the  course  of  time. 

This  proposition  is  established  by  observation,  ex¬ 
ternal  as  well  as  internal  or  anatomical,  in  the  case  of 
all  animals.  An  or^an  which  is  not  to  be  used,  or  an 
arrangement  which  does  not  attain  its  end,  is  a  contra¬ 
diction  in  the  teleological  science  of  nature.  For,  if  we 
turn  away  from  that  fundamental  principle,  we  have 
then  before  us  a  nature  moving  without  a  purpose,  and 
no  longer  conformable  to  law ;  and  the  cheerless  gloom 
of  chance  takes  the  place  of  the  guiding  light  of  reason. 


I 


6 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


SECOND  PROPOSITION 

In  man,  as  the  only  rational  creature  on  earth, 
those  natural  capacities  which  are  directed  toward 
the  use  of  his  reason  could  be  completely  developed 
only  in  the  species  and  not  in  the  individual. 

Reason,  in  a  creature,  is  a  faculty  of  which  it  is  charac¬ 
teristic  to  extend  the  laws  and  purposes  involved  in  the  use 
of  all  its  powers  far  beyond  the  sphere  of  natural  instinct, 
.  and  it  knows  no  limit  in  its  efforts.  Reason,  however, 
does  not  itself  work  by  instinct,  but  requires  experiments, 
exercise  and  instruction  in  order  to  advance  gradually 
from  one  stage  of  insight  to  another^ Hence  each  individ¬ 
ual  man  would  necessarily  have  to  live  an  enormous  length 
of  time  in  order  to  learn  by  himself  how  to  make  yi  com- 
• — -plete  use  of  all  his  natural  endowments.  Otherwise, /pf 
nature  should  have  given  him  but  a  short  lease  of  life  — 

o 

as  is  actually  the  case  —  reason  would  then  require  the 
production  of  an  almost  inconceivable  series  of  genera¬ 
tions,  the  one  handing  down  its  enlightenment  to  the  other, 
in  order  that  her  germs,  as  implanted  in  our  species  may 
be  at  last  unfolded  to  that  stage  of  development  which 
is  completely  conformable  to  her  inherent  design.  And 
the  point  of  time  at  which  this  is  to  be  reached  must,  at 
least  in  idea,  form  the  goal  and  aim  of  man’s  endeavors, 
because  his  natural  capacities  would  otherwise  have  to  be 
regarded  as,  for  the  most  part,  purposeless  and  bestowed 
in  vain.  But  such  a  view  would  abolish  all  our  practical 
principles,  and  thereby  also  throw  on  nature  the  suspicion 
of  practicing  a  childish  play  in  the  case  of  man  alone,  while 
her  wisdom  must  otherwise  be  recognized  as  a  funda- 
mental  principle  in  judging  of  all  other  arrangements. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  TIIE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


THIRD  PROPOSITION 

Nature  has  willed  that  man  shall  produce  wholly 
out  of  himself  all  that  goes  beyond  the  mechanical 
structure  and  arrangement  of  his  animal  existence, 
and  that  he  shall  participate  in  no  other  happiness 
or  perfection  than  that  which  he  has  procured  for 
himself,  apart  from  instinct,  by  his  own  reason.  . 

^Nature,  according  to  this  view,  does  nothing  that  is 
superfluous,  and  is  not  prodigal  in  the  use  of  means  for  A 
her  ehdsNAs  she  gave  man  reason  and  freedom  of  will 
on  the  basis  of  reason,  this  was  at  once  a  clear  indication 
of  her  purpose  in  respect  of  his  endowments.  With  such 
equipment,  he  was  not  to  be  guided  by  instinct  nor  fur¬ 
nished  and  instructed  by  innate  knowledge;  much  rather 
must  he  produce  everything  out  of  himself.  The  inven¬ 
tion  of  his  own  covering'  and  shelter  from  the  elements 
and  the  means  of  providing  for  his  external  security  and 
defense,  —  for  which  nature  gave  him  neither  the  horns 
of  the  bull,  nor  the  claws  of  the  lion,  nor  the  fangs  of 
the  dog,  —  as  well  as  all  the  sources  of  delight  which 
could  make  life  agreeable,  his  very  insight  and  prudence, 
and  even  the  goodness  of  his  will,  all  these  were  to  be 
entirely  his  own  work.  Nature  seems  to  have  taken 
pleasure  in  exercising  her  utmost  parsimony  in  this  case 
and  to  have  measured  her  animal  equipments  very  spar¬ 
ingly.  She  seems  to  have  exactly  fitted  them  to  the 
most  necessitous  requirements  of  the  mere  beginning 
of  an  existence,  as  if  it  had  been  her  will  that  man, 
when  he  had  at  last  struggled  up  from  the  greatest 
crudeness  of  life  to  the  highest  capability  and  to  internal 
perfection  in  his  habit  of  thought,  and  thereby  also  — 


8 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


iu. 

Cm 

f\ AA/> 

L-fw 

/ 

"V 

so  far  as  it  is  possible  on  earth  —  to  happiness,  should 
claim  the  merit  of  it  as  all  his  own  and  owe  it  only  to 
himself.  It  thus  looks  as  if  nature  had  laid  more  upon 
his  rational  self-esteem  than  upon  his  mere  well-being. 
For  in  this  movement  of  human  life  a  great  host  of 
toils  and  troubles  wait  upon  man.  It  appears,  however, 
that  the  purpose  of  nature  was  not  so  much  that  he 
should  have  an  agreeable  life,  but  that  he  should  carry 
forward  his  own  self-culture  until  he  made  himself  worthy 
of  life  and  well-being.  In  this  connection  it  is  always  a 
subject  of  wonder  that  the  older  generations  appear  only 
to  pursue  their  weary  toil  for  the  sake  of  those  who 
come  after  them,  preparing  for  the  latter  another  stage 
on  which  they  ynay  carry  higher  the  structure  which 
nature  has  in  view#  and  that  it  is  to  be  the  happy  fate 
of  only  the  latest  generations  to  dwell  in  the  building 
upon  which  the  long  series  of  their  forefathers  have 
labored,  without  so  much  as  intending  it  and  yet  with 
no  possibility  of  participating  in  the  happiness  which 
they  were  preparing.  Yet,  however  mysterious  this  may 
be,  it  is  as  necessary  as  it  is  mysterious  when  we  once 
accept  the  position  that  one  species  of  animals  was  des¬ 
tined  to  possess  reason,  and  that,  forming  a  class  of 
rational  beings  mortal  in  all  the  individuals  but  im¬ 
mortal  in  the  species,  it  was  yet  to  attain  to  a  complete 
development  of  its  capacities. 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


9 


FOURTH  PROPOSITION 

The  means  which  nature  employs  to  bring  about 
the  development  of  all  the  capacities  implanted  in 
men  is  their  mutual  antagonism  in  society,  but  only 
so  far  as  this  antagonism  becomes  at  length  the  cause 
of  an  order  among  them  that  is  regulated  by  law. 

a  By  this  antagonism  I  mean  the  unsocial  sociability  of 
men ;  that  is,  their  tendency  to  enter  into  society,  con¬ 
joined,  however,  with  an  accompanying  resistance  which 
continually  threatens  to  dissolve  this  society.^  The  dis¬ 
position  for  this  manifestly  lies  in  human  nature.  Man 
has  an  inclination  to  socialize  himself  by  associating  with 
others,  because  in  such  a  state  he  feels  himself  more  than 
a  natural  man,  in  the  development  of  his  natural  capaci¬ 
ties.  Me  has,  moreover,  a  great  tendency  to  individualize- 
himself  by  isolation  from  others,  because  he  likewise  finds 
in  himself  the  unsocial  disposition  of  wishing  to  direct 
everything  merely  according  to  his  own  mind  ;  and  lienee 
he  expects  resistance  everywhere,  just  as  lie  knows  with 
regard  to  himself  that  he  is  inclined  on  his  part  to  resist 
others.  Now  it  is  this  resistance  or  mutual  antagonism 
that  awakens  all  the  powers  of  man,  that  drives  him  to 
overcome  all  his  propensity  to  indolence,  and  that  impels 
him,  through  the  desire  of  honor  or  power  or  wealth,  to 
strive  after  rank  among  his  fellow  men  —  whom  he  can 
neither  bear  to  interfere  with  himself,  nor  yet  let  alone. 
Then  the  first  real  steps  are  taken  from  the  rudeness  of 
barbarism  to  the  culture  of  civilization,  which  particularly 
lies  in  the  social  worth  of  man.  All  his  talents  are  now 
gradually  developed,  and  with  the  progress  of  enlighten¬ 
ment  a  beeinnino'  is  made  in  the  institution  of  a  mode  of 


10 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


thinking  which  can  transform  the  crude  natural  capacity 
for  moral  distinctions,  in  the  course  of  time,  into  definite 
practical  principles  of  action ;  and  thus  a  pathologically 
constrained  combination  into  a  form  of  society  is  devel¬ 
oped  at  last  to  a  moral  and  rational  whole.  Without 
those  qualities  of  an  unsocial  kind  out  of  which  this 
antagonism  arises  —  which  viewed  by  themselves  are 
certainly  not  amiable  but  which  every  one  must  neces¬ 
sarily  find  in  the  movements  of  his  own  selfish  propen-  . 
sities  —  men  might  have  led  an  Arcadian  shepherd  life 
in  complete  harmony,  contentment  and  mutual  love,  but 
in  that  case  all  their  talents  would  have  forever  re¬ 
mained  hidden  in  their  germ.  As  gentle  as  the  sheep 
they  tended,  such  men  would  hardly  have  won  for  their 
existence  a  higher  worth  than  belonged  to  their  domesti- 
cated  cattle ;  they  would  not  have  filled  up  with  their 
rational  nature  the  void  remaining  in  the  creation,  in 
respect  of  its  final  end.  Thanks  be  then  to  nature  for 
this  unsociableness,  for  this  envious  jealousy  and  vanity, 
for  this  unsatiable  desire  of  possession  or  even  of  power. 
Without  them  all  the  excellent  capacities  implanted  in 
mankind  by  nature  would  slumber  eternally  undevel- 
]  oped.  Alan  wishes  concord ;  but  nature  knows  better 
what  is  good  for  his  species,  and  she  will  have  discord. 
He  wishes  to  live  comfortably  and  pleasantly;  but  nature 
wills  that,  turning  from  idleness  and  inactive  content¬ 
ment,  he  shall  throw  himself  into  toil  and  suffering  even 
in  order  to  find  out  remedies  against  them,  and  to  ex¬ 
tricate  his  life  prudently  from  them  again.'  ^The  natural 
impulses  that  urge  man  in  this  direction,  the  sources  of 
that  unsociableness  and  general  antagonism  from  which 
so  many  evils  arise,  do  yet  at  the  same  time  impel  him 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER  11 


to  new  exertion  of  Ins  powers,  and  consequently  to  fur¬ 
ther  development  of  his  natural  capacitieSy  Hence  they 
clearly  manifest  the  arrangement  of  a  wise  Creator,  and 
do  not  at  all,  as  is  often  supposed,  betray  the  hand  of 
a  malevolent  spirit  that  has  deteriorated  His  glorious 
creation,  or  spoiled  it  from  envy. 


FIFTH  PROPOSITION 

The  greatest  practical  problem  for  the  human  race, 
to  the  solution  of  which  it  is  compelled  by  nature,  \ 
is  the  establishment  of  a  civil  society,  universally 
administering  right  according  to  law. 

lit  is  only  in  a  society  which  possesses  the  greatest 
liberty,  and  which  consequently  involves  a  thorough 
antagonism  of  its  members  —  with,  however,  the  most 
exact  determination  and  guarantee  of  the  limits  of  this 
liberty  in  order  that  it  may  coexist  with  the  liberty  of 
others  —  that  the  highest  purpose  of  nature,  which  is 
the  development  of  all  her  capacities,  can  be  attained  in 
the  case  of  mankind.  Now  nature  also  wills  that  the 
human  race  shall  attain  through  itself  to  this,  as  to  all 
the  other  ends  for  which  it  was  destined.  Ilence  a  society 
in  which  liberty  under  external  laws  may  be  found  com¬ 
bined  in  the  greatest  possible  degree  with  irresistible 
power,  or  a  perfectly  just  civil  constitution,  is  the  high¬ 
est  natural  problem  prescribed  to  the  human  species. 
And  this  is  so  because  nature  can  only  by  means  of 
the  solution  and  fulfillment  of  this  problem  realize  her 
other  purposes  with  our  race.  A  certain  necessity  com¬ 
pels  man,  who  is  otherwise  so  greatly  prepossessed  in  favor 


12 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


of  unlimited  freedom,  to  enter  into  this  state  of  coercion 
and  restraint.  Indeed,  vit  is  the  greatest  necessity  of 
y  all  that  does  this ;  for  it  is  created  by  men  themselves 
whose  inclinations  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  exist 
long  beside  each  other  in  wild,  lawless  freedom.  But  in 
such  a  complete  growth  as  the  civil  union  these  very 
inclinations  afterward  produce  the  best  effects.  It  is  with 
them  as  with  the  trees  in  a  forest ;  for  just  because 
every  one  strives  to  deprive  the  other  of  air  and  sun 
they  compel  each  other  to  seek  them  both  above,  and 
thus  they  grow  beautiful  and  straight ;  whereas  those 
that  in  freedom  and  apart  from  one  another  shoot  out 
their  branches  at  will  grow  stunted  and  crooked  and 
awry.  All  the  culture  and  art  that  adorn  humanity 
and  the  fairest  social  order  are  fruits  of  that  unsociable¬ 
ness  which  is  necessitated  of  itself  to  discipline  itself 
and  which  thus  constrains  man,  by  compulsive  art,  to 
develop  completely  the  germs  of  his  nature. 


SIXTH  PROPOSITION 


\j  This  problem  is  likewise  the  most  difficult  of  its 
kind,  and  it  is  the  latest  to  be  solved  by  the  human 
race. 


The  difficulty  which  the  mere  idea  of  this  problem 
f  brings  into  view  is  that  mn  is  an  animal,  and  if  he 
lives  among  others  of  his  kind  he  has  need  of  a  master. 
For  he  certainly  misuses  his  freedom  in  relation  to  his 
fellow  men ;  and  although  as  a  rational  creature  he 
jju  |  desires  a  law  which  may  set  bounds  to  the  freedom  of 

all,  yet  his  own  selfish  animal  inclinations  lead  him, 


i  \M/ 


.iL 


IlaT 


jj 


n 


o^v  \wi  <*****  11  ^  ^  'W 

1 3 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


H 


wherever  lie  can,  to  except  himself  from  it.  He,  tliere- 


"  - - - 7 - - 1  ~  - - - 

fore,  requires  a  master  to  break  his  self-will  and  compel 

him  to  obey  a  will  that  is  universally  valid,  and  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  which  every  one  may  be  free.  Where,  then,  does 
he  obtain  this  master?  Nowhere  but  in  the  human  race. 
But  this  master  is  an  animal  too,  and  also  requires  a 
master.  jBegin,  then,  as  he  may,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how  he  can  procure  a  supreme  authority  over  public 
justice  that  would  be  essentially  just,  whether  such  an 
authority  may  be  sought  in  a  single  person  or  in  a  society 
of  many  selected  persons.  yThe  highest  authority  has  to 
be  just  in  itself,  and  yet  to  be  a  man.  This  problem  is, 
therefore,  the  most  difficult  of  its  kind ;  and,  indeed, 
its  perfect  solution  is  impossible,  j  Out  of  such  crooked 
material  as  man  is  made  of,  nothing  can  be  hammered 
quite  straight.  _So  it  is  only  an  approximation  to  this 


L/ 


r 


idea  that  is  imposed  upon  us  by  nature.*  It  fur  flier 


follows  that  this  problem— ia^the  last  to  be  practically 
worked  out,  because  it  requires  correct  conceptions  of 
tlib'mature  of  a  possible  constitution,  great  experience 
founded  on  the  practice  of  ages,  and  above  all  a  good 
will  prepared  for  the  reception  of  the  solution.  But 
these  three  conditions  could  not  easily  be  found  to¬ 
gether  ;  and  if  they  are  found  it  can  only  be  very  late 
in  time,  and  after  many  attempts  to  solve  the  problem 
have  been  made  in  vain. 


5  Ul  ^ 


(M 


hi 


*  The  part  that  has  to  he  played  by  man  is,  therefore,  a  very  artificial 
one.  We  do  not  know  how  it  may  he  with  the  inhabitants  of  other  planets 
or  what  are  the  conditions  of  their  nature  ;  but,  if  we  execute  well  the 
commission  of  nature,  we  may  certainly  flatter  ourselves  to  the  extent  of 
claiming  a  not  insignificant  rank  among  our  neighbors  in  the  universe.  It 
may  perhaps  he  the  case  that  in  those  other  planets  every  individual  com¬ 
pletely  attains  his  destination  in  this  life.  With  us  it  is  otherwise;  only 
the  species  can  hope  for  this. 


tp J  ! 

t p 

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^  YW 

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14 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


SEVENTH  PROPOSITION 

The  problem  of  the  establishment  of  a  perfect  civil 
constitution  is  dependent  on  the  problem  of  the  regu¬ 
lation  of  the  external  relations  between  the  states 
conformably  to  law ;  and  without  the  solution  of  this 
latter  problem  it  cannot  be  solved. 


What  avails  it  to  labor  at  the  arrangement  of  a  com¬ 
monwealth  as  a  civil  constitution  regulated  by  law  among 
individual  men  ?  The  same  unsociableness  which  forced 
men  to  it  becomes  again  the  cause  of  each  commonwealth’s 
assuming  the  attitude  of  uncontrolled  freedom  in  its  ex- 


1 


AIn 


a 


\A 


OM 


ternal  relations,  that  is,  as  one  State  in  relation  to  other 
States ;  and  consequently  any  one  State  must  expect 
from  any  other  the  same  sort  of  evils  as  oppressed  indi¬ 
vidual  men  and  compelled  them  to  enter  into  a  civil  union 
regulated  by  law.  Nature  has  accordingly  again  used  the 
unsociableness  of  men,  and  even  of  great  societies  •  and 
political  bodies,  her  creatures  of  this  kind,  as  a  means  to 
work  out  through  their  mutual  antagonism  a  condition 
of  rest  and  security.  She  works  through  wars,  through 
the  strain  of  never-relaxed  preparation  for  them,  and 
through  the  necessity  which  every  State  is  at  last  com¬ 
pelled  to  feel  within  itself,  even  in  the  midst  of  peace, 
to  begin  some  imperfect  efforts  to  carry  out  her  purpose. 
v  And,  at  last,  after  many  devastations,  overthrows  and 
even  complete  internal  exhaustion  of  their  powers,  the 
nations  are  driven  forward  to  the  goal  which  reason  might 
easily  have  impressed  upon  them,  even  without  so  much 
sad  experience.  This  is  none  other  than  the  advance  out 
of  the  lawless  state  of  savages  and  the  entering  into  a 
federation  of  nations./ It  is  thus  brought  about  that  every 


Q 


•q  O 


I  l/ 

\lu  &y,h  CUu ol  fUs 


UTXa 


I  f  „ 

K-ry  0  Ym  > 


(/^ 


1)  Uc  UaxA  urm 


f)  „  I  s 

a 

1  )  |  / 1  ■  ^ 

( >A  f  a  ^ K  Yv  U  wC? 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER  15 


State,  including  even  the  smallest,  may  rely  for  its  safety 
and  its  rights  not  on  its  own  power  or  its  own  judgment 
of  right,  hut  only  on  this  great  international  federation 
( foedus  amphictionum ) ,  on  its  combined  power  and  on 
the  decision  of  the  common  will  according  to  laws. 
However  visionary  this  idea  may  appear  to  be  —  and  it 
has  been  ridiculed  in  the  way  in  which  it  has  been  pre¬ 
sented  by  an  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  or  Rousseau  (perhaps 
because  they  believed  its  realization  to  be  so  near)  —  it 
is  nevertheless  the  inevitable  issue  of  the  necessity  in 
which  men  involve  one  another.  For  this  necessity  must 
compel  the  nations  to  the  very  resolution  —  however 
hard  it  may  appear  — to  which  the  savage  in  his  uncivi¬ 
lized  state  was  so  unwillingly  compelled  when  he  had 
to  surrender  his  brutal  liberty  and  seek  rest  and  security 
in  a  constitution  regulated  by  law. 

^All  wars  are,  accordingly,  so  many  attempts  —  not, 
indeed,  in  the  intention  of  men,  but  yet  according  to  the 
purpose  of  nature  —  to  bring  about  new  relations  between 
the  nations;  and  by  destruction,  or  at  least  dismember¬ 
ment,  of  them  all  to  form  new  political  corporations,- 
These  new  organizations,  again,  are  not  capable  of  being 
preserved  either  in  themselves  or  beside  one  another, 
and  they  must  therefore  pass  in  turn  through  similar 
new  revolutions,  till  at  last,  partly  by  the  best  possible 
arrangement  of  the  civil  constitution  within,  and  partly 
by  common  convention  and  legislation  without,  a  condi¬ 
tion  will  be  attained,  which,  in  the  likeness  of  a  civil 
commonwealth  and  after  the  manner  of  an  automaton, 
will  be  able  to  preserve  itself. 

Three  views  may  be  put  forward  as  to  the  way  in 
which  this  condition  is  to  be  attained.  In  the  first  place, 


1(3 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


it  may  be  held  that  from  an  Epicurean  concourse  of 
causes  in  action  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  States, 
like  little  particles  of  matter,  will  try  by  their  fortuitous 
conjunctions  all  sorts  of  formations,  which  will  be  again 
destroyed  by  new  collisions,  till  at  last  some  one  consti¬ 
tution  will  by  chance  succeed  in  preserving  itself  in  its 
proper  form,  —  a  lucky  accident  which  will  hardly  ever 
come  about !  In  the  second  place,  it  may  rather  be 
maintained  that  nature  here  pursues  a  regular  march  in 
carrying  our  species  up  from  the  lower  stage  of  animality 
to  the  highest  stage  of  humanity,  and  that  this  is  done 
by  a  compulsive  art  that  is  inherent  in  man,  whereby  his 
natural  capacities  and  endowments  are  developed  in  per¬ 
fect  regularity  through  an  apparently  wild  disorder.  Or, 
in  the  third  place,  it  may  even  be  asserted  that  out  of 
all  these  actions  and  reactions  of  men  as  a  whole  noth¬ 
ing  at  all  —  or  at  least  nothing  rational  —  will  ever  be 
produced ;  that  it  will  be  in  the  future  as  it  has  ever 
been  in  the  past,  and  that  no  one  will  ever  be  able  to 
say  whether  the  discord  which  is  so  natural  to  our 
species  may  not  be  preparing  for  us,  even  in  this  civilized 
state  of  society,  a  hell  of  evils  at  the  end ;  nay,  that  it 
is  not  perhaps  advancing  even  now  to  annihilate  again 
by  barbaric  devastation  this  actual  state  of  society  and 
all  the  progress  hitherto  made  in  civilization,  —  a  fate 
against  which  there  is  no  guarantee  under  a  government 
of  blind  chance,  identical  as  it  is  with  lawless  freedom  in 
action,  unless  a  connecting  wisdom  is  covertly  assumed 
to  underlie  the  system  of  nature. 

Now,  which  of  these  views  is  to  be  adopted  depends 
almost  entirely  on  the  question  whether  it  is  rational 
to  recognize  harmony  and  design  in  the  parts  of  the 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


17 


constitution  of  nature,  and  to  deny  them  of  the  whole. 
We  have  glanced  at  what  has  been  done  by  the  seemingly 
purposeless  state  of  savages ;  how  it  checked  for  a  time 
all  the  natural  capacities  of  our  species,  but  at  last  by 
the  very  evils  in  which  it  involved  mankind  it  compelled 
them  to  pass  from  this  state,  and  to  enter  into  a  civil 
constitution,  in  which  all  the  germs  of  humanity  could 
be  unfolded.  And,  in  like  manner,  the  barbarian  freedom 
of  the  States,  when  once  they  were  founded,  proceeded  in 
the  same  way  of  progress.  By  the  expenditure  of  all  the 
resources  of  the  commonwealth  in  military  preparations 
against  each  other,  by  the  devastations  occasioned  by  war, 
and  still  more  by  the  necessity  of  holding  themselves  con¬ 
tinually  in  readiness  for  it,  the  full  development  of  the 
capacities  of  mankind  are  undoubtedly  retarded  in  their 
progress  ;  out,  on  the  other  hand,  the  very  evils  which 
thus  arise,  compel  men  to  find  out  means  against  them. 
A  law  of  equilibrium  is  thus  discovered  for  the  regula¬ 
tion  of  the  really  wholesome  antagonism  of  contiguous 
States  as  it  springs  up  out  of  their  freedom  ;  and  a  united 
power,  giving  emphasis  to  this  law,  is  constituted,  whereby 
there  is  introduced  a  universal  condition  of  public  security 
among  the  nations.  And  that  the  powers  of  mankind  may 
not  fall  asleep,  this  condition  is  not  entirely  free  from 
danger  ;  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  not  without  a  principle 
which  operates,  so  as  to  equalize  the  mutual  action  and 
reaction  of  these  powers,  that  they  may  not  destroy  each 
other.  Before  the  last  step  of  bringing  in  a  universal  union 
of  the  States  is  taken  —  and  accordingly  when  human 
nature  is  only  halfway  in  its  progress  —  it  lias  to  endure 
the  hardest  evils  of  all,  under  the  deceptive  semblance 
of  outward  prosperity ;  and  Rousseau  was  not  so  far 


18 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


wrong  when  lie  preferred  the  state  of  the  savages,  if  the 
last  stage  which  our  race  has  yet  to  surmount  be  left  out 
of  view.  We  are  cultivated  in  a  high  degree  by  science 
and  art.  We  are  civilized,  even  to  excess,  in  the  way  of 
all  sorts  of  social  forms  of  politeness  and  elegance.  But 
there  is  still  much  to  be  done  before  we  can  be  regarded 
as  moralized.  The  idea  of  morality  certainly  belongs  to 
real  culture;  but  an  application  of  this  idea  which  extends 
no  farther  than  the  likeness  of  morality  in  the  sense  of 
honor  and  external  propriety  merely  constitutes  civiliza¬ 
tion.  So  long,  however,  as  States  lavish  all  their  resources 
upon  vain  and  violent  schemes  of  aggrandizement,  so  long 
as  they  continually  impede  the  slow  movements  of  the 
endeavor  to  cultivate  the  newer  habits  of  thought  and 


fy 

Ol  J;\W 

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\[JU: 


character  on  the  part  of  the  citizens,  and  even  withdraw 
from  them  all  the  means  of  furthering  it,  nothing  in  the 
way  of  moral  progress  can  be  expected. ,  A  long  internal 
process  of  improvement  is  thus  required  in  every  com¬ 
monwealth  as  a  condition  for  the  higlier  culture  of  its 
citizens.  But  all  apparent  good  that  is  not  grafted  upon 
a  morally  good  disposition  is  nothing  but  mere  illusion 
and  glittering  misery.  In  this  condition  the  human  race 
will  remain  until  it  shall  have  worked  itself,  in  the  way 
that  has  been  indicated,  out  of  the  existing  chaos  of  its 
political  relations. 

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PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER  19 


EIGHTH  PROPOSITION 

The  history  of  the  human  race,  viewed  as  a  whole, 
may  be  regarded  as  the  realization  of  a  hidden  plan 
of  nature  to  bring  about  a  political  constitution,  inter¬ 
nally,  and,  for  this  purpose,  also  externally  perfect, 
as  the  only  state  in  which  all  the  capacities  implanted 
by  her  in  mankind  can  be  fully  developed. 

This  proposition  is  a  corollary  from  the  preceding 
proposition.  We  see  by  it  that  philosophy  may  also 
have  its  millennial  view,  but  in  this  case  the  chiliasm 
is  of  such  a  nature  that  the  very  idea  of  it  —  although 
only  in  a  far-off  way  —  may  help  to  further  its  realiza¬ 
tion  ;  and  such  a  prospect  is,  therefore,  anything  but 
visionary.  The  real  question  is  whether  experience  dis¬ 
closes  anytlung  of  such  a  movement  in  the  purpose  of 
nature.  I  can  only  say  it  does  a  little ;  for  the  move¬ 
ment  in  this  orbit  appears  to  require  such  a  long  time 
till  it  goes  full  round  that  the  form  of  its  path  and  the 
relation  of  its  parts  to  the  whole  can  hardly  be  deter¬ 
mined  out  of  the  small  portion  which  the  human  race 
has  yet  passed  through  in  this  relation.^  The  determina¬ 
tion  of  this  problem  is  just  as  difficult  and  uncertain  as 
it  is  to  calculate  from  all  previous  astronomical  observa¬ 
tions  what  course  our  sun,  with  the  whole  host  of  his 
attendant  train,  is  pursuing  in  the  great  system  of  the 
fixed  stars,  although  on  the  ground  of  the  total  arrange¬ 
ment  of  the  structure  of  the  universe  and  the  little  that 
has  been  observed  of  it,  we  may  infer,  confidently  enough, 
the  reality  of  such  a  movement.  Human  nature,  how¬ 
ever,  is  so  constituted  that  it  cannot  be  indifferent  even 
in  regard  to  the  most  distant  epoch  that  may  affect  our 


20 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


race,  if  only  it  can  be  expected  with  certainty.  And  such 
indifference  is  the  less  possible  in  the  case  before  ns  when 
it  appears  that  we  might  by  our  own  rational  arrange¬ 
ments  hasten  the  coming  of  this  joyous  period  for  our 
descendants.  Hence  the  faintest  traces  of  the  approach 
of  this  period  will  be  very  important  to  ourselves.  Now 
the  States  are  already  in  the  present  day  involved  in  such 
close  relations  with  each  other  that  none  of  them  can 
pause  or  slacken  in  its  internal  civilization  without  losing 
power  and  influence  in  relation  to  the  rest ;  and  hence 
the  maintenance,  if  not  the  progress,  of  this  end  of  nature 
is,  in  a  manner,  secured  even  by  the  ambitious  designs 
of  the  States  themselves.  Further,  civil  liberty  cannot 
now  be  easily  assailed  without  inflicting  such  damage  as 
will  be  felt  in  all  trades  and  industries,  and  especially 
in  commerce  ;yand  this  would  entail  a  diminution  of  the 
powers  of  the  State  in  external  relations.  This  liberty, 
moreover,  gradually  advances  further.  But  if  the  citizen 
is  hindered  in  seeking  his  prosperity  in  any  way  suitable 
to  himself  that  is  consistent  with  the  liberty  of  others,  the 
activity  of  business  is  checked  generally  ;  and  thereby  the 
powers  of  the  whole  State  are  again  weakened.  s^JHence 
the  restrictions  on  personal  liberty  of  action  are  always 
v/  more  and  more  removed,  and  universal  liberty  even  in 
religion  comes  to  be  conceded.  And  thus  it  is  that,  not- 
withstanding  the  intrusion  of  many  a  delusion  and  caprice, 
the  spirit  of  enlightenment  gradually  arises  as  a  great 
good  which  the  human  race  must  derive  even  from  the 
selfish  purposes  of  aggrandizement  on  the  part  of  its 
rulers,  if  they  understand  what  is  for  their  own  advan¬ 
tage.  This  enlightenment,  however,  and  along  with  it  a 
certain  sympathetic  interest  which  the  enlightened  man 


21 


PRINCIPLE  OF  TIIE 


POLITICAL  ORDER 


cannot  avoid  taking  in  the  good  which  he  perfectly  under¬ 
stands,  must  by  and  by  pass  up  to  the  throne  and  exert 
an  influence  even  upon  the  principles  of  government. 
Thus  although  our  rulers  at  present  have  no  money  to 
spend  on  public  educational  institutions,  or  in  general  on 


all  that  concerns  the  highest  good  of  the  world  — be¬ 
cause  all  their  resources  are  already  placed  to  the  account 
of  the  next  war — yet  they  will  certainly  find  it  to  be  to 
their  own  advantage  at  least  not  to  hinder  the  people  in 
their  own  efforts  in  this  direction,  however  weak  and  slow 
these  may  be.  Finally,  war  itself  comes  to  be  regarded 
as  a  very  hazardous  and  objectionable  undertaking,  not 
only  from  its  being  so  artificial  in  itself  and  so  uncertain 
as  regards  its  issue  on  both  sides,  but  also  from  the  after- 

O 


pains  which  the  State  feels  in  the  ever-increasing  burdens 
it  entails  in  the  form  of  national  debt  —  a  modern  inflic¬ 
tion —  which  it  becomes  almost  impossible  to  extinguish. 
And  to  this  is  to  be  added  the  influence  which  every 
political  disturbance  of  any  State  of  our  continent  — 
linked  as  it  is  so  closely  to  others  by  the  connections  of 
trade — exerts  upon  all  the  States  and  which  becomes  so 
observable  that  they  are  forced  by  their  common  danger, 
although  without  lawful  authority,  to  offer  themselves  as 
arbiters  in  the  troubles  of  any  such  State.  In  doing  so, 
they  are  beginning  to  arrange  for  a  great  future  political 
body,  such  as  the  world  has  never  yet  seen.  Although 
this  political  body  may  as  yet  exist  only  in  a  rough  out¬ 
line,  nevertheless  a  feeling  begins,  as  it  were,  to  stir  in 
all  its  members,  each  of  which  has  a  common  interest  in 
the  maintenance  of  the  whole.  ^And  this  may  well  inspire 
the  hope  that,  after  many  political  revolutions  and  trans¬ 
formations,  the  highest  purpose  of  nature  will  be  at  last 


00 

JmJ 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


realized  in  tlie  establishment  of  a  universal  cosmopolitical 
institution,  in  the  bosom  of  which  all  the  original  .capaci¬ 
ties  and  endowments  of  the  human  species  will  be  un¬ 
folded  and  developed./ 

NINTH  PROPOSITION 

A  philosophical  attempt  to  work  out  the  universal 
history  of  the  world  according  to  the  plan  of  nature 
in  its  aiming  at  a  perfect  civil  union  must  be  regarded 
as  possible,  and  as  even  capable  of  helping  forward 
the  purpose  of  nature. 

It  seems,  at  first  sight,  a  strange  and  even  an  absurd 
proposal  to  suggest  tlie  composition  of  a  history  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  idea  of  how  the  course  of  the  world  must  pro¬ 
ceed,  if  it  is  to  be  conformable  to  certain  rational  laws. 
It  may  well  appear  that  only  a  romance  could  be  pro¬ 
duced  from  such  a  point  of  view.  However,  if  it  be 
assumed  that  nature,  even  in  the  play  of  human  free¬ 
dom,  does  not  proceed  without  plan  and  design,  the  idea 
may  well  be  regarded  as  practicable ;  and,  although  we 
are  too  shortsighted  to  see  through  the  secret  mecha¬ 
nism  of  her  constitution,  yet  the  idea  may  be  serviceable 
as  a  clew  to  enable  us  to  penetrate  the  otherwise  planless 
aggregate  of  human  actions  as  a  whole,  and  to  represent 
them  as  constituting  a  system.  For  the  idea  may  so  far 
be  easily  verified.  Thus,  suppose  we  start  from  the  his¬ 
tory  of  Greece,  as  that  by  which  all  the  older  or  con¬ 
temporaneous  history  has  been  preserved,  or  at  least 
accredited  to  us.*  Then,  if  we  study  its  influence  upon 

*  It  is  only  a  learned  public  which  has  had  an  uninterrupted  existence 
from  its  beginning  up  to  our  time  that  can  authenticate  ancient  history. 
Beyond  it,  all  is  terra  incognita ;  and  the  history  of  the  peoples  who  lived 


PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


oo 

ZiO 


tlie  formation  and  malformation  of  the  political  institu¬ 
tions  of  the  Roman  people,  which  swallowed  up  the 
Greek  states,  and  if  we  further  follow  the  influence  of 
the  Roman  Empire  upon  the  Barbarians  who  destroyed 
it  in  turn,  and  continue  this  investigation  down  to  our 
own  day,  conjoining  with  it  episodically  the  political  his¬ 
tory  of  other  peoples  according  as  the  knowledge  of  them 
has  gradually  reached  us  through  these  more  enlightened 
nations,  we  shall  discover  a  regular  movement  of  progress 
through  the  political  institutions  of  our  continent,  which 
is  probably  destined  to  give  laws  to  all  other  parts  of  the 
world.  Applying  the  same  method  of  study  everywhere, 
both  to  the  internal  civil  constitutions  and  laws  of  the 
States  and  to  their  external  relations  to  each  other,  we 
see  how  in  both  relations  the  good  they  contained  served 
for  a  certain  period  to  elevate  and  glorify  particular  na¬ 
tions,  and  with  themselves  their  arts  and  sciences,  —  until 
the  (Meets  attaching  to  their  institutions  came  in  time  to 
cause  their  overthrow. ,  And  yet  their  very  ruin  leaves 
always  a  germ  of  growing  enlightenment  behind,  which, 
being  further  developed  by  every  revolution,  acts  as  a 
preparation  for  a  subsequent  higher  stage  of  progress  and 
improvement.  Thus,  as  I  believe,  we  can  discover  a  clue 
which  may  serve  for  more  than  the  explanation  of  the 
confused  play  of  human  things,  or  for  the  art  of  political 
prophecy  in  reference  to  future  changes  in  States,  —  a 


out  of  its  range  can  only  be  begun  from  the  date  at  which  they  entered 
within  it.  In  the  case  of  the  Jewish  people  this  happened  in  the  time  of 
the  Ptolemies  through  the  Greek  translation  of  the  Bible,  without  which 
little  faith  would  have  been  given  to  their  isolated  accounts  of  themselves. 
From  that  date  taken  as  a  beginning,  when  it  has  been  determined,  their 
records  may  then  be  traced  upward.  And  so  it  is  with  all  other  peoples. 
The  first  page  of  Thucydides,  says  Hume,  is  the  beginning  of  all  true 
history. 


24 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


use  which  has  been  already  made  of  the  history  of  man¬ 
kind,  even  although  it  was  regarded  as  the  incoherent 
effect  of  an  unregulated  freedom !  Much  more  than  all 
this  is  attained  by  the  idea  of  human  history  viewed  as 
founded  upon  the  assumption  of  a  universal  plan  in 
nature.  For  this  idea  gives  us  a  new  ground  of  hope,  as 
it  opens  up  to  us  a  consoling  view  of  the  future,  in  which 
the  human  species  is  represented  in  the  far  distance  as 
having  at  last  worked  itself  up  to  a  condition  in  which 
all  the  germs  implanted  in  it  by  nature  may  be  fully 
developed,  and  its  destination  here  on  earth  fulfilled. 
Such  a  justification  of  nature  —  or  rather,  let  us  say, 
of  Providence  —  is  no  insignificant  motive  for  choosing 
a  particular  point  of  view  in  contemplating  the  course  of 
the  world.  For  what  avails  it  to  magnify  the  glory  and 
wisdom  of  the  creation  in  the  irrational  domain  of  nature, 
and  to  recommend  it  to  devout  contemplation,  if  that  part 
of  the  great  display  of  the  supreme  wisdom  which  pre¬ 
sents  the  end  of  it  all  in  the  history  of  the  human  race 
is  to  be  viewed  as  only  furnishing  perpetual  objections 
j  to  that  glory  and  wisdom  ?  •<Tlie  spectacle  of  history  if 
thus  viewed  would  compel  us  to  turn  away  our  eyes 
from  it  against  our  will ;  and  the  despair  of  ever  finding 
a  perfect  rational  purpose  in  its  movement  would  reduce 
us  to  hope  for  it,  if  at  all,  only  in  another  world.7 

This  idea  of  a  universal  history  is  no  doubt  to  a  cer¬ 
tain  extent  of  an  a  priori  character,  but  it  would  be  a 
misunderstanding  of  my  object  were  it  imagined  that  I 
have  any  wish  to  supplant  the  empirical  cultivation  of 

0 

history,  or  the  narration  of  the  actual  facts  of  experience. 
It  is  only  a  thought  of  what  a  philosophical  mind  - 
which,  as  such,  must  be  thoroughly  versed  in  history 


PRINCIPLE  OF  TIIE  POLITICAL  ORDER 


on: 


— might  be  induced  to  attempt  from  another  standpoint. 
Besides,  the  praiseworthy  circumstantiality  with  which 
our  history  is  now  written  may  well  lead  one  to  raise  the 
question  as  to  how  our  remote  posterity  will  be  able  to 
cope  with  the  burden  of  history  as  it  will  be  transmitted 
to  them  after  a  few  centuries.  They  will  surely  estimate 
the  history  of  the  oldest  times,  of  which  the  documentary 
records  may  have  been  long  lost,  only  from  the  point  of 
view  of  what  will  interest  them ;  and  no  doubt  this  will 
be  what  the  nations  and  governments  have  achieved,  or 
failed  to  achieve,  in  the  universal  world-wide  relation. 
It  is  well  to  be  giving  thought  to  this  relation  ;  and  at 
the  same  time  to  draw  the  attention  of  ambitious  rulers 
and  their  servants  to  the  only  means  by  which  they  can 
leave  an  honorable  memorial  of  themselves  to  latest  times. 
And  this  may  also  form  a  minor  motive  for  attempting 
to  produce  such  a  philosophical  history. 


II 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL 

RIGHT 

CONSIDERED  IN  CONNECTION  WITH 

THE  RELATION  OF  THEORY  TO  PRACTICE 
IN  NATIONAL  LAW 


1793 


- 


' 

. 


. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT 


The  establishment  of  a  civil  constitution  in  society  is 
one  of  the  most  important  facts  in  human  history.  In 
the  principle  on  which  it  is  founded  this  institution  dif¬ 
fers  from  all  the  other  forms  of  social  union  among  man¬ 
kind.  Viewed  as  a  compact,*  and  compared  with  other 
modes  of  compact!  by  which  numbers  of  men  are  united 
into  one  society, ^the  formation  of  a  civil  constitution  has 
much  in  common  with  all  other  forms  of  social  union  in 
respect  of  the  mode  in  which  it  is  carried  out  in  practice. 
But  while  all  such  compacts  are  established  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  promoting  in  common  some  chosen  end,  the  civil 
union  is  essentially  distinguished  from  all  others  by  the 
principle  on  which  it  is  based.  In  all  social  contracts  we 
find  a  union  of  a  number  of  persons  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  out  some  one  end  which  they  all  have  in  com¬ 
mon.  But  a  union  of  a  multitude  of  men,  viewed  as  an 
end  in  itself  that  every  person  ought  to  carry  out,  and 
which  consequently  is  a  primary  and  unconditional  duty 
amid  all  the  external  relations  of  men  who  cannot  help 
exercising  a  mutual  influence  on  one  another,  —  is  at 
once  peculiar  and  unique  of  its  kind.  Such  a  union  is 
only  to  be  found  in  a  society  which,  by  being  formed  into 
a  civil  state,  constitutes  a  commonwealth.  Now  the  end 
which  in  such  external  relations  is  itself  a  duty  and  even 
the  highest  formal  condition — the  conditio  sine  qua  non — 

*  I3  act  uni  unionis  civ  ills.  t  Pactum  sociale. 


30 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


of  all  other  external  duties,  is  the  realization  of  the  rights 
of  men  under  public  compulsory  laws,  by  which  every 
individual  can  have  what  is  his  own  assigned  to  him  and 
secured  against  the  encroachments  or  assaults  of  others. 

The  idea  of  an  external  law  generally  arises  wholly 
out  of  the  idea  of  human  freedom,  or  liberty,  in  the  ex¬ 
ternal  relations  of  men  to  one  another.  As  such,  it  has 
nothing  specially  to  do  with  the  realization  of  happiness 
as  a  purpose  which  all  men  naturally  have,  or  with  pre¬ 
scribing  the  means  of  attaining  it ;  so  that  therefore  such 
a  prescription  in  any  statute  must  not  be  confounded  with 
the  motive  behind  the  law  itself.  Law  in  general  may  be 
defined  as  the  limitation  of  the  freedom  of  any  individual 
to  the  extent  of  its  agreement  with  the  freedom  of  all 
other  individuals,  in  so  far  as  this  is  possible  by  a  uni¬ 
versal  law.  /Public  law,  again,  is  the  sum  of  the  external 
laws  which  make  such  a  complete  agreement  of  freedom 
in  society  possible.^  Now  as  all  limitation  of  freedom  by 
external  acts  of  the  will  of  another  is  a  mode  of  coercion 
or  compulsion,  it  follows  that  the  civil  constitution  is  a 
relation  of  free  men  who  live  under  coercive  laws,  with¬ 
out  otherwise  prejudicing  their  liberty  in  the  whole  of 
their  connection  with  others.  F or  reason  itself  wills  this. 
By  '  reason  ’  is  here  meant  the  purely  innate,  law-giving 
reason  which  gives  no  regard  to  any  end  that  is  derived 
from  experience,  all  of  which  is  comprehended  under 
the  general  name  of  happiness.  In  consideration  of 
such  ends  and  the  place  each  assigns  them  men  think 
so  differently  that  their  wills  could  not  be  brought 
under  any  common  principle,  nor,  consequently,  under 
any  external  laws  that  would  be  compatible  with  the 
liberty  of  all. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT 


31 


\The  civil  state,  then,  regarded  merely  as  a  social  state 
tlan  is  regulated  by  righteous  laws,  is  founded  upon  the 
following  rational  principles : 

1.  The  liberty  of  every  member  of  the  society  as 


a  man ; 

2.  The  equality  of  every  member  of  the  society  with 
every  other,  as  a  subject ; 

3.  The  self-dependency  of  every  member  of  the  com¬ 
monwealth,  as  a  citizen. 

These  principles  arenot  so  much  laws  given  by  the 
State  when  it  is  established  as  they  are  fundamental  con¬ 
ditions  according  to  which  alone  the  institution  of  a  State 
is  possible,  in  conformity  with  the  purely  rational  princi¬ 
ples  of  external  human  right  generally. 

1.  The  liberty  of  every  member  of  the  State  as  a  man 
is  the  first  principle  in  the  constitution  of  a  rational 
commonwealth.  I  would  express  this  principle  in  the 
following  form :  o  one  has  a  right  to  compel  me  to 

be  happy  in  the  peculiar  way  in  which  he  may  think  of 
the  well-being  of  other  men ;  but  every  one  is  entitled 
to  seek  his  own  happiness  in  the  way  that  seems  to  him 
best,  if  it  does  not  infringe  the  liberty  of  others  in  striv¬ 
ing  after  a  similar  end  for  themselves  when  their  liberty 
is  capable  of  consisting  with  the  right  of  liberty  in  all 
others  according  to  possible  universal  laws.’  A  govern¬ 
ment  founded  upon  the  principle  of  benevolence  toward 
the  people  —  after  the  analogy  of  a  father  to  his  children, 
and  therefore  called  a  paternal  government  —  would  be 
one  in  which  the  subjects  would  be  regarded  as  children 
or  minors  unable  to  distinguish  what  is  beneficial  or  in¬ 
jurious  to  them.  These  subjects  would  be  thus  com¬ 
pelled  to  act  in  a  merely  passive  way;  and  they  would 


32 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


be  trained  to  expect  all  that  ought  to  make  them  happy, 
solely  from  the  judgment  of  the  sovereign  and  just  as 
he  might  will  it,  merely  out  of  his  goodness.  Such  a 
government  would  be  the  greatest  conceivable  despot¬ 
ism  ;  for  it  would  present  a  constitution  that  would 
abolish  all  liberty  in  the  subjects  and  leave  them  no 
rights.  It  is  not  a  paternal  government,  but  only  a 
patriotic  government  that  is  adapted  for  men  who  are 
capable  of  rights,  and  at  the  same  time  fitted  to  give 
scope  to  the  good-will  of  the  ruler^/B y  '  patriotic  ’  is 
meant  that  condition  of  mind  in  which  every  one  in  the 
State  —  the  head  of  it  not  excepted  —  regards  the  com¬ 
monwealth  as  the  maternal  bosom,  and  the  country  as 
the  paternal  soil  out  of  and  on  which  he  himself  has 
sprung  into  being,  and  which  he  also  must  leave  to 
others  as  a  dear  inheritance.  Thus,  and  thus  only,  can 
he  hold  himself  entitled  to  protect  the  rights  of  his  father- 
land  by  laws  of  the  common  will,  but  not  to  subject  it 
to  an  unconditional  purpose  of  his  own  at  pleasure. 

This  right  of  liberty  thus  belongs  to  him  as  a  man, 
while  he  is  a  member  of  the  commonwealth;  or,  in  point 
of  fact,  so  far  as  he  is  a  being  capable  of  rights  generally. 

2.  The  equality  of  every  member  of  the  State  as  a  sub¬ 
ject  is  the  second  principle  in  the  constitution  of  a  rational 
commonwealth.  The  formula  of  this  principle  may  be  put 
thus :  \'  E  very  member  of  the  commonwealth  has  rights 
against  every  other  that  may  be  enforced  by  compulsory 
laws,  from  which  only  the  sovereign  or  supreme  ruler  of 
the  State  is  excepted,  because  he  is  regarded  not  as  a 
mere  member  of  the  commonwealth,  but  as  its  creator 
or  maintainer ;  and  he  alone  has  the  right  to  compel 
without  being  himself  subject  to  compulsory  lawd^  All, 


however,  who  live  under  laws  in  a  State  are  its  subjects  ; 


and,  consequently,  they  are  subjected  to  the  compulsory 
law,  like  all  other  members  of  the  commonwealth,  one 
only,  whether  an  individual  sovereign  or  a  collective 
body,  constituting  the  supreme  head  of  the  State  and 
as  such  being  accepted  as  the  medium  through  which 
alone  all  rightful  coercion  or  compulsion  can  be  exer¬ 
cised.  For,  should  the  head  of  the  State  also  be  subject 
to  compulsion,  there  would  no  longer  be  a  supreme  head, 
and  the  series  of  members  subordinate  and  superordinate 
would  go  on  upward  ad  infinitum.  Again,  were  there  in 
the  State  two  such  powers  as  persons  exempt  from  legal 
compulsion,  neither  of  them  would  be  subject  to  com¬ 
pulsory  laws,  and  as  such  the  one  could  do  no  wrong  to 
the  other ;  which  is  impossible. 

This  thoroughgoing  equality  of  the  individual  men  in 
a  State  as  its  subjects  is,  however,  quite  compatible  with 
the  greatest  inequality  in  the  extent  and  degrees  of  their 
possessions,  whether  consisting  in  corporeal  or  spiritual 


34 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


be  regarded  as  all  equal  to  one  another./  For  no  one  lias 
a  right  to  compel  or  coerce  any  one  whomsoever  in  the 
State,  otherwise  than  by  the  public  law  and  through  the 
sovereign  or  ruler  executing  it ;  and  any  one  may  resist 
another  thus  far,  and  through  the  same  medium.  On  the 
other  hand,  no  one  can  lose  this  right,  as  a  title  to  pro¬ 
ceed  by  legal  compulsion  against  others,  except  by  his 
own  fault  or  a  criminal  act.  Nor  can  any  one  divest  him¬ 
self  of  it  voluntarily,  or  by  a  compact,  so  as  to  bring  it 
about  by  a  supposed  act  of  right,  that  he  should  have 
no  rights  but  only  duties  toward  others ;  for  in  so  doing 
he  would  be  depriving  himself  of  the  right  of  making  a 
compact,  and  consequently  the  act  would  annul  itself. 

Out  of  this  idea  of  the  equality  of  men  as  subjects  in 
the  commonwealth,  there  arises  the  following  formula: 
i'  Every  member  of  the  State  should  have  it  made  pos¬ 
sible  for  him  to  attain  to  any  position  or  rank  that  may 
belong  to  any  subject  to  which  his  talent,  his  industry 
or  his  fortune  may  be  capable  of  raising  him ;  and  his 
fellow  subjects  are  not  entitled  to  stand  in  the  way  by 
any  hereditary  prerogative,  forming  the  exclusive  privi¬ 
lege  of  a  certain  class,  in  order  to  keep  him  and  his 
posterity  forever  below  tliem.’y 

For  all  law  consists  merely  in  restriction  of  the  liberty 
of  another  to  the  condition  that  is  consistent  with  my 
liberty  according  to  a  universal  law ;  and  national  law 
in  a  commonwealth  is  only  the  product  of  actual  legis¬ 
lation  conformable  to  this  principle  and  conjoined  with 
power,  in  virtue  of  which  all  who  belong  to  a  nation  as 
its  subjects  find  themselves  in  a  condition  constituted 
and  regulated  by  law  ( status  juridicus).  And,  as  such, 
this  condition  is  in  fact  a  condition  of  equality  inasmuch 


35 


TIIE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT 


as  it  is  determined,  by  the  action  and  reaction  of  free  wills 
limiting  one  another,  according  to  the  universal  law  of 
freedom ;  and  it  thus  constitutes  the  civil  state  of  human 
society.  Hence  the  inborn  right  of  all  individuals  in  this 
sphere  (that  is,  considered  as  being  prior  to  their  having 
actually  entered  upon  juridical  action)  to  bring  compul¬ 
sion  to  bear  upon  any  others  is  entirely  identical  and 
equal  throughout,  on  the  assumption  that  they  are  always 
to  remain  within  the  bounds  of  unanimity  and  concord 

.  Now  birth  is  not  an 
act  on  the  part  of  him  who  is  born,  and  consequently  it 
does  not  entail  upon  him  any  inequality  in  the  state  of 
law,  nor  any  subjection  under  laws  of  compulsion  other 
than  what  is  common  to  him  with  all  others  as  a  subject 
of  the  one  supreme  legislative  power ;  and,  therefore, 
there  can  be  no  inborn  privilege  by  way  of  law  in  any 
member  of  the  commonwealth  as  a  subject  before  another 
fellow  subject./  Nor,  consequently,  lias  any  one  a  right  to 
transmit  the  privilege  or  prerogative  of  the  rank  which 
he  holds  in  the  commonwealth  to  his  posterity  so  that 
they  should  be,  as  it  were,  qualified  by  birth  for  the  rank 
of  nobility  ;  nor  should  they  be  prevented  from  attaining 
by  their  own  merit  to  the  higher  stages  in  the  grada¬ 
tions  of  social  rank.  Everything  else  that  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  a  thing  and  does  not  relate  to  personality  may 
be  bequeathed;  and,  since  such  things  may  be  acquired 
as  property,  they  may  also  be  alienated  or  conveyed. 
Hence  after  a  number  of  generations  a  considerable 
inequality  in  external  circumstances  may  arise  among 
the  members  of  a  commonwealth,  producing  such  rela¬ 
tions  as  those  of  master  and  servant,  landlord  and  ten¬ 
ant,  etc.  These  circumstances  and  relations,  however, 


in  the  mutual  use  of  their  liberty 


36 


ought  not  to  hinder  any  of  the  subjects  of  the  State 
from  rising  to  such  positions  as  their  talent,  their  indus¬ 
try  and  their  fortune  may  make  it  possible  for  them  to  fill. 
For  otherwise  such  a  one  would  be  qualified  to  coerce 
without  being  liable  to  be  coerced  by  the  counter  action 
of  others  in  return ;  and  he  would  rise  above  the  stage 
of  being  a  fellow  subject.  Further,  no  man  who  lives 
under  the  legalized  conditions  of  a  commonwealth  can 
fall  out  of  this  equality  otherwise  than  by  his  own 
crime,  and  never  either  by  compact  or  through  any 
military  occupancy.*  For  he  cannot  by  any  legal  act, 
whether  of  himself  or  of  another,  cease  to  be  the  owner 
of  himself,  or  enter  into  the  class  of  domestic  cattle, 
which  are  used  for  all  sorts  of  services  at  will  and  are 
maintained  in  this  condition  without  their  consent  as 
long  as  there  is  a  will  to  do  it,  although  under  the  lirni- 
tation — which  is  sometimes  sanctioned  even  by  religion, 
as  among  the  Hindus  —  that  they  are  not  to  be  muti¬ 
lated  or  slain.  Under  any  conditions,  he  is  to  be  regarded 
as  happy  who  is  conscious  that  it  depends  only  on  him¬ 
self —  that  is,  on  his  faculty  or  earnest  will  —  or  on  cir¬ 
cumstances  which  he  cannot  impute  to  auy  other,  and  not 
on  the  irresistible  will  of  others,  that  he  does  not  rise  to 
a  stage  of  equality  with  others  who  as  his  fellow  subjects 
have  no  advantage  over  him  as  far  as  law  is  concerned. 


3.  The  self-dependency  t  of  a  member  of  the  com¬ 
monwealth  as  a  citizen,  or  fellow  legislator,  is  the  third 

*  Occupatio  bellica. 

t  [The  term  Selbstdndigkeit ,  here  rendered  hy  '  self-dependency,’  is  rep¬ 
resented  by  Kant  in  his  text  hy  the  Latin  equivalent  sibisufficientia.  The 
word  'self-sufficiency,’  however,  would  he  apt  to  mislead  English  readers. 
The  term  is  commonly  translated  hy  '  independence,’  hut '  self-dependency  ’ 
has  been  preferred  as  more  closely  indicative  of  the  form  and  connotation 
of  the  German  word. —  77\] 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT 


37 


principle  or  condition  of  law  in  the  State.  In  the  matter 
of  the  legislation  itself,  all  are  to  be  regarded  as  free  and 
equal  under  the  already-existing  public  laws ;  but  they 
are  not  to  be  all  regarded  as  equal  in  relation  to  the  right 
to  give  or  enact  these  laws^  JThose  who  are  not  capable  of 
this  right  are,  notwithstanding,'  subjected  to  the  observ¬ 
ance  of  the  laws  as  members  of  the  commonwealth  and 
thereby  they  participate  in  the  protection  which  is  in 
accordance  therewith ;  They  are,  however,  not  to  be  re¬ 
garded  as  citizens  but  as  protected  fellow  subjects. 

All  right,  in  fact,  depends  on  laws.  A  public  law, 
however,  which  determines  for  all  what  is  to  be  legally 
allowed  or  not  allowed  in  their  regard  is  the  act  of  a 
public  will,  from  which  all  law  proceeds  and  which 
therefore  itself  can  do  no  wrong  to  any  one.  For  this, 
however,  there  is  no  other  will  competent  than  that  of 
the  whole  people,  as  it  is  only  when  all  determine  about 
all  that  each  one  in  consequence  determines  about  him¬ 
self.  For  it  is  only  to  himself  that  one  can  do  no  wrong. 
But  if  it  be  another  will  that  is  in  question,  then  the  mere 
will  of  any  one  different  from  it  could  determine  nothing 
for  it  which  might  not  be  wrong ;  and  consequently  the 
law  of  such  a  will  would  require  another  law  to  limit  its 
legislation.  And  thus  410  particular  will  can  be  legislative 
for  a  commonwealth..  Properly  speaking,  in  order  to  make 
out  this,  the  ideas  of  the  external  liberty,  equality  and 
unity  of  the  will  of  all  are  to  be  taken  into  account ;  and 
for  the  last  of  these  self -dependency  is  the  condition,  since 
the  exercising  of  a  vote  is  required  when  the  former  two 
ideas  are  taken  along  with  it.  The  fundamental  law  thus 
indicated,  which  can  only  arise  out  of  the  universal  united 
will  of  the  people,  is  what  is  called  the  original  contract. 


38 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


l / 


Now  any  one  wlio  lias  the  right  of  voting  in  this  sys¬ 
tem  of  legislation  is  a  citizen  as  distinguished  from  a 
burgess ;  he  is  a  citoyen  as  distinguished  from  a  bour¬ 
geois.  The  quality  requisite  for  this  status,  in  addition 
to  the  natural  one  of  not  being  a  child  or  a  woman, 
is  solely  this,  that  the  individual  is  his  own  master  by 
right  (sui  juris )  ;  and,  consequently,  that  he  has  some 
property  that  supports  him,  under  which  may  be  reckoned 
any  art  or  handicraft,  or  any  fine  art  or  science.  Other¬ 
wise  put,  the  condition  in  those  cases  in  which  the  citizen 
must  acquire  from  others  in  order  to  live  is  that  he  ac¬ 
quires  it  only  by  alienation  of  what  is  his  own,  and  not 
by  a  consent  given  to  others  to  make  use  of  his  powers ; 
and  consequently  that  he  serves  no  one  but  the  common¬ 
wealth,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  In  this  relation 
those  skilled  in  the  arts  and  large  or  small  proprietors 
are  all  equal  to  one  another  as,  in  fact,  each  one  is 
entitled  to  only  one  vote.  As  regards  proprietors,  the 
question  might  be  considered  as  to  how  it  may  have 
happened  by  right  that  any  one  has  got  as  his  own  more 
land  than  he  can  himself  use  with  his  own  hands  (for 
acquisition  by  military  occupation  is  not  primary  acqui¬ 
sition)  ;  and  how  it  has  happened  that  many  men,  who 
otherwise  might  have  altogether  been  able  to  acquire  an 
independent  possession,  have  been  brought  to  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  merely  serving  such  a  one  in  order  to  be  able  to 
live.  But,  without  entering  here  upon  the  consideration 
of  this  question,  it  is  manifest  that  it  would  at  once  be 
contrary  to  the  previous  principle  of  equality  if  a  law 
were  to  invest  such  persons  with  the  privilege  of  a  class 
so  that  their  descendants  should  either  always  continue 
to  be  great  proprietors  of  land  —  in  the  manner  of  fiefs 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  39 


—  without  such  being  able  to  be  sold  or  divided  by  in¬ 
heritance,  and  thus  coming  to  be  applied  for  the  use  of 
more  of  the  people ;  or  if,  even  in  carrying  out  such 
divisions,  that  no  one  but  lie  who  belonged  to  a  certain 
class,  arbitrarily  regulated  in  this  connection,  could  ac¬ 
quire  any  part  of  such  land.  The  great  possessor  of  an 
estate  does  in  fact  annihilate  as  many  smaller  owners, 
and  their  voices,  as  might  occupy  the  place  he  takes  up  ; 
lie  does  not  vote  in  their  name,  and  he  has  consequently 
only  one  vote.  It  thus  must  be  left  to  depend  merely  on 
the  means,  the  industry  and  the  fortune  of  each  member 
of  the  commonwealth  that  each  one  may  acquire  a  part 
of  it,  and  all  of  its  members  the  whole.  But  these  dis¬ 
tinctions  cannot  be  brought  into  consideration  in  con- 
nection  with  a  universal  legislation ;  and  hence  the 
number  of  those  qualified  to  have  a  voice  in  the  legis¬ 
lation  must  be  reckoned  by  the  heads  of  those  who  are 
in  possession  and  not  according  to  the  extent  of  their 
possessions. 

Furthermore,  all  who  have  this  right  of  voting  must 
agree  in  order  to  realize  the  laws  of  public  justice,  for 
otherwise  there  would  arise  a  conflict  of  right  between 
those  who  were  not  in  agreement  with  it  and  the  others 
who  were:  and  this  would  give  rise  to  the  need  of  a 
higher  principle  of  right  that  the  conflict  might  be  de¬ 
cided.  A  universal  agreement  cannot  be  expected  from 
a  whole  people ;  and  consequently  it  is  only  a  plurality 
of  yoicgSj  and  not  even  of  those  who  immediately  vote  in 
a  large  nation,  but  only  of  their  delegates  as  representa¬ 
tive  of  the  people  that  can  alone  be  foreseen  as  pract  i- 
cally  attainable.  And  hence  even  the  principle  of  making 
the  majority  of  votes  suffice  as  representing  the  general 


40 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


consent  will  have  to  be  taken  as  by  compact ;  vand  it 
must  thus  be  regarded  as  the  ultimate  basis  of  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  any  civil 

We  have  next  to  consider  what  follows  by  way  of 
corollary  from  the  principles  thus  enunciated.  We  have 
before  us  the  idea  of  an  original  contract  as  the  only 
/  condition  upon  which  a  civil,  and  therefore,  wholly  legal, 
constitution  can  be  founded  among  men,  and  as  the 
only  basis  upon  which  a  State  can  be  established.  But 
this  fundamental  condition — -whether  called  an  original 
contract  or  a  social  compact  —  may  be  viewed  as  the 
coalition  of  all  the  private  and  particular  wills  of  a  peo¬ 
ple  into  one  common  and  public  will,  having  a  purely 
juridical  legislation  as  its  end.  But  it  is  not  necessary 
to  presuppose  this  contract  or  compact  to  have  been 
actually  a  fact;  nor  indeed  is  it  possible  as  a  fact.  We 
have  not  to  deal  with  it  as  if  it  had  first  to  be  proved 
from  history  that  a  people  into  whose  rights  and  obliga¬ 
tions  we  have  entered  as  their  descendants  did  actually 
on  a  certain  occasion  execute  such  a  contract,  and  that 
a  certain  evidence  or  instrument  of  an  oral  or  written 
kind  regarding  it  must  have  been  transmitted  so  as  to 
constitute  an  obligation  that  shall  be  binding  in  any 
existing  civil  constitution.  In  short,  ythis  idea  is  merely 
an  idea  of  reason ;  but  it  has  undoubtedly  a  practical 
reality^  For^it  ought  to  bind  every  legislator  by  the 
condition  that  he  shall  enact  such  laws  as  might  have 
arisen  from  the  united  will  of  a  whole  people ;  «and  it 
will  likewise  be  binding  upon  every  subject,  in  so  far  as 
he  will  be  a  citizen,  so  that  he  shall  regard  the  law  as  if 
he  had  consented  to  it  of  his  own  will.  This  is  the  test 


constitution. 


HI 


&  ur  to 


jlOO 


rf  - 


&a$a$jjqA  ^ 


CuaA  11 uab^<f  \JjjJs~f  (fl/JVj'td  -  ^  00 

^wi  <Q  Hii  i  £uur  \y)  £  ova  tUW3  to*\sJu$\  U&Oi 

u-o"f" 


TIIE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  41 


of  the  rightfulness  of  every  public  law.  If  the  law  be  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  is  impossible  that  the  whole  people 
could  give  their  assent  to  it,  it  is  not  a  just  law.  An  in¬ 
stance  of  this  kind  would  be  a  law  enacting  that  a  certain 


class  of  subjects  should  have  all  the  privileges  of  heredi¬ 
tary  rank  by  mere  birth.  But  if  it  be  possible  that  a 
people  consent  to  a  law,  it  is  a  duty  to  regard  it  as  just, 
even  supposing  that  the  people  were  at  the  moment  in 
such  a  position  or  mood  that  if  it  were  referred  to  them 
their  consent  to  it  would  probably  be  refused.* 

This  limitation,  however,  manifestly  applies  only  to 
the  judgment  of  the  legislator  and  not  to  that  of  the 
subject.  If  then,  under  a  certain  actual  state  of  the 
law,  a  people  should  conclude  that  the  continuance  of 
that  law  would  probably  take  away  their  happiness, 
what  would  they  have  to  do?  Would  it  not  be  a  duty 
to  resist  the  law  ?  GPhe  answer  can  only  be  that  the 
people  should  do  nothing  but  obeyy  For  the  question 
here  does  not  turn  upon  the  happiness  which  the  sub¬ 
ject  may  expect  from  some  special  institution  or  mode 
of  administering  the  commonwealth,  but  the  primary  J 
concern  is  purely  that  of  the  right  which  has  thus  to 
be  secured  to  every  individual.  This  is  the  supreme 
principle  from  which  all  the  maxims  relating  to  the 


J 


*  If,  for  example,  a  proportioned  war  tax  were  imposed  on  all  the  sub¬ 
jects,  they  are  not  entitled,  because  it  is  burdensome,  to  say  that  it  is  un¬ 
just  because  somehow,  according  to  their  opinion,  the  war  was  unnecessary. 
For  they  are  not  entitled  to  judge  of  this;  whereas,  because  it  is  at  least 
always  possible  that  the  war  was  inevitable  and  the  tax  indispensable,  it 
must  be  regarded  as  rightful  in  the  judgment  of  the  subject.  If,  however, 
in  such  a  war  certain  owners  of  property  were  to  he  burdened  by  imposts 
from  which  others  of  the  same  class  were  spared,  it  is  easily  seen  that  a 
whole  people  could  not  concur  in  such  a  law,  and  it  is  entitled  at  the  least 
to  make  protestation  against  it,  because  it  could  not  regard  this  unequal 
distribution  of  the  public  burdens  as  just. 


42 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


commonwealth  must  proceed ;  and  it  cannot  be  limited 
by  anything  else.  In  regard  to  the  interest  of  happiness, 
no  principle  that  could  be  universally  applicable  can  be 
laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  legislation ;  for  not  only 
the  circumstances  of  the  time  but  the  very  contradictory 
and  ever-changing  opinions  which  men  have  of  what  will 
constitute  happiness  make  it  impossible  to  lay  down  fixed 
principles  regarding  it;  and  so  the  idea  of  happiness,  taken 
by  itself,  is  not  available  as  a  principle  of  legislation.  No 
one  can  prescribe  for  another  as  to  what  he  shall  find 
happiness  in.  \  'The  principle,  solus  public  a  supremo  civitatis 
lex  est ,  remains  undiminished  in  value  and  authority;  and 
the  public  weal,  which  has  first  of  all  to  be  taken  into 
consideration,  is  just  the  maintenance  of  that  legal  con¬ 
stitution  by  which  the  liberty  of  all  is  secured  through 
the  lawsy  Along  with  this,  the  individual  is  left  undis¬ 
turbed  in  his  right  to  seek  his  happiness  in  whatever  way 
may  seem  to  him  best,  if  only  he  does  not  infringe  the 
universal  liberty  secured  through  the  law  by  violating 
the  rights  of  other  fellow  subjects. 

When  the  sovereign  power  enacts  laws  which  are 
directed  primarily  toward  the  happiness  of  the  citizens, 
out  of  regard  to  their  well-being,  the  state  of  the  popu¬ 
lation  and  such  like,  this  is  not  done  from  its  being  the 
end  for  which  the  civil  constitution  is  established,  but 
merely  as  a  means  of  securing  the  state  of  right,  espe¬ 
cially  against  the  external  enemies  of  the  people.  The 
government  must  be  capable  of  judging,  and  has  alone 
to  judge,  whether  such  legislation  belongs  to  the  func¬ 
tion  of  the  commonwealth,  and  whether  it  is  requisite 
in  order  to  secure  its  strength  and  steadfastness  both 
within  itself  and  against  foreign  enemies  ;  but  this  is 

<zj  o  y 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  43 


not  to  be  done  as  if  the  aim  were  to  make  the  people 
happy  even  against  their  will,  but  only  to  bring  it  about 
that  they  shall  exist  as  a  commonwealth.*  In  thus  judg¬ 
ing  whether  any  such  measure  can  be  taken  prudently 
or  not,  the  legislator  may  indeed  err.  But  he  does  not 
err  in  so  far  as  he  considers  whether  the  law  does  or 
does  not  agree  with  a  principle  of  right.  And  in  doing 
so  he  has  an  infallible  criterion  in  the  idea  of  the  origi¬ 
nal  contract ,  viewed  as  an  essential  idea  of  reason  ;  and 
hence  he  does  not  require  —  as  would  be  the  case  with 
the  principle  of  happiness  —  to  wait  for  experience  to 
instruct  him  about  the  utility  rather  than  the  rightness 
of  his  proposed  measure.  For  if  it  is  only  not  contra¬ 
dictory  in  itself  that  a  whole  people  should  agree  to  such 
a  law,  however  unpleasant  may  be  its  results  in  fact,  it 
would  as  such  be  conformable  to  right.  If  a  public  law  be 
thus  conformable  to  right,  it  is  irrepreliensible,  and  hence 
it  will  give  the  right  to  coerce ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  would  involve  the  prohibition  of  active  resistance  to 
the  will  of  the  legislator.  The  power  in  the  State  which 
gives  effect  to  the  law  is  likewise  irresistible  ;  and  no 
entirely  legal  commonwealth  exists  without  such  a  power 
to  suppress  all  internal  resistance  to  it.  For  such  resist¬ 
ance  would  proceed  according  to  a  rule  which,  if  made 
universal,  would  destroy  all  civil  constitutionalism  and 
would  annihilate  the  only  state  in  which  men  can  live 
in  the  actual  possession  of  rights. 


*  Here  belong  certain  prohibitions  of  imports  in  order  that  the  means 
of  acquisition  may  be  promoted  in  the  best  interests  of  the  subjects  and  not 
for  the  advantage  of  strangers  and  the  encouragement  of  the  industry  of 
others,  because  the  State  without  the  prosperity  of  the  people  would  not 
possess  sufficient  power  to  resist  external  enemies  or  to  maintain  itself  as 
a  commonwealth. 


44 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Hence  it  follows  that  all  resistance  to  the  sovereign 
legislative  power,  every  kind  of  instigation  to  bring  the 
discontent  of  the  subjects  into  active  form,  and  rebellion 
or  insurrection  of  every  degree  and  kind,  constitute  the 
highest  and  most  punishable  crimes  in  the  common  wealth^/) 
for  they  would  destroy  its  very  foundations.  The  pro¬ 
hibition  of  them  is  therefore  absolute ;  so  that,  even  if 
the  supreme  power  or  the  sovereign  as  its  agent  were  to 
violate  the  original  contract,  and  thereby  in  the  judg¬ 
ment  of  the  subject  lose  the  right  of  making  the  laws, 
yet,  as  the  government  has  been  empowered  to  proceed 
'  even  thus  tyrannically,  no  right  of  resistance  can  be 
allowed  to  the  subject  as  a  power  antagonistic  to  the 
State.  The  reason  of  this  is  that  in  the  actually  existing 
civil  constitution  the  people  have  no  longer  the  right  to 
determine  by  their  judgment  how  it  is  to  be  adminis¬ 
tered.  For,  suppose  they  had  such  a  right  and  that  it 
was  directly  opposed  to  the  judgment  of  the  actual  head 
of  the  State,  who  would  there  be  to  decide  with  which  of 
them  the  right  lay  ?  Evidently  neither  of  them  could  do 
this,  as  it  makes  them  judges  in  their  own  cause.  There 
would  therefore  have  to  be  another  sovereign  head  above 
the  sovereign  head  to  decide  between  it  and  the  people : 
but  this  is  a  contradiction.  Nor  can  some  supposed  law 
of  necessity  (jus  in  casu  necessitatis')  —  which  is  at  best 
a  spurious  thing,  such  as  is  the  fancied  right  to  do  wrong 
in  an  extreme  physical  necessity  —  come  in  here  as  a 
lever  for  the  removal  of  the  barrier  thus  limiting*  the 

O 

voluntary  power  of  the  people.  For  the  head  of  the 
State  may  just  as  well  think  to  justify  his  hard  proce¬ 
dure  against  the  subjects  by  the  fact  of  their  obstinacy 
and  intractability,  as  they  to  justify  their  revolt  by 


TIIE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  45 


complaining  against  him  about  their  undue  suffering. 
Who  shall  decide  between  them  ?  It  is  only  he  who  is'  ^ 
in  possession  of  the  supreme  public  administration  of 
law  or  who  is  otherwise  the  head  of  the  State  who  can 
do  this ;  and  no  one  in  the  commonwealth  can  have  the 
right  to  contest  his  possession  of  the  power  to  do  itj 

Nevertheless  I  find  excellent  men  asserting  such  a 
right  on  the  part  of  the  subject  to  resist  the  higher 
authority  under  certain  circumstances.  Among  these  I 
shall  now  refer  only  to  Achenwall,  a  very  cautious,  posi¬ 
tive  and  careful  writer.  In  his  doctrine  of  Natural  Right 

o 

he  says :  "  If  the  danger  which  threatens  the  common¬ 
wealth  from  longer  toleration  of  the  injustice  of  the 
sovereign  is  greater  than  what  may  be  anticipated  from 
taking  up  arms,  then  the  people  may  resist  such  a  sover¬ 
eign  ;  and  in  order  to  maintain  their  rights  they  may 
break  their  compact  of  submission  and  dethrone  him  as 
a  tyrant.”  And  hence  he  infers  that  in  this  way  the 
people  return  to  the  state  of  nature  as  opposed  to  their 
relation  to  their  previous  head. 

I  am  willing  to  believe  that  neither  Achenwall  nor 
any  of  the  worthy  men  who  agree  with  him  in  this  sort 
of  reasoning  would  have  ever  given  their  advice  or  con¬ 
sent  in  any  case  to  enterprises  of  so  dangerous  a  nature. 
Nor  can  it  well  be  doubted  that,  if  the  revolutions  by 
which  Switzerland,  the  United  Netherlands  and  even 
Great  Britain  acquired  the  political  constitutions  now 
so  celebrated  had  failed,  the  readers  of  history  would 
have  seen  in  the  execution  of  the  leaders  now  so  highly 
lauded  only  the  punishment  deserved  by  great  political 
criminals.  The  result  thus  usually  becomes  intermingled 
with  our  judgment  of  the  principles  of  right  in  question, 


46 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


although  the  former  is  always  uncertain  in  fact,  whereas 
the  latter  are  always  certain  in  themselves.  It  is,  how¬ 
ever,  clear  that  as  regards  these  principles  the  people  by 
their  mode  of  seeking  to  assert  their  rights  commit  the 
greatest  wrong,  even  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  rebellion 
might  do  no  wrong  to  the  ruling  sovereign  who  had  vio¬ 
lated  in  a  sort  of  joyeuse  entree  the  actual  compact  upon 
which  his  relation  to  the  people  was  founded.  F or,  if  this 
mode  of  conduct  were  adopted  as  a  maxim,  every  politico- 
legal  constitution  would  be  made  uncertain  and  a  natural 
state  of  utter  lawlessness  would  be  introduced,  in  which 
all  law  would  at  least  cease  to  have  effect^  With  regard 
to  this  tendency  in  so  many  thoughtful  writers  to  encour¬ 
age  the  people  to  their  own  detriment,  I  will  only  observe 
that  there  are  ^wo  influences  commonly  at  work  in  deter¬ 
mining  it. ;  It  is  partly  caused*by  the  common  illusion 
which  substitutes  the  principle  of  happiness  as  the  crite¬ 
rion  of  judgment  when  the  principle  of  right  is  really  in 
question ;  and  partly  by  the  fact  that,  where  there  is  no 
record  of  anything  like  a  compact  actually  proposed  to 
the  commonwealth,  accepted  by  the  sovereign  or  sanc¬ 
tioned  by  bothpthese  thinkers  have  assumed  the  idea  of 
an  original  contract ,  which  is  always  involved  in  reason, 
as  a  thing  which  must  have  actually  happened  ;  and  thus 
they  supposed  that  the  right  was  always  reserved  to  the 
people  —  in  the  case  of  any  gross  violation  of  it  hr  their 
judgment  —  to  resile  from  it  at  pleasure.* 

*  However  the  actual  compact  of  the  people  with  the  ruler  may  be  vio¬ 
lated,  the  people  canuot  in  fact  directly  offer  opposition  as  a  commonwealth, 
but  only  by  mutiny  and  rebellion.  For  the  hitherto  existing  constitution 
is  then  broken  through  by  the  people ;  whereas  the  organization  of  a  new 
commonwealth  lias  still  to  find  place.  In  these  circumstances  the  state  of 
anarchy  arises  with  all  its  abominations,  which  are  thereby  at  least  made 
possible ;  and  the  wrong  which  thus  ensues  is  what  is  inflicted  by  one  party 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  47 


It  thus  becomes  evident  that  the  principle  of  happiness, 
which  is  properly  incapable  of  any  definite  determination 
as  a  principle,  may  be  the  occasion  of  much  evil  in  the 
sphere  of  political  right,  just  as  it  is  in  the  sphere  of 
morals.  And  this  will  hold  good  even  with  the  best 
intentions  on  the  part  of  those  who  teach  and  inculcate 
it.  The  sovereign  acting  on  this  principle  determines  to 
make  the  people  happy  according  to  his  notions,  and  he 
becomes  a  despot.  The  people  will  not  give  up  their 
common  human  claim  to  what  they  consider  their  own 
happiness,  and  they  become  rebels.  Now  if  at  the  out¬ 
set  it  had  been  asked  what  is  right  and  just  with  regard 
to  the  established  principles  of  reason,  without  regard  to 
the  notions  of  the  empiric,  the  idea  underlying  the  theory 
of  the  social  compact  would  always  have  incontestable 
authority.  But  it  would  not  be  correct  to  treat  it  as  an 
empirical  fact,  as  Danton  would  have  it ;  for  he  thought 
that,  apart  from  this  fact,  all  rights  found  in  any  exist¬ 
ing  civil  constitution  and  all  property  would  have  to  be 
declared  null  and  void.  The  idea  in  question  is  only  to 
be  taken  as  a  rational  principle  for  the  estimation  and 
judgment  of  all  the  public  rights  existing  under  a  politi¬ 
cal  constitution.  And,  so  regarded, yit  then  becomes  evi¬ 
dent  that,  prior  to  the  existence  of  a  common  will,  the 
people  possess  no  right  of  coercion  in  relation  to  their 
ruler  because  they  can  bring  such  coercion  to  bear  as  a 
matter  of  right  only  through  him.  And  when  this  will 

upon  another  in  the  people.  Thus,  from  the  example  referred  to  above,  it 
is  seen  how  the  rebellious  subjects  of  that  State  strove  at  last  to  force  on 
each  other  a  constitution  which  would  have  been  far  more  oppressive  than 
the  one  they  abandoned ;  as  it  would  have  led  to  their  being  consumed  by 
clergy  and  aristocrats  instead  of  their  waiting  for  more  equality  in  the 
distribution  of  the  burdens  of  the  State  under  an  all-controlling  head. 


48 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


does  exist,  no  coercion  can  be  exercised  by  tbe  people 
against  liim  because  this  would  make  them  to  be  them¬ 
selves  the  supreme  ruler.  Hence  <1  right  of  compulsion 
or  coercion  in  the  form  of  a  resistance  in  word  or  deed 
against  the  sovereign  head  of  the  State  can  never  belong 
of  right  to  the  people^ 

Further,  we  see  this  theory  sufficiently  confirmed  in 
practice.  In  the  constitution  of  Great  Britain  the  people 
form  such  an  important  element  that  it  is  represented 
as  a  model  for  the  whole  world,  and  yet  we  find  that  it 
is  entirely  silent  about  any  right  pertaining  to  the  peo¬ 
ple  in  case  the  monarch  should  transgress  the  contract 
of  1688 ;  and,  consequently,  since  there  is  no  law  upon 
the  subject,  if  there  is  any  right  of  rebellion  against  him 
should  he  violate  the  constitution,  it  can  only  be  there 
by  secret  reservation.  For  it  would  be  a  manifest  con¬ 
tradiction  that  the  constitution  should  contain  a  law 
providing  for  such  a  case.  That  would  be  to  justify  the 
overthrow  of  the  subsisting  constitution  from  which  all 
particular  laws  arise ;  which  would  be  absurd,  even  on 
the  supposition  that  the  contract  was  violated.  Such  a 
constitution  would  be  contradictory  for  the  reason  that 
it  would  necessarily  have  to  include  a  publicly  consti¬ 
tuted  counter  power  which  consequently  would  be  a 
second  sovereign  in  the  State,  and  its  function  would 
be  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  people  against  the  other 
sovereign.*  But  the  existence  of  this  second  sovereign 

*  No  law  or  right  in  the  State  can  he,  as  it  were,  maliciously  concealed 
by  a  secret  reservation ;  least  of  all  the  rights  which  the  people  claim  as 
belonging  to  the  constitution,  because  all  its  laws  must  be  conceived  as 
having  sprung  from  a  public  will.  If  the  constitution  allowed  insurrection, 
it  would  therefore  publicly  have  to  define  the  right  to  it  as  well  as  the  way 
in  which  it  was  to  be  put  in  practice. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  49 


would  likewise  require  a  third  whose  function  would  be 
to  decide  between  these  two  and  to  determine  on  which 
side  right  and  justice  lay.  Hence  such  guides,  or  rather 
let  us  say  guardians,  of  the  people,  perplexed  by  the 
possibility  of  such  an  accusation  should  their  enterprise 
fail  in  any  way,  have  contrived,  for  the  behoof  of  a 
monarch  who  might  be  scared  away  by  them,  a  volun¬ 
tary  power  of  demitting  the  government  rather  than 
claimed  a  presumptuous  right  of  deposition.  But  this 
view  manifestly  puts  the  constitution  into  contradiction 
with  itself. 

Now  if,  in  presence  of  these  assertions,  the  objection  is 
not  raised  against  me,  as  it  certainly  should  not  be,  that 
I  flatter  the  monarch  too  much  by  this  view  of  his  invio¬ 
lability,  I  may  hope  also  to  be  spared  another  objection 
from  the  opposite  side.  In  a  word,  I  hope  to  be  spared 
the  contrary  objection  that  I  assert  too  much  in  favor 
of  the  people  when  I  say  that  they  have  also  their  own 
inalienable  rights  as  against  the  sovereign  of  the  State, 
although  these  cannot  be  justly  regarded  as  rights  of 
coercion  or  constraint. 

Hobbes  is  of  the  opposite  opinion.  In  his  view  the 
sovereign  as  head  of  the  State  is  bound  in  nothing  to 
the  people  by  compact  and  can  do  no  wrong  to  the 
citizens,  however  he  act  toward  them.  This  proposition 
would  be  quite  'correct  if  by  '  wrong  ’  we  understand 
that  kind  of  lesion  which  allows  to  the  injured  party  a 
right  of  coercion  against  the  one  who  does  the  wrong. 
So  it  is  in  the  special  relation ;  but,  taken  generally, 
the  proposition  is  repulsive  and  appalling. 

Any  subject  who  is  not  utterly  intractable  must  be 
able  to  suppose  that  his  sovereign  does  not  really  wish 


50 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


to  do  him  wrong.  Moreover,  every  man  must  be  held 
to  have  his  own  inalienable  rights,  which  he  cannot  give 
up  though  he  wish  to  do  it  and  about  which  he  is  him¬ 
self  entitled  to  judge.  But  the  wrong  which  in  his  opin¬ 
ion  is  done  to  him  occurs  according  to  that  view  only 
from  error  or  ignorance  of  certain  consequences  that  will 
ensue  from  the  laws  laid  down  by  the  sovereign  power. 
Consequently  the  right  must  be  conceded  to  the  citizen, 
and  with  the  direct  consent  of  the  sovereign,  that  he  shall 
be  able  to  make  his  opinion  publicly  known  regarding 
what  appears  to  him  to  be  a  wrong  committed  against 
the  commonwealth  by  the  enactments  and  administration 
of  the  sovereign. j  For  to  assume  that  the  sovereign  power 
can  never  err,  or  never  be  ignorant  of  anything,  would 
amount  to  regarding  that  power  as  favored  with  heavenly 
inspiration  and  as  exalted  above  the  reach  of  mankind, 
which  is  absurd.  Hence  the  liberty  of  the  press  is  the 
sole  palladium  of  the  rights  of  the  people.  But  it  must 
be  exercised  within  the  limits  of  reverence  and  love  for 
the  constitution  as  it  exists,  while  it  must  be  sustained 
by  the  liberal  spirit  of  the  subjects,  which  the  constitution 
itself  tends  to  inspire ;  and  it  must  be  so  limited  by  the 
wise  precautions  of  those  who  exercise  it  that  their  free¬ 
dom  be  not  lost.  s[o  refuse  this  liberty  to  the  people 
/  amounts  to  taking  from  them  all  claim  to  right  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  supreme  power;  and  this  is  the  view  of  Hobbes. 
But  more  than  this  is  involved.  As  the  will  of  the  sover¬ 
eign  commands  the  subjects  as  citizens  only  on  the  ground 
that  he  represents  the  general  will  of  the  people,  to  deprives 
the  people  of  this  liberty  would  be  to  withdraw  from  the 
sovereign  power  all  knowledge  of  what  he  would  himself 
alter  if  he  only  knew  it ;  and  it  would  thus  put  him  into 


TIIE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  51 


contradiction  with  himself.  Moreover,  to  instil  an  anxiety 
into  the  sovereign  that  independent  thinking  and  public 
utterance  of  it  would  of  themselves  excite  trouble  in  the 
State  would  amount  to  exciting  distrust  against  his  own 
power  or  even  awakening  hatred  against  the  people. 

There  is,  then,  a  general  principle  whereby  the  peo¬ 
ple  may  assert  their  rights  negatively,  so  far  as  merely 
to  judge  that  a  certain  thing  is  to  be  regarded  as  not 
ordained  by  the  supreme  legislation  in  accordance  with 
their  best  will.  This  principle  may  be  expressed  in  the 
following  proposition :  What  a  people  could  not  ordain 
over  itself  ought  not  to  be  ordained  by  the  legislator  over 
the  people. 

For  example,  the  question  may  be  raised  as  to  whether 
a  law,  enacting  that  a  certain  regulated  ecclesiastical  con¬ 
stitution  shall  exist  permanently  and  for  all  time,  can  be 
regarded  as  issuing  from  the  proper  will  of  the  lawgiver 
according  to  his  real  intention.  In  dealing  with  it,  the 
position  which  first  arises  is  whether  a  people  may  make 
a  law  for  itself  to  the  effect  that  certain  dogmas  and  ex¬ 
ternal  forms  of  religion,  when  once  adopted,  shall  con¬ 
tinue  to  be  valid  for  all  time ;  and,  therefore,  whether  it 
may  prevent  itself  in  its  own  descendants  from  advanc¬ 
ing  further  in  religious  insight  or  from  altering  any  old 
errors  when  they  have  become  recognized  as  such.  It 
will  thus  become  clear  that  an  original  contract  of  the 
people  which  made  such  a  position  a  law  would  be  in  it¬ 
self  null  and  void,  because  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  essen¬ 
tial  destination  and  purposes  of  mankind.  Consequently, 
a  law  enacted  to  such  an  effect  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
the  proper  will  of  the  monarch ;  and  counter  representa¬ 
tions  against  it  may  therefore  be  made  to  him.  In  all 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


£9 

cases,  however,  even  when  such  things  have  been  ordained 
by  the  supreme  legislation,  resistance  is  not  to  be  offered 
to  them  in  word  or  in  deed,  but  they  are  only  to  be  opposed 
by  the  influence  of  general  and  public  judgments. 

yin  every  commonwealth  there  must  be  obedience  to 
coercive  laws  relating  to  the  whole  people  and  regulated 
by  the  mechanism  of  the  political  constitution.^  But  at 
the  same  time  there  must  be  a  spirit  of  liberty  among 
the  people ;  for  in  things  relating  to  universal  human 
duty  every  one  needs  to  be  convinced  by  reason  that 
such  coercion  is  in  accordance  with  right.  Without  this 
he  would  be  in  contradiction  with  his  own  nature. 
Obedience  without  the  spirit  of  liberty  is  the  cause  and 
occasion  of  all  secret  societies.  For  there  is  a  natural 
tendency  implanted  in  mankind  to  communicate  to  one 
another  what  is  in  them,  especially  in  what  bears  upon 
man  generally.  Such  societies  would  therefore  fall  away 
if  such  liberty  were  more  favored.  And  how  can  gov¬ 
ernments  obtain  the  knowledge  which  is  necessary  for 
furthering  their  own  essential  object  otherwise  than  by 
giving  scope  in  its  origin  and  in  its  effects  to  this  estimable 
spirit  of  human  liberty  ? 

There  is  a  certain  practical  spirit  that  professes  to  dis¬ 
regard  all  principles  of  pure  reason ;  and  it  expresses  it¬ 
self  nowhere  with  more  presumption  regarding  theoretical 
truth  than  in  reference  to  the  question  as  to  the  requisites 
of  a  good  political  constitution.  The  cause  of  this  is  that, 
where  there  has  been  a  legal  constitution  long  in  existence, 
the  people  have  been  gradually  accustomed  to  take  the 
condition  in  which  everything  has  hitherto  advanced  in 
a  quiet  course  as  the  rule  by  which  to  judge  of  their 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  RIGHT  53 


happiness  as  well  as  their  rights.  On  this  account  they 
have  not  been  accustomed  to  judge  of  their  condition  in 
these  respects  according  to  the  conceptions  which  are  fur¬ 
nished  by  reason  regarding  them.  And  thus  they  come 
rather  to  prefer  continuance  of  their  passive  state  to  the 
dangerous  position  of  seeking  for  a  better ;  for  here  too 
the  maxim  which  Hippocrates  lays  down  for  the  physician 
finds  application:  "Judgment  is  uncertain,  experiment 
is  dangerous."  *  Thus  it  is  that  all  constitutions  that 
have  subsisted  for  some  length  of  time  —  whatever  may 
be  their  defects  — •  agree,  amid  all  their  differences,  in  one 
result;  namely,  in  producing  a  certain  contentment  with 
every  one’s  own.  Hence,  when  regard  is  given  merely 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  people,  theory  has  properly  no 
place,  but  everything  rests  upon  the  practice  that  follows 
experience. 

But  the  question  arises  whether  there  is  anything  in 
reason  that  can  find  expression  in  the  term  r  national  law,’ 
and  whether  this  conception  is  of  binding  force  in  the 
case  of  men  who  stand  in  antagonism  to  each  other  by 
virtue  of  their  individual  liberty  ?  This  involves  the 
question  as  to  the  objective  and  practical  reality  of  such 
a  principle  of  law,  and  whether  it  can  be  applied  with¬ 
out  regard  to  the  mere  well-being  or  ill-being  which  may 
arise  from  it,  the  knowledge  of  which  can  rest  only  upon 
experience.  qlf  there  be  such  a  basis  of  national  law,  as 
has  now  been  maintained,  it  must  be  founded  upon  the 
principles  of  pure  reason  ;  for  experience  cannot  teach 
what  is  right  and  just  in  itselfy  And,  if  it  be  so,  there 
is  a  theory  of  national  law,  and  no  practice  is  valid  which 
is  not  in  conformity  with  it. 

*  Judicium,  anceps,  experimentum  periculosum. 


54 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Against  this  position  objection  could  be  taken  only  in 
the  following  way:  It  might  be  alleged  that,  although 
men  have  in  their  minds  the  idea  of  rights  as  belonging 
to  them,  they  are  still,  on  account  of  their  obtuseness 
and  refractoriness,  incapable  and  unworthy  of  being 
treated  in  accordance  with  it.  And  hence  it  might  be 
maintained  that  a  supreme  power  proceeding  merely  in 
accordance  with  rules  of  expediency  should  and  must 
keep  them  in  order.  This  is  a  leap  of  despair,  a  salto 
mortale ;  and  it  is  of  such  a  kind  that,  since  might  only 
and  not  right  comes  into  consideration,  the  people  may 
then  also  be  justified  in  trying  their  best  by  force ;  and 
every  legal  constitution  is  thus  made  uncertain.  If  there 
be  no  human  law  which  compels  respect  directly  by  its 
rationality,  then  all  influences  put  forth  to  control  the 
arbitrary  will  and  liberty  of  men  will  be  found  unavail¬ 
ing.  But  if,  along  with  the  sentiment  of,  benevolence, 
the  principle  of  right  speaks  aloud,  human  nature  will 
show  itself  not  to  be  so  degenerate  that  its  voice  will  not 
be  heard  with  reverence.  We  may  say  of  it  in  the  words 
of  Virgil : 

Turn  pietate  gravem  meritisque  si  forte  virum  quern 

Conspexere,  silent  arrectisque  auribus  adstant. 


Ill 

THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS 

CONSIDERED  IN  CONNECTION  WITH 

THE  RELATION  OF  THEORY  TO  PRACTICE 
IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


1793 


/ 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OE  PROGRESS 


Does  the  human  race,  viewed  as  a  whole,  appear 
worthy  of  being  loved ;  or  is  it  an  object  which  we 
must  look  upon  with  repugnance,  so  that,  while  in  order 
to  avoid  misanthropy  we  continue  to  wish  for  it  all  that 
is  good,  we  yet  can  never  expect  good  from  it,  and  would 
rather  turn  our  eyes  away  from  its  ongoings  ?  The  reply 
to  this  question  will  depend  on  the  answer  that  may  be 
given  to  this  other  question  :  P  Is  human  nature  endowed 
with  capacities  from  which  we  can  infer  that  the  species 
will  always  advance  to  a  better  condition,  so  that  the 
evil  of  the  present  and  past  times  will  be  lost  in  the 
good  of  the  future?’  Under  such  a  condition  we  may 
indeed  love  the  race,  at  least  when  viewed  as  continually 
approaching  to  the  good,  but  otherwise  we  might  well 
despise  or  even  hate  it,  let  the  affectation  of  a  universal 
philanthropy  —  which  at  most  would  then  be  only  a 
benevolent  wish,  and  not  a  satisfied  love — express  itself 
as  it  may.  For  what  is  and  remains  bad,  especially  in  the 
form  of  intentional  and  mutual  violation  of  the  holiest 
rights  of  man,  cannot  but  be  hated,  whatever  efforts 
may  be  made  to  constrain  the  feeling  of  love  toward  it. 
Not  that  this  dislike  of  human  evil  would  prompt  us  to 
inflict  evil  upon  men,  but  it  would  at  least  lead  us  to 
have  as  little  to  do  with  them  as  possible. 

Moses  Mendelssohn  was  of  this  latter  opinion ;  and 
lie  has  opposed  it  to  his  friend  Lessing’s  hypothesis  of  a 

57 


58 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


divine  education  of  the  human  race.  It  is,  in  his  view,* 
a  mere  illusion  to  hold  "  that  the  whole  of  mankind  here 
below  shall  always  move  forward  in  the  course  of  time, 
and  thus  perfect  itself.”  He  says,  "  We  see  the  human 
race  as  a  whole  making  oscillations  backward  and  for¬ 
ward  ;  but  it  has  never  taken  a  few  steps  forward  with¬ 
out  soon  sliding  back  with  double  rapidity  to  its  former 
state.”  This  is  then  the  very  movement  of  the  stone  of 
Sisyphus ;  and  we  might  thus  suppose,  like  the  Hindu, 
that  the  earth  is  a  place  for  the  expiation  of  old  and  for¬ 
gotten  sins.  "  The  individual  man,”  he  continues,  "  ad¬ 
vances,  but  mankind,  as  a  whole,  moves  up  and  down 
between  fixed  limits,  and  maintains  through  all  periods 
of  time  about  the  same  stage  of  morality,  the  same  amount 
of  religion  and  irreligion,  of  virtue  and  vice,  of  happi¬ 
ness  (?)  and  misery.”  These  assertions  he  introduces 
by  saying:  "You  would  fain  find  out  what  are  the  pur¬ 
poses  of  Providence  with  regard  to  mankind.  But  form 
no  hypotheses,” — he  had  formerly  said  "  theory,”  —  "only 
look  around  on  what  actually  happens  and,  if  you  can 
survey  the  history  of  all  times,  upon  what  has  happened 
from  the  beginning.  This  gives  facts.  Thus  much  must 
have  belonged  to  the  purpose  of  Providence  and  must 
have  been  approved  in  the  plan  of  wisdom,  or  at  least 
must  have  been  adopted  along  with  it.” 

I  am  of  a  different  opinion.  If  it  is  a  spectacle  worthy 
of  a  divinity  to  see  a  virtuous  man  struggling  with  adver¬ 
sities  and  temptation  and  yet  holding  his  ground  against 
them,  it  is  a  spectacle  most  unworthy  —  I  will  not  say 
of  a  divinity,  but  even  of  the  commonest  well-disposed 
man  —  to  see  the  human  race  making  a  few  steps  upward 

*  Jerusalem ,  II,  44-77. 


TIIE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS 


59 


in  virtue  from  one  period  to  another,  and  soon  thereafter 
falling  down  again  as  deep  into  vice  and  misery  as  be¬ 
fore.  To  gaze  for  a  short  while  upon  this  tragedy  may 
be  moving  and  instructive ;  but  the  curtain  must  at  last 
be  let  fall  upon  it.  For  when  prolonged  in  this  manner 
it  becomes  a  farce  ;  and,  although  the  actors  may  not  be¬ 
come  weary,  being  fools,  yet  the  spectator  will  become 
tired  of  it,  having  enough  in  one  or  two  acts  to  infer 
that  this  play  that  comes  never  to  an  end  is  but  an 
eternal  repetition  of  the  same  thing.  The  punishment 
that  follows  at  the  close  can,  in  the  case  of  a  mere 
drama,  compensate  for  the  unpleasant  feelings  aroused 
during  its  course.  But  to  see  numberless  vices,  even 
accompanied  with  occasional  virtues,  towered  and  heaped 
on  each  other  in  the  world  of  reality  in  order  that 
there  may  be  some  grand  retribution  in  the  end,  is  — 
at  least,  according  to  our  ideas  —  altogether  opposed 
to  the  morality  of  a  wise  Creator  and  Governor  of  the 
world. 

I  will,  therefore,  venture  to  assume  that  as  the  human 
race  is  continually  advancing  in  civilization  and  culture 
as  its  natural  purpose,  so  it  is  continually  making  prog¬ 
ress  for  the  better  in  relation  to  the  moral  end  of  its 
existence,  and  that  this  progress,  although  it  may  be 
sometimes  interrupted,  will  never  be  entirely  broken  off 
or  stopped.  It  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  prove  this 
assumption ;  the  burden  of  proof  lies  on  its  opponents. 
For  I  take  my  stand  upon  my  innate  sense  of  duty  in 
this  connection.  Every  member  in  the  series  of  genera¬ 
tions  to  which  I  belong  as  a  man  —  although  mayhap 
not  so  well  equipped  with  the  requisite  moral  qualifica¬ 
tions  as  1  ought  to  be,  and  consequently  might  be  —  is, 


60 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


in  fact,  prompted  by  his  sense  of  duty  so  to  act  in  ref¬ 
erence  to  posterity  that  they  may  always  become  better, 
and  the  possibility  of  this  must  be  assumed.  This  duty 
can  thus  be  rightfully  transmitted  from  one  member  of 
the  generations  to  another.  Now  whatever  doubts  may 
be  drawn  from  history  against  my  hopes,  and  were  they 
even  of  such  a  kind  as,  in  case  of  their  being  demon¬ 
strated,  might  move  me  to  desist  from  efforts  which  ac¬ 
cording  to  all  appearances  would  be  vain,  yet  so  long  as 
this  is  not  made  out  with  complete  certainty,  I  am  not 
entitled  to  give  up  the  guidance  of  duty  which  is  clear, 
and  to  adopt  the  prudential  rule  of  not  working  at  the 
impracticable,  since  this  is  not  clear  but  is  mere  hypoth¬ 
esis.  And,  however  uncertain  I  may  always  be  as  to 
whether  we  may  rightly  hope  that  the  human  race  will 
attain  to  a  better  condition,  yet  this  individual  uncer¬ 
tainty  cannot  detract  from  the  general  rule  of  conduct 
or  from  the  necessary  assumption  in  the  practical  rela¬ 
tion  that  such  a  condition  is  practicable. 

This  hope  of  better  times,  without  which  an  earnest 
desire  to  do  something  conducive  to  the  common  well¬ 
being  would  never  have  warmed  the  human  heart,  has 
always  exercised  an  influence  upon  the  practical  conduct 
of  the  well-disposed  of  mankind ;  and  the  good  Men¬ 
delssohn  must  also  have  recognized  its  power  in  his  own 
zealous  efforts  for  the  enlightenment  and  prosperity  of 
the  nation  to  which  he  belonged.  For  he  could  not  have 
reasonably  hoped  to  have  accomplished  those  objects  by 
himself  alone,  unless  others  after  him  were  to  advance 
further  on  the  same  path.  In  presence  of  the  saddening 
spectacle,  not  merely  of  the  evils  which  oppress  the 
human  race  from  natural  causes,  but  still  more  of  those 


61 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS 


which  men  inflict  on  each  other,  the  heart  is  still  glad¬ 
dened  by  the  prospect  that  it  may  become  better  in  the 
future,  and  that  this  will  be  accomplished  in  part  by  our 
unselfish  benevolence,  even  after  we  have  been  long  in 
the  grave  and  have  ceased  to  be  able  to  reap  the  fruits 
which  we  ourselves  have  sown.  Arguments  from  experi¬ 
ence  against  the  success  of  such  endeavors  resolved  and 
carried  out  in  hope  are  of  no  avail.  For  the  fact  that 
something  has  not  yet  succeeded  is  no  proof  that  it  will 
never  succeed  ;  nor  would  such  an  argument  even  justify 
the  abandonment  of  any  practical  or  technical  efforts, 
such  as,  for  example,  the  attempts  to  make  pleasure  ex¬ 
cursions  in  aerostatic  balloons.  And  still  less  would  such 
conditions  justify  the  abandonment  of  a  moral  purpose 
which,  as  such,  becomes  a  duty  if  its  realization  is  not 
demonstrated  to  be  impossible.  Besides  all  this,  many 
proofs  can  be  given  that  the  human  race  as  a  whole  is 
actually  farther  advanced  in  our  age  toward  what  is 
morally  better  than  it  ever  was  before,  and  is  even  con¬ 
siderably  so  when  its  present  condition  is  compared  with 
what  it  has  been  in  all  former  ages,  notwithstanding  tem¬ 
porary  impediments,  which,  being  transitory,  can  prove 
nothing  against  the  general  position.  And  hence  the 
cry  about  the  continually  increasing  degeneracy  of  the 
race  merely  arises  from  the  fact  that  as  it  stands  on  a 
higher  stage  of  morality  it  sees  so  much  the  further  be¬ 
fore  it ;  and  thus  its  judgment  on  what  men  are  in  com¬ 
parison  with  what  they  ought  to  be  becomes  —  as  in  our 
own  self-criticism  —  the  more  severe  the  more  numerous 
are  the  stages  of  morality  which  mankind  have  already 
surmounted  in  the  whole  course  of  the  world’s  history 
as  it  is  now  known  to  us. 


% 


62 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


The  question  next  arises  as  to  the  meanfe  by  which 
this  continuous  progress  to  the  better  may  be  maintained 
and  even  hastened.  When  carefully  considered,  we  soon 
see  that  as  this  process  must  go  on  to  an  incalculable 
distance  of  time  it  cannot  depend  so  much  on  what  we 
may  do  of  ourselves,  for  instance,  on  the  education  we 
give  to  the  younger  generation  or  on  the  method  by 
which  we  may  proceed  in  order  to  realize  it,  as  on  what 
human  nature  as  such  will  do  in  and  with  us  to  compel 
us  to  move  in  a  track  into  which  we  would  not  readily 
have  betaken  ourselves.  For,  it  is  from  human  nature 
iu  general,  or  rather — since  supreme  wisdom  is  requisite 
for  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  —  it  is  from  Provi¬ 
dence  alone  that  we  can  expect  a  result  which  proceeds 
by  relation  to  the  whole  and  reacts  through  the  whole 
upon  the  parts.  Men  with  their  plans  start,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  only  from  the  parts,  and  even  continue  to  regard 
the  parts  alone,  while  the  whole  as  such  is  viewed  as  too 
great  for  them  to  influence  and  as  attainable  by  them 
only  in  idea.  And  this  holds  all  the  more  seeing  that, 
being  adverse  to  each  other  in  their  plans,  they  would 
hardly  be  able  to  work  together  in  order  to  influence  the 
whole  out  of  any  particular  free  purpose  of  their  own. 

Un  iversal  violence  and  the  necessity  arising  there¬ 
from  must  finally  bring  a  people  to  the  determination 
to  subject  themselves  to  national  law  and  to  set  up  a 
political  constitution,  a  necessity  which  is  the  very  method 
that  reason  itself  prescribes.  And,  in  like  manner,  the 
evils  arising  from  constant  wars  by  which  the  States 
seek  to  reduce  or  subdue  each  other  bring  them  at  last, 
even  against  their  will,  also  to  enter  into  a  universal,  or 
cosmopolitical,  constitution.  Or,  should  such  a  condition 

) 


TIIE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS 


(33 


of  universal  peace  —  as  lias  often  been  the  case  with 
overgrown  States  —  be  even  more  dangerous  to  liberty 
on  another  side  than  war,  by  introducing  the  most  terrible 
despotism,  then  the  evils  from  which  deliverance  is  sought 
will  compel  the  introduction  of  a  condition  among  the 
nations  which  does  not  assume  the  form  of  a  universal 
commonwealth  or  empire  under  one  sovereign  but  of  a 
federation  regulated  by  law,  according  to  the  law  of 
nations  as  concerted  in  common. 

For  the  advancing  civilization  of  the  several  States  is 
accompanied  with  a  growing  propensity  to  enlarge  them¬ 
selves  at  the  cost  of  others,  by  fraud  or  force.  And  thus 
wars  are  multiplied ;  and  greater  expenditure  is  always 
caused  by  the  necessary  maintenance  of  increased  stand¬ 
ing  armies,  kept  in  a  state  of  readiness  and  discipline  and 
provided  ever  and  again  with  more  numerous  instruments 
of  war.  At  the  same  time  the  prices  of  all  the  necessaries 
of  life  must  go  on  continually  increasing,  while  there  can 
be  no  hope  of  a  proportionately  progressive  growth  of 
the  metals  that  represent  them.  Nor  does  peace  ever  last 
so  long  that  the  savings  during  it  would  equal  the  ex¬ 
penditure  required  for  the  next  war.  Against  this  evil 
the  introduction  of  national  debts  is  indeed  an  ingenious 
resource,  but  it  is  one  which  must  annihilate  itself  in  the 
long  run.  Under  pressure  of  all  these  evils,  what  good¬ 
will  ought  to  have  done  but  did  not  do  is  at  last  brought 
about  by  sheer  weakness,  so  that  every  State  becomes  so 
organized  within  that  it  is  no  longer  the  sovereign  —  to 
whom  war  properly  costs  nothing  since  he  carries  it  on  at 
the  cost  of  the  people  —  but  it  is  the  people,  on  whom 
the  cost  falls,  who  have  the  deciding  voice  as  to  whether 


there  shall  be  war  or  no. 


This  is  necessarily  implied  in 


64 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


the  realization  of  the  idea  of  the  original  contract.  But 
when  the  decision  of  the  question  of  war  falls  to  the 
people,  neither  will-  the  desire  of  aggrandizement  nor 
mere  verbal  injuries  be  likely  to  induce  them  to  put 
themselves  in  danger  of  personal  privation  and  want  by 
inflicting  upon  themselves  the  calamities  of  war,  which 
the  sovereign  in  his  own  person  escapes.  And  thus  pos¬ 
terity,  no  longer  oppressed  by  undeserved  burdens  and 
owing*  it  not  to  the  direct  love  of  others  for  them  but 

O 

only  to  the  rational  self-love  of  each  age  for  itself,  will 
be  able  to  make  progress  even  in  moral  relations.  For 
each  commonwealth,  now  become  unable  to  injure  any 
other  by  violence,  must  maintain  itself  by  right  alone ; 
and  it  may  hope  on  real  grounds  that  the  others  being 
constituted  like  itself  will  then  come,  on  occasions  of 
need,  to  its  aid. 

This,  however,  it  may  be  said,  is  only  opinion  and 
mere  hypothesis,  and  it  is  uncertain,  like  all  theories 
which  aim  at  stating  the  only  suitable  natural  cause  for 
a  proposed  effect  that  is  not  wholly  in  our  own  power. 
Further,  even  regarded  as  such,  the  cause  suggested, 
when  it  is  taken  in  relation  to  an  already  existing  State, 
does  not  contain  a  principle  that  is  applicable  to  the 
subject  so  as  to  compel  the  production  of  the  effect, 
but  is  only  available  through  sovereigns  who  are  free 
from  compulsion.  But  although  it  does  not  lie  in  the 
nature  of  men,  according  to  common  experience,  to 
make  a  voluntary  renouncement  of  their  power,  yet  in 
pressing  circumstances  this  is  not  $t  all  impossible. 
And  so  the  statement,  that  the  circumstances  requisite 
for  the  end  in  question  are  to  be  expected  from  Provi¬ 
dence,  may  be  regarded  as  an  expression  not  unsuitable 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESS 


65 


to  the  moral  wishes  and  hopes  of  men  conscious  of 
their  own  incapability.  For  it  is  to  Providence  that 
we  must  look  for  the  realization'  of  the  end  of  human¬ 
ity  in  the  whole  of  the  species,  as  furnishing  the 
means  for  the  attainment  of  the  final  destination  of  man, 
through  the  free  exercise  of  his  powers  so  far  as  they 
can  go.  For  to  this  end  the  purposes  of  individual  men, 
regarded  separately,  are  directly  opposed.  For  by  this 
mutual  antagonism  even  the  opposition  of  the  inclina¬ 
tions  from  which  evil  arises  provides  reason  free  play  to 
subject  them  all ;  and  so,  instead  of  evil  which  destroys 
itself,  good  makes  itself  predominant,  and  when  once 
established  continues  to  maintain  itself. 

Human  nature  appears  nowhere  less  amiable  than  in 
the  relation  of  whole  nations  to  each  other.  No  State  is 
for  a  moment  secure  against  another  in  its  independence 
or  its  possessions.  The  will  to  subdue  each  other  or  to 
reduce  their  power  is  always  rampant ;  and  the  equip¬ 
ment  for  defense,  which  often  makes  peace  even  more 
oppressive  and  more  destructive  of  internal  prosperity 
than  war,  can  never  be  relaxed.  Against  such  evils  there 
is  no  possible  remedy  but  a  system  of  international  right 
founded  upon  public  laws  conjoined  with  power,  to  which 
every  State  must  submit,  —  according  to  the  analogy  of 
the  civil  or  political  right  of  individuals  in  any  one  State. 
For  a  lasting  universal  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  so-called 
balance  of  power  in  Europe  is  a  mere  chimera.  It  is  like 
the  house  described  by  Swift,  which  was  built  by  an  archi¬ 
tect  so  perfectly  in  accordance  with  all  the  laws  of  equilib¬ 
rium  that  when  a  sparrow  lighted  upon  it  it  immediately 
fell.  "  But,”  it  may  be  said,  "  the  States  will  never  submit 


66 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


to  such  compulsory  laws ;  and  the  proposal  to  institute 
a  universal  International  State,  or  Union  of  Nations 
a  union  under  whose  power  all  the  separate  States 
shall  voluntarily  arrange  themselves  in  order  to  obey  its 
laws  —  may  sound  ever  so  pretty  in  the  theory  of  an 
Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  or  a  Rousseau,  but  it  is  of  no  value 
for  practical  purposes ;  and  as  such  it  has  always  been 
laughed  at  by  great  statesmen,  and  still  more  by  sover¬ 
eigns  and  rulers,  as  a  childish  and  pedantic  idea  fit  only 
for  the  schools  from  which  it  takes  its  rise.” 

For  my  part,  on  the  contrary,  I  trust  to  a  theory  which 
is  based  upon  the  principle  of  right  as  determining  what 
the  relations  between  men  and  States  ought  to  be ;  and 
which  lays  down  to  these  earthly  gods  the  maxim  that 
they  ought  so  to  proceed  in  their  disputes  that  such  a 
universal  International  State  may  be  introduced  thereby, 
and  to  assume  it  therefore  as  not  only  possible  in  prac¬ 
tice  but  such  as  can  exist  in  reality.  Nay  more,  this 
theory  is  further  to  be  regarded  as  founded  upon  the 
nature  of  things,  which  compels  movement  in  a  direc¬ 
tion  even  against  the  will  of  man.  Fata  volentem  ducunt , 
nolentem  trahunt.  Under  the  nature  of  things,  human 
nature  is  also  to  be  taken  into  account ;  and  as  in  human 
nature  there  is  always  a  living  respect  for  right  and  duty, 
I  neither  can  nor  will  regard  it  as  so  sunk  in  evil  that 
the  practical  moral  reason  could  ultimately  fail  to  triumph 
over  this  evil,  even  after  many  of  its  attempts  have  failed. 
And  so  it  is  that  I  would  represent  human  nature  as 
worthy  to  be  loved.  In  the  widest  cosmopolitical  rela¬ 
tion  the  position  therefore  holds  good  that  what  is  valid 
on  rational  grounds  as  a  theory  is  also  valid  and  good 
for  practice. 


IV 

ETERNAL  PEACE 
A  PHILOSOPHICAL  ESSAY 
1795 


" ETERNAL  PEACE ” 


These  words  were  once  put  by  a  Dutch  innkeeper  on 
his  signboard  as  a  satirical  inscription  over  the  representa¬ 
tion  of  a  churchyard.  We  need  not  inquire  whether  they 
hold  of  men  in  general  or  particularly  of  the  rulers  of 
States  who  seem  never  to  be  satiated  of  war  or  even  only 
of  the  philosophers  who  dream  that  sweet  dream  of  Peace. 
The  author  of  the  present  sketch,  however,  would  make 
one  remark  by  way  of  reservation  in  reference  to  it.  It 
is  well  known  that  the  practical  politician  looks  down, 
with  great  self-complacency,  on  the  theoretical  politician 
when  he  comes  in  the  way,  as  a  mere  pedant  whose  empty 
ideas  can  bring  no  danger  to  the  State,  proceeding,  as  it 
does,  upon  principles  derived  from  experience ;  and  the 
theorizer  may,  therefore,  be  allowed  to  throw  down  his 
eleven  skittle-pins  at  once,  while  the  sagacious  statesman 
who  knows  the  world  need  not,  on  that  account,  even 
give  himself  a  turn !  This  being  so,  should  any  matter 
of  controversy  arise  between  them,  the  practical  states¬ 
man  must  so  far  proceed  consistently  and  not  scent  out  a 
danger  for  the  State  behind  the  opinions  of  the  theoretical 
thinker,  which  he  has  ventured  in  a  good  intent  publicly 
to  express  —  by  which  "saving  clause,"  the  author  will 
consider  himself  expressly  safeguarded  against  all  mali¬ 
cious  interpretation. 


G8 


FIRST  SECTION 


WHICH  CONTAINS 

THE  PRELIMINARY  ARTICLES  OF  AN  ETERNAL 
PEACE  BETWEEN  STATES 

1.  "  No  conclusion  of  peace  shall  be  held  to  be  valid 
as  such  when  it  has  been  made  with  the  secret  reser¬ 
vation  of  the  material  for  a  future  war.” 

For,  in  that  case,  it  would  be  a  mere  truce,  or  a  sus¬ 
pension  of  hostilities,  and  not  a  peace.  A  peace  properly 
signifies  the  end  of  all  hostilities,  and  to  qualify  it  by 
the  addition  of  the  epithet  '  perpetual  ’  or  '  eternal  ’  is 
pleonastic  and  suspicious.  All  existing  causes  for  a  future 
war — although  they  were  perhaps  unknown  to  the  con¬ 
tracting  parties  at  the  time  —  are  to  be  regarded  as  entirely 
removed  or  annihilated  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  even  if 
they  could  be  picked  out  by  the  dexterity  of  an  acute 
interpretation  from  the  terms  of  documents  in  the  pub¬ 
lic  archives.  There  may  be  a  mental  reservation  of  old 
pretensions  or  claims  with  the  view  of  asserting  them  at 
a  future  time,  of  which,  however,  neither  party  makes  any 
mention  for  the  present  because  they  are  too  exhausted 
to  continue  the  war,  while  there  remains  the  evil  will  to 
take  advantage  of  the  first  favorable  opportunity  for  this 
purpose  ;  but  this  is  illegitimate  and  belongs  to  the  Jesu¬ 
itical  casuistry  of  politics.  If  we  consider  the  subject  of 
reservation  in  itself,  it  is  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  rulers 

G9 


70 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


of  States  to  have  to  do  with  it,  and,  in  like  manner,  the 
complacent  participation  in  such  deductions  is  beneath 
the  dignity  of  their  ministers.  But  if  the. true  glory  of 
the  State  is  placed  in  the  continual  increase  of  its  power, 
by  any  means  whatever,  —  according  to  certain  "  enlight¬ 
ened  ”  notions  of  national  policy,  —  then  this  judgment 
will  certainly  appear,  to  those  who  adopt  that  view,  to 
be  impractical  and  pedantic. 

2.  "  No  State  having  an  existence  by  itself  — 
whether  it  be  small  or  large  —  shall  be  acquirable 
by  another  State  through  inheritance,  exchange,  pur¬ 
chase  or  donation.” 


A  State  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  property  or  patrimony 
like  the  soil  on  which  it  may  be  settled.  is  a  society 
of  men,  over  which  no  one  but  itself  has  the  right  to  rule 
or  to  disponeJ  Like  the  stem  of  a  tree  it  has  its  own  root, 
and  to  incorporate  it  as  a  graft  in  another  State  is  to  de- 
stroy  its  existence  as  va  moral  person ;  it  is  to  reduce  it  to 
a  thing,  and  thereby  to  contradict  the  idea  of  the  origi¬ 
nal  compact  without  which  a  right  over  a  people  is  incon¬ 
ceivable.*  Every  one  knows  what  danger  the  prejudice 
in  favor  of  thus  acquiring  States  has  brought  to  Europe, 
—  for  in  the  other  parts  of  the  world  it  lias  never  been 
known,  —  even  down  to  our  own  times.  It  was  considered 
that  the  States  might  marry  one  another;  and  hence, 
on  the  one  hand,  a  new  kind  of  industry  in  the  effort  to 
acquire  predominance  by  family  alliances,  without  any 


*  A  hereditary  kingdom  is  not  a  State  which  can  be  bequeathed  to 
another  State,  hut  one  whose  right  to  rule  can  be  transmitted  to  another 
physical  person.  The  State  thus  acquires  a  ruler,  but  the  ruler  does  not  as 
such  (that  is,  as  already  possessing  another  kingdom)  acquire  the  State. 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


71 


expenditure  of  power ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  in¬ 
crease  in  this  way  by  new  possessions  the  extent  of  a 
country.  Further,  the  lending  of  the  troops  of  one  State 
to  another  on  pay  to  fight  against  an  enemy  not  at  war 
with  their  own  State  has  arisen  from  the  same  erroneous 
view ;  for  the  subjects  of  the  State  are  thus  used  and 
abused  as  things  that  may  be  managed  at  will. 

3.  "  Standing  armies  shall  be  entirely  abolished  in 
the  course  of  time.” 

For  they  threaten  other  States  incessantly  with  war  by 
their  appearing  to  be  always  equipped  to  enter  upon  it. 
Standing  armies  ( miles  perpetuus)  excite  the  States  to 
outrival  each  other  in  the  number  of  their  armed  men, 
which  has  no  limits.  By  the  expense  occasioned  thereby, 
peace  becomes  in  the  long  run  even  more  oppressive  than 
a  short  war ;  and  standing  armies  are  thus  the  cause  of 
acforessive  wars  undertaken  in  order  to  «'et  rid  of  this 
burden.  Besides,  it  has  to  be  considered  that  for  men  to 
be  hired  for  pay  to  kill  or  to  be  killed  appears  to  imply  the 
using  of  them  as  mere  machines  and  instruments  in  the 
hand  of  another,  although  it  be  the  State ;  and  that  this 
cannot  be  well  reconciled  with  the  right  of  humanity  in 
our  own  person.  It  is  quite  otherwise,  however,  as  regards 
the  voluntary  exercise  of  the  citizens  in  arms  at  certain  ap¬ 
pointed  periods  ;  for  the  object  in  view  is  thereby  to  pro¬ 
tect  themselves  and  their  country  from  external  attacks. 
The  accumulation  of  treasure  in  a  State  would  have  the 
same  sort  of  influence  as  regular  troops,  in  so  far  as,  being 
regarded  by  other  States  as  a  threat  of  war,  it  might  compel 
them  to  anticipate  such  a  war  by  an  attack  upon  the  State. 
For  of  the  three  powers  known  in  the  State  as  the  power 


72 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


of  the  army,  the  power  of  external  alliance  and  the  power 
of  money,  the  money  power  might  well  become  the  most 
reliable  instrument  of  war,  did  not  the  difficulty  of  deter¬ 
mining  its  real  force  stand  in  the  way  of  its  employment. 

i 

4.  "  No  national  debts  shall  be  contracted  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  external  affairs  of  the  State/ ’ 

No  objection  can  be  taken  to  seeking  assistance,  either 
without  or  within  the  State,  in  behalf  of  the  economic 
administration  of  the  country ;  such  as,  for  the  improve¬ 
ment  of  highways  or  in  support  of  new  colonies  or  in  the 
establishment  of  resources  against  dearth  and  famine.  A 

O 

loan,  whether  raised  externally  or  internally,  as  a  source 
of  aid  in  such  cases  is  above  suspicion.  But  a  credit  sys¬ 
tem,  when  used  by  the  powers  as  a  hostile,  antagonistic 
instrument  against  each  other  and  when  the  debts  under 
it  go  on  increasing  to  an  excessive  extent  and  yet  are 
always  secured  for  the  present  (because  all  the  creditors 
are  not  to  put  in  their  claims  at  once),  is  a  dangerous 
money  power.  This  arrangement  —  the  ingenious  inven¬ 
tion  of  a  cofnmercial  people  in  this  century — constitutes, 
in  fact,  a  treasure  for  the  carrying  on  of  war ;  it  may  ex¬ 
ceed  the  treasures  of  all  the  other  States  taken  together, 
and  it  can  only  be  exhausted  by  the  forthcoming  deficit 
of  the  taxes, — which,  however,  may  be  long  delayed  even 
by  the  animation  of  the  national  commerce  from  the  re¬ 
action  of  the  system  upon  industry  and  trade.  The  facility 
given  by  this  system  for  engaging  in  war,  combined  with 
the  inclination  of  rulers  toward  it  (an  inclination  which 
seems  to  be  implanted  in  human  nature),  is,  therefore, 
a  great  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  perpetual  peace.  The 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


73 


prohibition  of  it  must  be  laid  down  as  a  preliminary  article 
in  the  conditions  of  such  a  peace,  even  more  strongly  on 
the  further  ground  that  the  national  bankruptcy,  which 
it  inevitably  brings  at  last,  would  necessarily  involve  in  the 
loss  many  other  States  that  are  without  debt ;  and  this 
would  be  a  public  lesion  of  these  other  States.  And,  con¬ 
sequently,  the  other  States  are  justified  in  allying  them¬ 
selves  against  such  a  State  and  its  pretensions. 

5.  "  No  State  shall  intermeddle  by  force  with  the 
constitution  or  government  of  another  State.’ ’ 

For  what  could  justify  it  in  doing  so?  Mayhap  the 
scandal  or  offense  given  by  that  State  to  the  subjects  of 
another  State  ?  Then  the  offending  State  should  much 
rather  serve  as  a  warning  by  the  example  of  the  great 
evils  which  peoples  have  drawn  upon  themselves  through 
their  lawlessness;  and  generally  a  bad  example  given  by 
one  free  person  to  another  (as  a  scandalum  acceptum )  is 
not  a  lesion  of  his  right.  But  it  is  a  different  case  where 
a  State  has  become  divided  into  two  by  internal  disunion 
and  when  each  of  the  parts  represents  itself  as  a  separate 
State  laying  claim  to  the  whole  ;  for  to  furnish  assistance 
to  one  of  them  under  these  circumstances  might  not  be 

O 

reckoned  as  the  intermeddling  of  an  external  State  with 
the  constitution  of  another,  as  that  other  is  then  in  a 
condition  of  anarchy.  Yet  so  long  as  this  internal  strife 
is  not  decided,  such  an  interference  on  the  part  of  exter¬ 
nal  powers  would  be  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  an  inde¬ 
pendent  people  that  is  only  struggling  with  an  external 
evil.  It  would,  therefore,  itself  be  a  cause  of  offense,  and 

m 

would  make  the  autonomy  of  all  other  States  insecure. 


74 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


6.  "  No  State  at  war  with  another  shall  adopt 
such  modes  of  hostility  as  would  necessarily  render 
mutual  confidence  impossible  in  a  future  peace ; 
such  as  the  employment  of  assassins  ( percussores) 
or  poisoners  ( venefici ),  the  violation  of  a  capitulation, 
the  instigation  of  treason  and  such  like.” 

These  are  dishonorable  stratagems.  For  there  must 
be  some  trust  in  the  habit  and  disposition  even  of  an 
enemy  in  war ;  otherwise  no  peace  could  be  concluded, 
and  the  hostilities  would  pass  into  an  internecine  war 
of  extermination.  War,  however,  is  only  a  melancholy 
necessity  of  asserting  right  by  force  —  where,  as  in  the 
state  of  nature,  there  is  no  common  tribunal  with  the 
rightful  power  to  adjudicate  on  causes  of  quarrel.  In 
such  circumstances  neither  of  the  two  parties  can  be  de¬ 
clared  to  be  an  unjust  enemy  as  this  presupposes  a  judi¬ 
cial  sentence;  but  the  issue  of  the  conflict — as  in  the 
so-called  "  judgments  of  God  ” —  has  to  decide  on  which 
side  is  the  right.  As  between  States,  however,  a  punitive 
war,  according  to  the  principle  of  punishment,  is  incon¬ 
ceivable  ;  because  there  is  no  relation  of  subordination 
between  them,  as  between  superior  and  inferior.  Hence 
it  follows  that  a  war  of  extermination,  in  which  the  proc¬ 
ess  of  annihilation  would  strike  at  both  parties,  and 
likewise  at  all  right  at  the  same  time,  would  reach  per¬ 
petual  peace  only  on  the  final  Golgotha  of  the  human 
race.  Such  a  war,  therefore,  as  well  as  the  use  of  such 
means  as  might  lead  to  it,  must  be  absolutely  unallowable. 
And  that  the  means  referred  to  inevitably  lead  to  that 
result  is  apparent  from  the  fact  that  when  these  hellish 
arts,  which  are  debasing  in  themselves,  are  once  brought 
into  use  they  are  not  kept  long  within  the  limits  of  war. 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


75 


Such,  for  instance,  is  the  employment  of  spies.  In  this  case 
it  is  only  the  dishonesty  of  others  that  is  employed,  and, 
as  such  practices  and  habits  cannot  be  exterminated  at 
once,  they  would  be  carried  over  into  the  state  of  peace, 
and  thus  its  very  purpose  would  be  entirely  frustrated. 

The  articles  thus  indicated,  when  viewed  objectively, 
or  as  to  the  intention  of  the  powers,  represent  merely 
prohibitive  laws.  Some  of  them,  however,  are  strict  laws 
( leges  strictae )  that  are  valid  without  distinction  of  cir¬ 
cumstances,  and  press  immediately  for  the  abolition  of 
certain  things.  Such  are  Nos.  1,  5,  6.  Others,  again, — 
as  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  —  have  a  certain  subjective  breadth 
( leges  latae)  in  respect  of  their  application.  Although 
they  present  no  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  right,  they 
imply  a  regard  to  circumstances  in  practice.  They  in¬ 
clude  permissions  to  delay  their  fulfillment  without, 
however,  losing  sight  of  their  end ;  for  their  end  allows 
such  delay.  Thus,  for  instance,  in  regard  to  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  certain  States  to  the  liberty  of  which  they  have 
been  deprived,  it  is  allowable,  according  to  the  second 
article,  to  postpone  it  —  not,  indeed,  to  the  Greek  kalends, 
as  Augustus  was  wont  to  say,  so  that  its  time  would 
never  come ;  but  only  so  as  not  to  precipitate  its  com¬ 
ing,  and  thus  by  overhaste  to  act  contrary  to  the  very 
purpose  in  view.  The  prohibition  in  question  bears  only 
upon  a  mode  of  acquisition  which  is  to  be  no  longer  valid, 
but  not  upon  the  state  of  possession  which,  although  it 
may  not  hold  the  requisite  title  of  right,  was  neverthe¬ 
less  regarded  as  rightful  and  valid  by  all  the  States  at 
the  date  of  the  putative  acquisition,  in  accordance  with 
the  public  opinion  of  the  time.1 

Notes  indicated  by  Arabic  numbers  are  long  and  are  gathered  at  the 
end  of  the  volume,  pages  lb'J-lTU. 


SECOND  SECTION 


WHICH  CONTAINS 


THE  DEFINITIVE  ARTICLES  OF  AN  ETERNAL  PEACE 

BETWEEN  STATES 

A  state  of  peace  among  men  who  live  side  by  side 
with  each  other  is  not  the  natural  state.  The  state  of 
nature  is  rather  a  state  of  war for  although  it  may  not 
always  present  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  it  is  never¬ 
theless  continually  threatened  with  them.  The  state  of 
peace  must,  therefore,  be  established ;  for  the  mere  ces¬ 
sation  of  hostilities  furnishes  no  security  against  their 
recurrence,  and  where  there  is  no  guarantee  of  peace 
between  neighboring  States  —  which  can  only  be  fur¬ 
nished  under  conditions  that  are  regulated  by  law  — 
the  one  may  treat  the  other,  when  proclamation  is  made 
to  that  effect,  as  an  enemy.2 


FIRST  DEFINITIVE  ARTICLE  IN  THE  CONDITIONS  OF 

ETERNAL  PEACE 

"  The  civil  constitution  in  every  State  shall  be 
republican.” 

A  republican  constitution  is  one  that  is  founded, 
firstly,  according  to  the  principle  of  the  liberty  of  the 
members  of  a  society,  as  men ;  secondly,  according  to 
the  principle  of  the  dependence  of  all  its  members  on  a 

76  . 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


77 


single  common  legislation,  as  subjects ;  and,  thirdly, 
according  to  the  law  of  the  equality  of  its  members  as 
citizens.  \The  republican  constitution  3  is  thus  the  only 
one  which  arises  out  of  the  idea  of  the  original  compact 
upon  which  all  the  rightful  legislation  of  a  people  is 
founded.  As  regards  public  law,  Ahe  republican  prin¬ 
ciples,  therefore,  lie  originally  and  essentially  at  the 


t 


I 


basis  of  the  civil  constitution  in  all  its  forms  y  and  the 


only  question  for  us  now  is  whether  it  is  also  the  only 


constitution  that  can  lead  to  a  perpetual  peace. 

Now,  in  point  of  fact,  the  republican  constitution,  in 
addition  to  the  purity  of  its  origin  as  arising  from  the 
original  source  of  the  conception  of  right,  includes  also 
the  prospect  of  realizing  the  desired  object,  —  perpetual 
peace”ambng  the  nations.  And  the  reason  of  this  may 
be  stated  as'  follows :  According  to  the  republican  con¬ 
stitution,  the  consent  of  the  citizens  as  members  of  the 


o 


State  is  required  to  determine  at  any  time  the  question 
whether  there  shall  be  war  or  not.  Hence,  nothing  is 


more  natural  than  that  they  should  be  very  loath  to  enter 
upon  so  undesirable  an  undertaking ;  for  in  decreeing  it 
they  would  necessarily  be  resolving  to  bring  upon  them¬ 
selves  all  the  horrors  of  war.  And,  in  their  case,  this 
implies  such  consequences  as  these :  to  have  to  fight  in 
their  own  persons ;  to  supply  the  costs  of  the  war  out 
of  their  own  property;  to  have  sorrowfully  to  repair  the 
devastation  which  it  leaves  behind ;  and,  as  a  crowning 
evil,  to  have  to  take  upon  themselves  at  the  end  a  bur¬ 
den  of  debt  which  will  go  on  embittering  peace  itself  and 
which  it  will  be  impossible  ever  to  pay  off  on  account  of 
the  constant  threatening  of  further  impending  wars.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  a  constitution  where  the  subject  is  not 


78 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


a  voting  member  of  the  State  and  which  is,  therefore, 
not  republican,  the  resolution  to  go  to  war  is  a  matter 
of  the  smallest  concern  in  the  world.  For,  in  this  case, 
the  ruler,  who,  as  such,  is  not  a  mere  citizen  but  the 
owner  of  the  State,  need  not  in  the  least  suffer  person¬ 
ally  by  war,  nor  has  he  to  sacrifice  his  pleasures  of  the 
table  or  of  the  chase  or  his  pleasant  palaces,  court  festi¬ 
vals  and  such  like.  He  can,  therefore,  resolve  for  war 
from  insignificant  reasons,  as  if  it  were  but  a  hunting 
expedition ;  and,  as  regards  its  propriety,  he  may  leave 
the  justification  of  it  without  concern  to  the  diplomatic 
•body,  who  are  always  too  ready  to  give  their  services 
for  that  purpose. 

The  republican  constitution  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  the  democratic  constitution^  But  as  this  is  com¬ 
monly  done,  the  following  remarks  must  be  made  in  order 
to  guard  against  this  confusion.  The  various  forms  of  the 
State  ( civitas )  may  be  divided  either  according  to  the 
difference  of  the  persons  who  hold  the  highest  authority 
in  the  State,  or  according  to  the  mode  of  the  governing  of 
the  people  through  its  supreme  head.  The  first  is  prop¬ 
erly  called  the  form  of  rule  in  the  State  ( forma  imperii ). 
There  are  only  three  forms  of  this  kind  possible,  accord¬ 
ing  as  one  only,  or  as  some  in  connection  with  each  other, 
or  as  allThose  constituting  the  civil  society  combined 
together  may  happen  to  possess  the  governing  power; 
and  thus  we  have  either  an  autocracy  constituted  by 
the  power  of  a  monarch,  or  an  aristocracy  constituted 
by  the  power  of  the  nobles,  or  a  democracy  Constituted 
by  the  power  of  the  people.  The  second  principle  of  divi¬ 
sion  is  taken  from  the  form  of  the  government  ( forma 
regiminis );  and,  viewing  the  constitution  as  the  act  of 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


79 


the  common  or  universal  will  by  which  a  number  of  men 
become  a  people,  it  regards  the  mode  in  which  the  State, 
founded  on  the  constitution,  makes  use  of  its  supreme 
power.  In  this  connection  the  form  of  government  is 
either  republican  or  despotic.  Republicanism  regarded 
as  the  constitutive  principle  of  a  State  is  the  political 
severance  of  the  executive  power  of  the  government 
from  the  legislative  power.  Despotism  is  in  principle 
the  irresponsible  executive  administration  of  the  State 
by  laws  laid  down  and  enacted  by  the  same  power  that 
administers  them ;  and  consequently  the  ruler  so  far  ex¬ 
ercises  his  own  private  will  as  if  it  were  the  public  will. 
Of  the  three  forms  of  the  State,  a  democracy,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  is  necessarily  a  despotism ;  because  it 
establishes  an  executive  power  in  which  all  resolve  about 
and,  it  may  be,  also  against  any  one  who  is  not  in  accord 
with  it ;  and  consequently  the  all  who  thus  resolve  are 
really  not  all ;  which  is  a  contradiction  of  the  universal 
will  with  itself  and  with  liberty. 

^  Every  form  of  government,  in  fact,  which  is  not 
representative  is  properly  a  spurious  form  of  govern¬ 
ment,  or  not  a  form  of  government  at  all ;  because  the 
lawgiver  in  one  and  the  same  person  may,  at  the  same 
time,  be  the  executive  administrator  of  his  own  will. 
And,  although  the  other  two  political  constitutions  — 
autocracy  and  aristocracy  —  are  always  so  far  defective 
in  that  they  afford  opportunity  for  such  a  mode  of  gov¬ 
ernment,  it  is  at  least  possible  in  their  cases  that  a  mode 
of  government  may  be  adopted  in  conformity  with  the 
spirit  of  a  representative  system.  Thus  Frederick  the 
Great  was  wont  to  say  of  himself  that  he  was  f  merely 
the  highest  servant  of  the  State.’4  But  the  democratic 


80 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


constitution,  on  the  contrary,  makes  such  a  spirit  impos¬ 
sible  ;  because  under  it  every  one  wishes  to  be  master. 

J  (It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  fewer  the  number  of 
tile  rulers  or  personal  administrators  of  the  power  of  the 
State,  and  the  greater  the  representation  embodied  in 
them,  so  much  the  more  does  the  political  constitution 
harmonize  with  the  possibility  of  republicanism ;  and 
such  a  constitution  may  hope  to  raise  itself,  by  gradual 
reforms,  to  the  republican  ideal.  On  this  account,  it  is 
more  difficult  to  attain  to  this  one  perfect  constitution 
according  to  the  principles  of  right  in  an  aristocracy  than 
in  a  monarchy,  and  in  a  democracy  it  is  impossible  other¬ 
wise  than  by  violent  revolution.  As  regards  the  people, 
however,  the  mode  of  government5  is  incomparably  more 
important  than  the  form  of  the  constitution,  although  the 
degree  of  conformity  in  the  constitution  to  the  end  of  gov¬ 
ernment  is  also  of  much  importance.  But  if  the  mode 
of  government  is  to  conform  to  the  idea  of  right,  it  must 
embody  the  representative  system.  For  in  this  system 
alone  is  a  really  republican  mode  of  government  possible; 
and  without  it,  let  the  constitution  be  what  it  may,  it  will 
be  despotic  and  violent.  In  none  of  the  ancient  so-called 
republics  was  this  known ;  and  they  necessarily  became 
resolved,  in  consequence,  into  an  absolute  form  of  despot¬ 
ism,  which  is  always  most  bearable  when  the  supreme 
power  is  concentrated  in  a  single  individual. 


ETERNAL  TEACE 


81 


SECOND  DEFINITIVE  ARTICLE  IN  THE  CONDITIONS  OF 

ETERNAL  PEACE 


"  The  law  of  nations  shall  be  founded  on  a  federa¬ 
tion  of  free  States/ 9 


(^Peoples  or  nations  regarded  as  States  may  be  judged 
like  individual  men.  Now  men  living  in  a  state  of  nature 
independent  of  external  laws,  by  their  very  contiguity 
to  each  other,  give  occasion  to  mutual  injury  or  lesion. 
Every  people,  for  the  sake  of  its  own  security,  thus  may 
and  ought  to  demand  from  any  other  that  it  shall  enter 
along  with  it  into  a  constitution,  similar  to  the  civil  con¬ 
stitution,  in  which  the  right  of  each  shall  be  secured. 
This  would  give  rise  to  an  international  federation  of  the 
peoples.  This,  however,  would  not  have  to  take  the  form 
of  a  State  made  up  of  these  nations.  For  that  would  in¬ 
volve  a  contradiction,  since  every  State,  properly  so  called, 
contains  the  relation  of  a  superior  as  the  lawgiver  to  an 
inferior  as  the  people  subject  to  the  laws.  Moreover, 
many  nations  in  one  State  would  constitute  only  one 
nation,  which  is  contradictory  to  the  principle  assumed, 
as  we  are  here  considering  the  right  of  nations  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  each  other,  in  so  far  as  they  constitute  different 
States  and  are  not  to  be  fused  into  one. 

The  attachment  of  savages  to  the  lawless  liberty  of 
rather  being  engaged  in  incessant  conflict  with  each 
other  than  submitting  to  a  legal  constraint  constituted 
by  themselves  is  well  known.  Hence  their  preference 
of  wild  freedom  to  rational  liberty  is  looked  upon  by  us 
with  profound  contempt  and  characterized  as  barbarism, 
coarseness  and  a  brutal  degradation  of  humanity.  Thus 


82 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


it  might  be  thought  that  civilized  nations,  being  each 
united  into  a  State,  would  of  necessity  make  all  haste 
to  advance  as  soon  as  possible  out  of  any  semblance  to 
a  condition  that  is  so  much  condemned.  Instead  of  this, 
however,  we  rather  find  that  every  State  founds  its  maj¬ 
esty*  on  not  being  subject  to  any  external  legal  coercion; 
and  the  glory  of  its  ruler  or  head  is  made  to  consist  in 
the  fact  that,  without  his  requiring  to  encounter  any 
danger  himself,  many  thousands  stand  ready  to  be  sacri¬ 
ficed  at  his  command  for  a  cause  which  may  be  no  con¬ 
cern  of  theirs.  +  Thus  the  difference  between  the  white 
savages  of  Europe  and  the  red  savages  of  America,  con¬ 
sists  mainly  in  this :  that,  while  some  tribes  of  the  latter 
have  been  entirely  eaten  up  by  their  enemies,  the  former 
know  how  to  make  a  better  use  of  the  vanquished  than 
to  eat  them,  by  rather  adding  them  to  the  number  of  their 
subjects  and  thereby  increasing  the  multitude  of  their  in¬ 
struments  and  means  for  still  more  extensive  wars. 

The  depravity  of  human  nature  is  exhibited  without 
disguise  in  the  unrestrained  relations  of  the  nations  to 
each  other,  whereas  in  the  legalized  state  of  civil  society 
it  is  greatly  veiled  under  the  constraint  of  government. 
In  view  of  it,  we  may  well  wonder  that  the  word  '  law’ 
has  not  yet  been  entirely  banished  from  the  policy  of 
war  as  pedantic,  and  that  no  State  has  as  yet  ventured 
to  declare  itself  publicly  in  favor  of  that  doctrine.  For 
Grotius,  Puffendorf,  Vattel  and  the  others  —  miserable 
comforters  all  of  them  —  are  still  always  quoted  cordially 

*  The  majesty  of  a  people  or  nation  is  an  erroneous  and  absurd  expression. 

f  Thus  a  Bulgarian  prince,  when  the  Greek  Emperor  was  desirous  to 
bring  his  quarrel  with  him  to  an  end  by  a  duel,  gave  his  answer  by  saying: 
"  A  smith  who  has  tongs  will  not  pluck  the  glowing  iron  out  of  the  coals 
with  his  hands.” 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


83 


for  the  justification  of  an  outbreak  of  war,  although  their 
philosophically  or  diplomatically  composed  codes  have 
not,  nor  could  have,  the  slightest  legal  force,  since  the 
States  as  such  stand  under  no  common  legal  constraint; 
and  there  is  not  an  example  of  a  State  ever  having 
been  moved  to  desist  from  its  purpose  by  arguments, 
although  armed  with  testimonies  of  such  important  men. 
Yet  the  homage  which  every  State  thus  renders  — at  least 
in  words — to  the  conception  of  law  still  proves  that  there 
is  to  be  found  in  man  a  higher  and  greater  moral  capacity, 
though  it  may  slumber  for  a  time ;  and  it  is  evidently 
felt  that  this  capacity  will  yet  attain  the  mastery  over 
the  evil  principle  in  him,  the  existence  of  which  cannot 
be  denied  ;  and  this  gives  a  ground  of  hope  to  others. 
For  the  word  'law'  would  otherwise  never  enter  into  the 
vocabulary  of  States  desirous  to  go  to  war  with  each 
other,  unless  it  were  merely  to  make  a  jest  of  it,  in  the 
manner  of  the  Gallic  prince  who  declared  that  "  it  is  the 
prerogative  of  the  strong  to  make  the  weak  obey  them.” 

The  means  by  which  States  pursue  their  rights  at 
present  can  never  be  by  a  form  of  process,  —  as  if  there 
were  an  external  tribunal,  —  but  can  only  be  by  war ; 
but  even  the  favorable  issue  of  war  in  victory  will  not 
decide  a  matter  of  right.  A  treaty  of  peace  may,  indeed, 
put  an  end  to  a  particular  war,  yet  not  to  the  general 
condition  of  war,  in  which  a  pretext  can  always  be  found 
for  new  hostilities.  Nor  can  such  a  pretext  under  these 
circumstances  be  regarded  as  unjust ;  for  in  this  state  of 
society  every  nation  is  the  judge  of  its  own  cause.  At 
the  same  time,  the  position  which,  according  to  the  law 
of  nature,  holds  of  men  in  a  lawless  condition,  that  "they 
ought  to  advance  out  of  that  condition,”  cannot  according 


84 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


to  the  law  of  nations  be  directly  applied  to  States;  be¬ 
cause  as  States  they  have  already  within  themselves  a 
legal  constitution  and  have  thus  outgrown  the  coercive 
right  of  others  to  bring  them  under  a  wider  legal  con¬ 
stitution  according  to  conceptions  of  law.  And  yet 
reason  on  the  throne  of  the  highest  moral  law-giving 
power  absolutely  condemns  war  as  a  mode  of  right,  and, 
on  the  contrary,  makes  the  state  of  peace  an  immediate 
duty.  But  the  state  of  peace  cannot  be  founded  or 
secured  without  a  compact  of  the  nations  with  each 
other.  Hence,  there  must  be  a  compact  of  a  special  kind, 
which  may  be  called  a  pacific  federation  ( foedus  pacifi- 
cum ),  and  which  would  be  distinguished  from  a  mere 
treaty  or  compact  of  peace  ( pad  Tim  pads )  in  that  the 
latter  merely  puts  an  end  to  one  war  whereas  the  former 
would  seek  to  put  an  end  to  all  wars  forever.  This  fed¬ 
eration  will  not  aim  at  the  acquisition  of  any  of  the 
political  powers  of  a  State,  but  merely  at  the  preserva¬ 
tion  and  guarantee  for  itself,  and  likewise  for  the  other 
confederated  States,  of  the  liberty  that  is  proper  to  a 
State  ;  and  this  would  not  require  these  States  to  subject 
themselves  for  this  purpose  —  as  is  the  case  with  men 
in  the  state  of  nature  —  to  public  laws  and  to  coercion 
under  them.  <  The  practicability  and  objective  realiza¬ 
tion  of  this  idea  of  federalism,  inasmuch  as  it  has  to 
spread  itself  over  all  States  and  thereby  lead  to  per¬ 
petual  peace,  may  be  easily  shown. ,  For  if  happy  circum¬ 
stances  bring  it  about  that  a  powerful  and  enlightened 
people  form  themselves  into  a  republic  —  which  by  its 
very  nature  must  be  disposed  in  favor  of  perpetual  peace 
—  this  will  furnish  a  center  of  federative  union  for 
other  States  to  attach  themselves  to,  and  thus  to  secure 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


85 


the  conditions  of  liberty  among  all  States,  according  to 
the  idea  of  the  law  of  nations.  And  such  a  union  would 
extend  wider  and  wider,  in  the  course  of  time,  by  the 
addition  of  further  connections  of  this  kind. 

It  is  intelligible  that  a  people  should  say:  'There 
shall  be  no  war  among  us :  for  we  will  form  ourselves 
into  a  State  and  constitute  of  ourselves  a  supreme  legis¬ 
lative,  governing  and  judicial  power  which  will  peace¬ 
fully  settle  our  differences/  But  if  this  State  says : 
'  There  shall  be  no  war  between  me  and  other  States, 
although  I  recognize  no  supreme  legislative  power  which 
will  secure  me  my  right  and  whose  right  I  will  also 
secure,’  —  then  there  is  no  intelligible  basis  upon  which 
any  security  for  such  rights  could  be  founded  unless  it 
were  a  surrogate  of  the  union  embodied  in  civil  society. 
And  this  can  be  nothing  but  a  free  federation  of  the 
states,  which  reason  must  necessarily  connect  with  the 
idea  of  the  law  of  nations  if  there  is  anything  further  to 
be  thought  in  connection  with  it. 

The  notion  of  a  right  to  go  to  war  cannot  be  properly 
conceived  as  an  element  in  the  law  of  nations.  For  it 
would  be  equivalent  to  a  right  to  determine  what  is  just, 
not  by  universal  external  laws  limiting  the  freedom  of 
every  individual  alike  but  through  one-sided  maxims 
that  operate  by  means  of  force.  If  such  a  right  be  con¬ 
ceivable  at  all  it  would  amount,  in  fact,  to  this :  that  in 
the  case  of  men  who  are  so  disposed  it  is  quite  right  for 
them  to  destroy  and  devour  each  other,  and  thus  to  find 
perpetual  peace  only  in  the  wide  grave  which  is  to  cover 
all  the  abomination  of  the  deeds  of  violence  and  their 
authors!  For  States  viewed  in  relation  to  each  other, 
there  can  be  only  one  way,  according  to  reason,  of 


86 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


emerging1  from  that  lawless  condition  which  contains 

O  O 


nothing  but  occasions  of  war.  Just  as  in  the  case  of 

O 

individual  men,  reason  would  drive  them  to  give  up  their 
savage,  lawless  freedom  to  accommodate  themselves  to 
public  coercive  laws,  and  thus  to  form  an  ever-growing 
state  of  nations,  such  as  would  at  last  embrace  all  the 
nations  of  the  earth.  But  as  the  nations,  according  to 
their  ideas  of  international  law,  will  not  have  such  a 
positive  rational  system,  and  consequently  reject  in  fact 
(in  the  si)  what  is  right  in  theory  (in  hypothesi),  it  can¬ 
not  be  realized  in  this  pure  form.  Hence,,  instead  of  the 
positive  idea  of  a  universal  republic  —  if  all  is  not  to  be 
lost  —  we  shall  have  as  result  only  the  negative  surro¬ 
gate  of  a  federation  of  the  states  averting  war,  subsist- 
iug  in  an  external  union  and  always  extending  itself 
over  tiny  worlds  And  thus  the  current  of  those  inclina¬ 
tions  and  passions  of  men  which  are  antagonistic  to  right 
and  productive  of  war  may  be  checked,  although  there 
will  still  be  a  danger  of  their  breaking  out  betimes.6  For 

O  O 


as  Virgil 


puts  it, 


Furor  impius  intus 


.  .  .  fremet  horridus  ore  cruento. 


THIRD  DEFINITIVE  ARTICLE  IN  THE  CONDITIONS  OF 

ETERNAL  PEACE 

"  The  rights  of  men  as  citizens  of  the  world  in  a 
cosmopolitical  system  shall  be  restricted  to  condi¬ 
tions  of  universal  hospitality.’ ’ 

In  this  as  in  the  previous  articles,  the  question  is  not 
about  a  relation  of  philanthropy,  but  one  of  right. 
Hospitality  here  indicates  the  right  of  a  stranger,  in 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


87 


consequence  of  his  arrival  on  the  soil  of  another  country, 
not  to  be  treated  by  its  citizens  as  an  enemy.  As  a 
stranger  he  may  be  turned  away,  if  this  can  be  done 
without  involving  his  death ;  but  so  long  as  he  conducts 
himself  peacefully  in  the  place  where  he  may  happen  to 
be,  he  is  not  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  hostile  way.  The 
stranger  may  not  lay  claim  to  be  entertained  by  right 
as  a  guest,  —  for  this  would  require  a  special  friendly 
compact  to  make  him  for  a  certain  time  the  member  of 
a  household ;  he  may  only  claim  a  right  of  resort,  or  of 
visitation.  All  men  are  entitled  to  present  themselves 
thus  to  society  in  virtue  of  their  right  to  the  common 
possession  of  the  surface  of  the  earth,  to  no  part  of 
which  any  one  had  originally  more  right  than  another; 
and  upon  which,  from  its  being  a  globe,  they  cannot 
scatter  themselves  to  infinite  distances,  but  must  at  last 
bear  to  live  side  by  side  with  each  other.  Uninhabitable 
portions  of  this  surface  are  formed  by  seas  and  deserts ; 
these  present  barriers  to  the  fellowship  of  men  in  society  ; 
but  they  are  of  such  a  nature  that  the  ship  or  the  camel, 
"  the  ship  of  the  desert,”  makes  it  possible  for  men  to 
approach  each  other  over  these  unappropriated  regions, 
and  thus  to  turn  the  right  which  the  human  species 
have  in  common  to  the  surface  of  the  earth  into  a  means 
for  social  intercourse.  T 1  leinhos pitality,  practiced  for 
instance  on  the  Barbary  coasts,  of  plundering  ships  in 
the  neighboring  seas  and  making  slaves  of  stranded 
mariners,  or  that  of  the  sandy  deserts,  as  practiced  by 
Arab  Beduins  who  regard  their  access  to  nomadic  tribes 
as  constituting  a  right  to  plunder  them,  is  thus  contrary 
to  the  law  of  nature.  But  this  right  of  hospitality  as 
vested  in  strangers  arriving  in  another  State  does  not 


88 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


*  »  . 


| 

\  (V  ' 


extend  further  than  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
entering  into  social  intercourse  with  the  inhabitants  of 
the  country.  In  this  way  distant  continents  may  enter 
into  peaceful  relations  with  each  other.  These  may  at 
last  become  publicly  regulated  by  law,  and  thus  the 
human  race  may  be  always  brought  nearer  to  a  cosmo- 
political  constitution. 

If  we  compare  the  barbarian  instances  of  inhospitality 
referred  to  with  the  inhuman  behavior  of  the  civilized, 
and  especially  the  commercial,  States  of  our  continent, 
the  injustice  practiced  by  them  even  in  their  first  contact 
with  foreign  lands  and  peoples  fills  us  with  horror,  the 
mere  visiting  of  such  peoples  being  regarded  by  them  as 
equivalent  to  a  conquest.  America,  the  Negro  lands,  the 
Spice  Islands,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  etc.,  on  being 
discovered,  were  treated  as  countries  that  belonged  to 
nobody ;  for  the  aboriginal  inhabitants  were  reckoned  as 
nothing.  In  the  East  Indies,  under  the  pretext  of  in¬ 
tending  merely  to  plant  commercial  settlements,  the 
Europeans  introduced  foreign  troops,  and  with  them 
oppression  of  the  natives,  instigation  of  the  different 
States  to  widespread  wars,  famine,  sedition,  perfidy  and 
all  the  litany  of  evils  that  can  oppress  the  human  race. 

China7  and  Japan,  having  had  experience  of  such 
guests,  therefore,  did  wisely  in  limiting  their  intercourse. 
China  permitted  only  access  to  her  coasts  but  not  en¬ 
trance  into  the  country.  Japan  restricted  access  to  one 
European  people,  the  Dutch,  and  even  they  were  treated 
like  prisoners  by  being  excluded  from  social  intercourse 
with  the  natives.  The  worst  (or,  regarded  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  moral  judge,  the  best)  of  all  this  is 
that  no  satisfaction  is  derived  from  this  violence,  as 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


89 


all  these  commercial  societies  are  at  present  on  the 
verge  of  ruin.  The  Sugar  Islands  —  that  seat  of  the 
crudest  and  completest  slavery  —  have  yielded  up  no 
real  profit,  but  have  been  only  indirectly  of  account, 
and  that  in  no  praiseworthy  relation.  They  have  fur¬ 
nished  only  sailors  for  ships  of  war,  and  have  thereby 
contributed  to  the  carrying  on  of  wars  in  Europe. 
And  all  this  has  been  done  by  nations  who  make  a 
great  ado  about  their  piety,  and  who,  while  drinking 
up  iniquity  like  water,  would  have  themselves  regarded 
as  the  very  elect  of  the  orthodox  faith. 

But  the  social  relations  between  the  various  peoples 
of  the  world,  in  narrower  or  wider  circles,  have  now  ad¬ 
vanced  everywhere  so  far  that  a  violation  of  right  in  one 
place  of  the  earth  is  felt  all  over  it.  Hence  the  idea  of 
a  cosmopolitical  right  of  the  whole  human  race  is  no 
fantastic  or  overstrained  mode  of  representing  right, 
but  is  a  necessary  completion  of  the  unwritten  code 
which  carries  national  and  international  law  to  a  con¬ 
summation  in  the  public  law  of  mankind.  Thus  the 
whole  system  leads  to  the  conclusion  of  a  perpetual 
peace  among  the  nations.  And  it  is  only  under  the 
conditions  now  laid  down  that  men  may  flatter  them¬ 
selves  with  the  belief  that  they  are  making  a  continual 
approach  to  its  realization. 


% 


FIRST  SUPPLEMENT 


THE  GUARANTY  OF  ETERNAL  PEACE 

The  guaranty  of  eternal  peace  is  furnished  by  no  less 
a  power  than  the  great  artist  Nature  herself,  Natura 
daedala  rerum .  /The  mechanical  course  of  nature  visibly 
exhibits  a  design  to  bring  forth  concord  out  of  the  dis¬ 
cord  of  men,  even  against  their  will.  This  power  as  a 
cause  working  by  laws  which  are  unknown  to  us  is 
commonly  called  fate ;  but,  in  view  of  the  design  mani¬ 
fested  in  the  course  of  the  world,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  deep  wisdom  of  a  higher  cause  directed  toward  the 
realization  of  the  final  purpose  of  the  human  race  and 
predetermining  the  course  of  the  world  by  relation  to  it, 
and  as  such  we  call  it  providence.8  This  power  we  do 
not  indeed  perceive  externally  in  the  artistic  formations 
of  nature,  nor  can  we  even  infer  from  them  to  it ;  but,  as 
in  all  referring  of  the  form  of  things  to  final  causes  gen¬ 
erally,  we  not  only  can,  but  must,  conjoin  this  thought 
with  them  in  order  to  make  their  possibility  conceivable 
after  the  analogy  of  the  operations  of  human  art.  The 
relation  and  accord  of  these  things  to  the  moral  purpose 
which  reason  immediately  prescribes  to  us  can  only  be 
,  represented  by  an  idea  which  indeed  theoretically  tran¬ 
scends  our  experience,  but  which  is  practically  determin¬ 
able  and  is  well  founded  in  reality.  Such,  for  example, 
is  the  idea  of  perpetual  peace  being  a  duty  when  the 
mechanism  of  nature  is  regarded  as  conducing  to  its 

o  o 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


91 


realization.  The  employment  of  the  term  'nature’  rather 
than  'providence’  for  the  designation  of  this  power  is 
more  proper  and  more  modest  in  view  of  the  limits  of 
human  reason,  when  we  are  dealing  with  it  merely  from 
the  theoretical  and  not  from  the  religious  point  of  view. 
For  human  reason,  when  dealing  with  the  relation  of 
effects  to  their  causes,  must  keep  within  the  limits  of  pos¬ 
sible  experience ;  and  to  speak  of  Providence  as  know- 
able  by  us  in  this  relation  would  be  putting  on  Icarian 
wings  with  presumptuous  rashness  in  order  to  approach 
the  mystery  of  His  unfathomable  purposes. 

Before  determining  this  guaranty  more  exactly,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  look  first  at  that  state  of  things  arranged 
by  nature  for  those  who  live  and  act  upon  the  stage  of 
her  great  theater,  which  ultimately  gives  the  guaranty  of 
peace.  Thereafter  we  shall  consider  the  manner  in  which 
this  guaranty  is  furnished. 

'Phe  provisory  arrangements  of  nature  in  this  relation 
consist  mainly  in  these  three  things :  1st,  she  has  pro¬ 
vided  so  that  men  shall  be  able  to  live  in  all  parts  of 
the  earth ;  2nd,  she  has  scattered  them  everywhere  by 
means  of  war  so  that  they  might  populate  even  the  most 
inhospitable  regions ;  and,  3rd,  by  this  same  means  she 
has  compelled  them  to  enter  into  relations  more  or  less 
legal  with  one  another.  The  facts  that  come  here  into 
view  are  truly  wonderful.  Thus  in  the  cold,  icy  wastes 
around  the  Arctic  Ocean  there  grows  the  moss  which 
the  reindeer  scrapes  forth  from  beneath  the  snow  in 
order  that  it  may  itself  become  food,  or  that  it  may  be 
yoked  to  the  sledge  of  the  Ostiak  or  the  Samoyed.  And, 
in  like  manner,  the  wildernesses  of  sand,  barren  though 
they  be,  do  yet  contain  the  camel  which  appears  to  have 


92 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


been  created  for  traveling  through  them,  in  order  that 
they  might  not  be  left  unutilized.  Still  more  distinctly 
does  design  appear  when  we  come  to  know  how,  along 
with  the  fur-clad  animals  on  the  shores  of  the  Arctic 
Ocean,  there  are  seals,  walruses  and  whales  that  fur¬ 
nish  food  by  their  flesh,  and  warmth  and  light  by  their 
fat,  to  the  inhabitants  around.  But  most  of  all  does 
the  provident  care  of  nature  excite  our  admiration  by 
the  driftwood  which  it  brings  to  the  treeless  shores, 
even  when  it  is  not  well  known  whence  it  comes ;  with¬ 
out  this  material  the  dwellers  in  the  region  could  neither 
construct  their  canoes  nor  their  arms  nor  huts  for  their 
abode ;  under  these  conditions  they  are  compelled  to 
carry  on  war  against  the  wild  beasts,  so  that  they 
have  to  live  at  peace  with  each  other.  Moreover,  it  is 
remarkable  that  it  was  probably  nothing  but  war  that 
drove  men  into  different  regions.  And  the  first  instru¬ 
ment  of  war  which  man  appropriated  to  himself  from 
among  all  the  animals  was  the  horse,  which  he  had 
learned  to  tame  and  to  domesticate  in  the  early  period 
of  the  populating  of  the  earth ;  for  the  elephant  belongs 
to  the  later  period  of  the  luxury  which  arose  with  estab¬ 
lished  States.  In  like  manner,  the  art  of  cultivating 
certain  grasses  called  cereals,  which  are  now  no  longer 
recognizable  by  us  in  their  original  condition,  as  well  as 
the  multiplication  and  improvement  of  species  of  fruits 
by  'transplanting  and  grafting  them,  could  only  arise 
under  the  conditions  of  regulated  States  when  property 
iu  the  soil  had  been  rendered  secure.  These  arts  could 
only  arise  after  men  who  had  been  previously  existing 
in  lawless  freedom  had  advanced  from  the  mode  of  life 
of  the  hunter,9  the  fisher  and  the  shepherd  to  that  of  the 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


93 


cultivator  of  the  land.  Then,  in  connection  witli  the  life 
of  the  agriculturist,  salt  and  iron  were  discovered,  which 
were  perhaps  the  first  articles  that  were  sought  far  and 
near  and  which  entered  into  the  commercial  intercourse 
of  different  peoples.  Thereby  they  would  be  first  brought 
into  a  peaceful  relation  to  one  another ;  and  thus  the 
most  distant  of  them  would  come  to  mutual  under¬ 
standing,  sociability  and  pacific  intercourse. 

Now  as  nature  has  provided  so  that  men  could  thus 
be  able  to  live  everywhere  on  the  earth,  she  lias  likewise 
at  the  same  time  despotically  willed  that  they  shall  live 
everywhere  upon  it,  although  against  their  own  inclina¬ 
tion  and  even  without  any  idea  of  duty  being  connected 
with  this  determination  through  a  moral  law.  On  the 
contrary,  she  has  chosen  war  as  the  means  of  attaining 
to  this  end.  In  point  of  fact,  we  see  certain  peoples 
whose  unity  of  descent  is  made  known  by  the  unity  of 
their  language  far  divided  from  each  other.  Thus  the 
Samoyeds  on  the  Arctic  Ocean  are  of  the  same  race  as 
other  tribes  speaking  a  similar  language  a  thousand 
miles  away  from  them  in  the  Altaian  Mountains,  an¬ 
other  race  of  Mongolian  origin  equipped  with  horses  and 
of  a  warlike  character  having  pressed  in  between  them 
and  having  thus  driven  the  former  apart 10  from  the 
latter  into  the  most  inhospitable  regions,  whither  their 
own  inclination  would  certainly  never  have  carried  them. 
In  like  manner,  the  Finns  in  the  northernmost  tract  of 
Europe,  where  they  are  called  Lapps,  have  been  sepa¬ 
rated  by  as  "great  a  distance  from  the  Hungarians,  who 

are  affiliated  to  them  in  language,  by  the  intrusion  of 

% 

Gothic  and  Sarmatian  races.  Nor  can  anything  else  but 
war  well  account  for  the  presence  in  the  far  north  of 


94 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


America  of  the  Eskimo,  a  race  entirely  distinct  from  all 
the  other  American  tribes  and  perhaps  descended  from 
early  European  adventurers ;  and  the  same  may  be  said 
of  the  Pesherais  who  have  been  driven  into  Tierra  del 
Fuego,  in  the  far  south  of  America.  Nature  has  thus 
used  war  as  the  means  of  getting  the  earth  everywhere 
populated.  War,  however,  requires  no  special  motive 
for  its  explanation  ;  it  appears  to  be  ingrafted  on  human 
nature  and  is  even  regarded  as  noble  in  itself,  man  being 
stimulated  to  it  by  the  love  of  glory  without  regard  to 
selfish  interests.  Thus  martial  courage,  not  only  among 
the  American  savages  but  even  among  Europeans  in  the 
age  of  chivalry,  was  considered  to  be  of  great  value  in 
itself,  not  merely  in  time  of  war  —  as  was  right  enough 
—  but  just  because  it  was  war  ;  and  thus  war  was  often 
entered  upon  merely  to  show  off  this  quality.  An  in¬ 
herent  dignity  was  thus  attached  to  war  itself,  so  that 
even  philosophers  have  glorified  it  as  giving  a  certain 
nobleness  to  humanity,  unmindful  of  the  Greek  saying 
that  '  War  is  bad  in  that  it  makes  more  bad  people  than 
it  takes  away.’  So  much,  then,  in  reference  to  what 
nature  does  in  carrying  out  her  own  design  in  regard  to 
the  human  race  as  a  class  of  her  creatures. 

The  question  then  arises  as  to  what  is  the  essential 
meaning  and  aim  of  this  design  of  a  perpetual  peace. 
It  may  be  put  thus :  "  What  does  nature  do  in  this 
respect  with  reference  to  the  end  which  man’s  own  rea¬ 
son  presents  to  him  as  a  duty ;  and,  consequently,  what 
does  she  do  for  the  furtherance  of  his  moral  purpose 
in  life  ?  And,  further,  how  does  she  guarantee  that 
what  man  ought  to  do  according  to  the  laws  of  his  free¬ 
dom  and  yet  does  not  do  shall  be  done  by  him  without 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


95 


prejudice  to  his  freedom  even  by  a  certain  constraint  of 
nature  ;  and  how  does  she  secure  this  in  all  the  three 
relationships  of  public  right  as  constitutional  law,  inter¬ 
national  law  and  cosmopolitan  law  ?  ”  When  I  say  of 
nature  that  she  wills  a  certain  thing  to  be  done  I  do  not 
mean  that  she  imposes  upon  us  a  duty  to  do  it,  for  only 
the  practical  reason  as  essentially  free  from  constraint 
can  do  this ;  but  I  mean  that  she  does  it  herself  whether 
we  be  willing  or  not.  Fata  volentem  ducunt ,  nolentem 
trahunt. 

1.  Even  if  a  people  were  not  compelled  by  internal 
discord  to  submit  to  the  coercion  of  public  laws,  war  as 
an  external  influence  would  effect  this.  For,  according 

7  O 

to  the  arrangement  of  nature  already  indicated,  every 
people  finds  another  pressing  upon  it  in  its  neighbor¬ 
hood  and  it  must  form  itself  internally  into  a  State  in 
order  to  be  equipped  as  a  power  so  as  to  defend  itself. 
Now  the  republican  constitution  is  the  only  one  which 
perfectly  corresponds  to  the  rights  of  man ;  but  it  is  at 
the  same  time  the  most  difficult  to  found,  and  still  more 
so  to  maintain.  So  much  is  this  the  case  that  many  ha've 
asserted  that  the  realization  of  a  true  republic  would  be 
like  a  State  formed  by  angels,  because  men  with  their 
selfish  inclinations  are  incapable  of  carrying  out  a  con¬ 
stitution  of  so  sublime  a  form.  In  these  circumstances, 
then,  nature  comes  to  the  aid  of  the  rational  and  uni¬ 
versal  will  of  man,  which,  however  honored  in  itself,  is 
impotent  in  practice ;  and  it  does  this  just  by  means  of 
these  selfish  inclinations.  Thus  it  comes  that  the  chief 
interest  turns  only  upon  a  good  organization  of  the 
State,  which  is  certainly  within  the  power  of  man, 
whereby  the  powers  of  the  human  will  shall  be  so 


96 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


directed  in  relation  to  each  other  that  the  one  will  check 
the  destructive  effects  of  the  other  or  nullify  them ;  and 
hence  the  result  will  be  as  regards  reason  the  same  as 
if  these  forces  did  not  exist  when  their  evil  effects  are 
thus  neutralized ;  and  man,  although  not  possessed  of 
real  moral  goodness,  yet  becomes  constrained  to  be  a 
good  citizen. 

The  problem  of  the  institution  of  a  State,  however 
hard  it  may  appear,  would  not  be  insoluble  even  for  a 
race  of  devils,  assuming  only  that  they  have  intelligence, 
and  it  may  be  put  as  follows :  "A  multitude  of  rational 
beings  all  requiring  laws  in  common  for  their  own  pres¬ 
ervation,  and  yet  of  such  a  nature  that  each  of  them  is 
inclined  secretly  to  except  himself  from  their  sway,  have 
to  be  put  under  order,  and  a  constitution  has  to  be  estab¬ 
lished  among  them  so  that,  although  they  may  be  antag¬ 
onistic  to  one  another  in  their  private  sentiments,  they 
have  yet  to  be  so'  organized  that,  in  their  public  rela¬ 
tions,  their  conduct  will  have  the  same  result  as  if  they 
had  no  such  bad  sentiments.” 

’Such  a  problem  must  be  capable  of  solution.  For  it 
does  not  turn  directly  upon  the  moral  improvement  of 
men,  but  only  upon  the  mechanism  of  nature  ;  and  the 
problem  is  to  know  how  men  can  use  the  conditions  of 
nature  in  order  so  to  regulate  the  antagonism  of  the 
hostile  sentiments  at  work  among  the  people  that  the 
individuals  composing  it  shall  have  to  compel  each  other 
to  submit  to  common  compulsory  laws,  and  that  there 
shall  thus  be  brought  about  a  state  of  peace  in  which 
the  laws  will  have  full  power.  This  process  may  be  seen 
going  on  in  the  actually  existing,  although  still  very 
imperfectly  organized,  States.  For  in  their  external 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


97 


relations  to  one  another  they  already  approach  what  the 
idea  of  right  prescribes,  although  the  essential  principle 
of  morality  is  certainly  not  the  cause  of  it ;  and  indeed  a 
good  political  constitution  is  not  so  much  to  be  expected 
from  that  principle,  but  rather,  conversely,  the  good 
moral  culture  of  a  people  from  such  a  constitution. 
Hence  the  mechanism  of  nature,  as  it  works  through 
selfish  inclinations  which  are  externally  and  naturally 
antagonistic  in  their  operation  to  each  other,  may  be  used 
by  reason  as  a  means  of  making  way  for  the  realization 
of  her  own  end  by  the  application  of  a  precept  of  right,  . 
and  thereby  of  furthering  and  securing  peace  both  in¬ 
ternal,  and  external,  so  far  as  it  may  lie  within  the 
power  of  the  State  to  do  so.  It  may  then  be  said  that 
nature  irresistibly  wills  that  right  shall  at  last  obtain  the 
supremacy.  What  men  may  here  neglect  to  do  will  at 
length  be  done  of  itself,  although  through  much  incon¬ 
venience,  and  as  Bouterwek  says: 

Bend  but  the  reed  too  strong,  it  breaks ; 

Who  wills  too  much,  but  nothing  makes. 

2.  The  idea  of  international  law  presupposes  the  sepa¬ 
ration  of  several  neighboring  States  that  are  independent 
of  each  other ;  and  such  a  condition  of  things  is  of  itself 
already  one  of  war,  unless  by  their  federated  union  they 
can  prevent  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Such  a  condition 
of  things  is,  however,  according  to  the  idea  of  reason, 
better  than  the  fusion  of  all  the  States  into  a  universal 
monarchy  by  one  power  that  has  overgrown  the  rest 
and  subjected  them  to  its  sway.  This  is  so  because  the 
laws  always  lose  something  of  their  definiteness  as  the 
range  of  a  government  becomes  enlarged ;  and  soulless 


98 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


despotism,  when  it  lias  choked  the  seeds  of  good,  at  length 
lapses  into  anarchy.  Nevertheless  there  is  a  desire  on 
the  part  of  every  State,  or  of  its  sovereign,  to  attain  to 
a  lasting  condition  of  peace  by  subjecting  the  whole 
world,  were  it  possible,  to  its  sway.  But  nature  wills 
it  otherwise.  She  employs  two  means  to  prevent  the 
peoples  from  intermingling,  and  to  keep  them  apart. 
These  are  the  differences  of  their  languages  and  of  their 
religions,11  which  bring  with  them  a  certain  tendency  to 
mutual  hatred  and  furnish  pretexts  for  war.  However, 
as  civilization  increases,  there  is  a  gradual  approach  of 
men  to  greater  unanimity  in  principles  and  to  a  mutual 
understanding  of  the  conditions  of  peace  even  in  view  of 
these  differences.  This  pacific  spirit,  unlike  that  despot¬ 
ism  which  revels  upon  the  grave  of  liberty,  is  developed 
and  secured,  not  by  the  weakening  of  all  the  separate 
powers  of  the  States,  but  by  an  equilibrium  which  is 
brought  forth  and  guaranteed  through  their  rivalry  with 
each  other. 

3.  Nature  wisely  separates  the  nations,  which  the  will 
of  each  State,  even  according  to  the  principles  of  inter¬ 
national  law,  would  fain  combine  into  one  by  fraud  or 
force.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  she  again  unites  the 
nations  whom  the  idea  of  a  universal  cosmopolitan  law 
would  not  have  secured  from  violence  and  war  by  regard 
to  their  mutual  interests.  This  is  effected  by  the  com¬ 
mercial  spirit,  which  cannot  exist  along  with  war  and 
which  sooner  or  later  controls  every  people.  Among  all 
the  means  of  power  subordinate  to  the  regulation  of  the 
State,  the  power  of  money  is  the  most  reliable  ;  and  thus 
the  States  find  themselves  driven  to  further  the  noble 
interest  of  peace,  although  not  directly  from  motives  of 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


99 


morality.  Hence,  wherever  war  threatens  to  break  out 
in  the  world,  the  States  have  an  interest  to  avert  it  by 
mediations,  just  as  if  they  stood  in  a  constant  league 
with  each  other  for  this  purpose.  Thus,  great  combina¬ 
tions  with  a  view  to  war  can  but  very  rarely  occur  from 
the  very  nature  of  things,  and  still  more  rarely  can  they 
succeed. 

In  this  way  nature  guarantees  the  conditions  of  per¬ 
petual  peace  by  the  mechanism  involved  in  our  human 
inclinations  themselves ;  and  although  this  is  not  real¬ 
ized  with  a  guarantee  that  is  sufficient  to  enable  us  to 
prophesy  the  future  theoretically,  yet  the  security  in¬ 
volved  is  sufficient  for  all  practical  relations.  And  thus  it 
becomes  a  duty  to  labor  for  the  realization  of  this  purpose 
as  not  at  all  chimerical  in  itself. 


SECOND  SUPPLEMENT 


SECRET  ARTICLE  RELATING  TO  ETERNAL  PEACE 

A  secret  article  in  transactions  relating  to  public 
right,  when  viewed  objectively  or  as  to  its  matter,  is  a 
contradiction.  Viewed  subjectively,  however,  and  con¬ 
sidered  in  reference  to  the  quality  of  the  person  who 
dictates  it,  it  is  possible  that  there  may  be  a  secret  con¬ 
tained  in  it  which  it  may  not  be  compatible  with  his 
dignity  to  have  publicly  announced  as  originating  with 
him. 

The  only  article  of  this  kind  is  contained  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  proposition :  "  The  maxims  of  the  philosophers  re¬ 
garding  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  a  public  peace 
shall  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  States  that  are 
armed  for  war.” 

It  appears,  however,  to  detract  from  the  dignity  of  the 
legislative  authority  of  a  State  — *  to  which  we  must 
naturally  attribute  the  highest  wisdom  —  to  have  to 
seek  for  instruction  regarding  the  principles  of  their 
practical  relations  to  other  States  from  subjects,  even 
though  they  be  philosophers.  Hence  the  State  will 
rather  encourage  them  silently,  making  a  secret  of  the 
matter,  than  deal  with  them  directly.  This  amounts  to 
saying  that  it  will  allow  them  to  speak  forth  freely  and 
publicly  their  universal  maxims  regarding  the  carrying 
on  of  war  and  the  establishment  of  peace  ;  for  this  they 
will  do  of  themselves  if  they  are  not  prohibited  from 

100 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


101 


doing  it.  Nor  is  there  any  particular  agreement  of  the 
States  with  one  another  required  in  this  connection  for 
their  harmony  on  this  point ;  for  it  lies  already  in  the 
obligations  imposed  by  the  common  human  reason  as  a 
moral  lawgiver.  It  is  not,  however,  meant  that  the  State 
must  give  a  preference  to  the  principles  of  the  philosopher 
over  the  dictates  of  the  jurist,  who  is  a  representative  of 
the  political  authority ;  it  is  only  meant  that  the  philos¬ 
opher  ought  to  be  heard.  The  jurist,  who  has  taken  for 
his  symbol  the  scales  of  right  and  the  sword  of  justice, 
commonly  uses  the  latter  not  merely  to  keep  away  all 
foreign  influences  from  the  former,  but,  should  the  one 
scale  not  sink,  to  throw  his  sword  into  it;  and  then,  Vae 
victis  !  The  jurist,  who  is  not  at  the  same  time  a  moral 
philosopher,  is  under  the  greatest  temptation  to  do  this, 
because  the  function  of  his  office  is  only  to  apply  exist¬ 
ing  laws  and  not  to  inquire  whether  they  may  be  in  need 
of  improvement.  And,  further,  he  reckons  this  really 
lower  order  of  his  faculty  as  belonging  by  its  functions 
to  a  higher  rank,  because  it  is  accompanied  with  power ; 
as  holds  also  of  the  other  two  faculties  of  medicine  and 
divinity.  Philosophy  thus  stands  on  a  very  humble  stage 
below  these  allied  authorities.  Hence  it  is  said  of  philos¬ 
ophy  that  she  is  the  handmaid  of  theology ;  and  the  same 
has  been  said  of  her  relation  to  medicine  and  law.  But 
it  is  not  easy  to  see,  as  has  been  remarked,  "  whether 
she  bears  the  torch  before  these  gracious  ladies,  or  carries 
their  train.” 

\That  ”  kings  will  philosophize  or  philosophers  become 
kings”  is  not  to  be  expected^Nor,  indeed,  is  it  to  be 
desired,  because  the  possession  of  power  inevitably  cor¬ 
rupts  the  free  judgment  of  reason.  But  kings  or  kinglike 


102 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


nations  who  govern  themselves  according  to  laws  of 
equality  should  not  allow  the  philosophers  as  a  class  to  dis¬ 
appear  or  to  be  silenced  ;  rather,  should  they  be  allowed 
to  speak  forth  their  maxims  publicly.  Nay,  this  is  even 
indispensable  to  both  for  the  mutual  enlightenment  of 
their  functions.  Nor  should  this  process  of  communicating 
enlightenment  be  jealously  regarded  as  a  kind  of  propa- 
gandism,  because  as  a  class  the  philosophers  are  by  their 
nature  incapable  of  combining  into  political  clubs  and 
factions. 


APPENDIX 


I 


ON  THE  DISCORDANCE  BETWEEN  MORALS  AND 
POLITICS  IN  REFERENCE  TO  ETERNAL  PEACE 


The  science  of  morals  relates  directly  to  practice  in 
the  objective  sense, , inasmuch  as  it  is  a  system  of  uncon¬ 
ditionally  authoritative  laws  in  accordance  with  which 
we  ought  to  act.  It  is  therefore  a  manifest  absurdity, 
after  admitting  the  authority  of  this  conception  of  duty, 
to  assert,  notwithstanding,  that  we  cannot  so  act ;  for, 
were  it  so,  this  conception  would  have  no  value.  Ultra 
posse  nemo  obligatur.  Hence  ^there  can  be  no  conflict  be¬ 
tween  political  philosophy  as  the  practical  science  of  right, 
and  moral  philosophy  as  the  theoretical  science  of  right; 
and,  consequently,  there  can  be  no  opposition  in  this  rela¬ 
tion  between  practice  and  theory.  An  opposition  can  only 
arise  between  them  when  the  science  of  morals  is  regarded 
as  a  general  doctrine  of  prudence,  or  expediency,  or  a 
theory  of  the  maxims  by  which  we  are  to  choose  the  means 
most  conducive  for  the  attainment  of  useful  and  advan¬ 
tageous  objects ;  and  this  amounts  to  denying  generally 
that  there  is  a  science  of  morals.  Politics  may  be  regarded 
as  saying, " be  wise  (that  is,  prudent)  as  serpents” ;  morals 
adds  as  a  limiting  condition,  "  and  harmless  (that  is,  guile¬ 
less)  as  doves.”  If  the  two  maxims  cannot  coexist  in  one 
commandment,  there  is  really  an  incongruity  between 

103 


104 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


politics  and  morals ;  but,  if  the  two  can  be  combined 
throughout,  any  idea  of antagonism  between  them  is  absurd 
and  any  question  about  harmonizing  them,  as  if  they  were 
in  conflict,  need  not  be  even  raised.  It  is  true  that  the  say¬ 
ing,  "Honesty  is  the  best  policy,'’  contains  a  theory  which 
unhappily  is  very  often  contradicted  by  practice ;  and  yet 
the  equally  theoretical  proposition,  "  Honesty  is  better 
than  policy,"  is  infinitely  removed  above  all  objection, 
and  it  is  even  to  be  held  that  honesty  or  honor  is  the 
indispensable  condition  of  all  true  policy.  The  tutelary 
divinity  who  is  the  guardian  of  the  boundaries  of  morals 
does  not  yield  to  the  Jupiter  who  is  the  limiting  divinity 


of  force,  for  he  still  stands  under  the  sway  of  fate.  In 
other  words,  reason  is  not  sufficiently  enlightened  to  fore¬ 
see  the  series  of  the  predetermining  causes,  which,  with 
certainty,  would  enable  it  to  predict  the  happy  or  unhappy 
consequences  that  would  follow  from  the  conduct  of  men 
according  to  the  mechanism  of  nature,  however  much  our 
wishes  and  hopes  may  be  directed  to  it.  But  what  we 
have  to  do,  in  order  to  continue  on  the  path  of  duty  ac¬ 
cording  to  rules  of  wisdom,  reason  shows  us  everywhere 
clearly  enough  in  the  light  of  the  final  end  which  we  have 
to  pursue. 

The  practical  man,  however,  who  regards  morals  as  a 
mere  theory,  rejects  our  generous  hopes  of  attaining  to 
that  end,  even  while  admitting  the  distinction  between 
what  ought  to  be  and  what  can  be.  lie  founds  his  un¬ 
belief  specially  upon  the  fact  that  he  pretends  to  be  able 
to  foresee  from  the  nature  of  man  that  men  will  never 
resolve  to  do  what  is  required  to  bring  about  the  result 
that  leads  to  perpetual  peace.  Now  it  is  admitted  that 
the  voluntary  determination  of  all  individual  men  to  live 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


105 


under  a  legal  constitution  according  to  principles  of  lib¬ 
erty,  when  viewed  as  a  distributive  unity  made  up  of  the 
wills  of  all,  is  not  sufficient  to  attain  to  this  end,  but  all 
must  will  the  realization  of  this  condition  through  the 
collective  unity  of  their  united  wills,  in  order  that  the 
solution  of  so  difficult  a  problem  may  be  attained ;  for 
such  a  collective  unity  is  required  in  order  that  civil 
society  may  take  form  as  a  whole.  Further,  a  uniting 
cause  must  supervene  upon  this  diversity  in  the  par¬ 
ticular  wills  of  all,  in  order  to  educe  from  them  such 
a  common  will  as  they  could  not  individually  attain. 
Hence,  in  the  realization  of  that  idea  in  practice  no  other 
beginning  of  a  social  state  of  law  can  be  reckoned  upon 
than  one  that  is  brought  about  by  force ;  and  upon  such 
compulsion,  national  law  is  afterward  founded.  This 
condition  certainly  leads  us  from  the  outset  to  expect 
great  divergences  in  actual  experience  from  the  idea  of 
right  as  apprehended  in  theory.  For  the  moral  sentiment 
of  the  lawgiver  cannot  be  relied  upon  in  this  connection 
to  the  extent  of  assuming  that,  after  the  chaotic  mass 
has  been  united  into  a  people,  he  will  then  leave  it  to 
themselves  to  bring  about  a  legal  constitution  by  their 
common  will. 

This  amounts  to  saying  that,  when  any  one  lias  once 
got  the  power  in  his  hands,  he  will  not  allow  the  people 
to  prescribe  laws  for  him.  Similarly,  a  State  which  has 
once  entered  into  power  so  as  to  be  subject  to  no  exter¬ 
nal  laws  will  not  bring  itself  to  submit  to  the  judgment 
of  other  States  as  to  how  it  shall  seek  to  maintain  its 
rights  in  relations  to  them ;  and  even  a  continent,  when 
it  realizes  its  superiority  to  another  which  may  not  be 
at  all  in  its  way,  will  not  neglect  to  use  the  means  of 


106 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


strengthening  its  own  power,  even  by  spoliation  or  con¬ 
quest.  Thus  it  appears  that  all  the  theoretical  plans 
relating  to  national  law  or  international  law  or  cos- 
mopolitical  law  dissolve  into  empty  unpractical  ideas. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  mode  of  practice,  founded  upon 
the  empirical  principles  of  human  nature  and  consider¬ 
ing  nothing  in  the  world  too  low  for  furnishing  guid¬ 
ance  for  its  maxims,  seems  as  if  it  alone  could  hope 
to  find  a  sure  foundation  for  its  system  of  political 
expediency. 

Now,  certainly,  if  there  is  no  freedom  nor  any  moral 
law  founded  upon  it,  so  that  all  that  happens  or  can 
happen  is  mere  mechanism  of  nature,  this  would  hold 
true,  under  that  supposition  ;  and  politics,  viewed  as  the 
art  of  applying  the  mechanical  arrangements  of  nature 
to  the  government  of  men,  would  constitute  the  whole 
of  practical  wisdom,  and  the  conception  of  law  would  be 
an  empty  and  unreal  one.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
may  be  the  case  that  it  is  indispensably  necessary  to 
combine  the  arrangements  of  nature  with  the  method  of 
politics  and  even  to  raise  them  to  the  position  of  condi¬ 
tions  limiting  its  practice,  and  on  this  ground  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  uniting  them  must  be  admitted.  I  can  thus 
easily  enough  think  of  a  moral  politician  as  one  who 
holds  the  principles  of  political  expediency  in  such  a  way 
that  they  can  coexist  with  morals ;  but  I  cannot  con¬ 
ceive  of  a  political  moralist  who  fashions  a  system  of 
morality  for  himself  so  as  to  make  it  subordinate  and 
subservient  to  the  interest  of  the  statesman. 

The  moral  politician  will  adopt  the  following  as  his 
principle :  "If  certain  defects  which  could  not  be  pre¬ 
vented  are  found  in  the  political  constitution  or  in  the 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


107 


relations  of  the  State,  it  becomes  a  duty  especially  for 
the  heads  of  the  State  to  apply  themselves  to  correct 
them  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  improve  the  constitu¬ 
tion  so  that  it  may  be  brought  into  conformity  with  nat¬ 
ural  right,  which  is  presented  to  them  as  a  model  in  the 
idea  of  reason.”  Now  it  would  manifestly  be  contrary 
to  that  political  expediency  which  is  in  agreement  with 
morals  to  destiw  the  existing  bonds  of  national  and 
cosmopolitical  union  before  there  was  a  better  constitu¬ 
tion  ready  to  take  their  place  ;  and  hence  it  would  be 
absurd  to  demand  that  every  imperfection  in  the  consti¬ 
tution  should  be  at  once  violently  removed.  It  may, 
however,  be  reasonably  required  that  the  maxim  of  the 
necessity  of  such  an  alteration  should  be  consciously 
recognized  by  the  supreme  power  in  order  that  it  may 
continue  to  make  constant  approximation  toward  realiz¬ 
ing  the  constitution  that  best  accords  with  righteous 
laws.  A  State  may  thus  govern  itself  even  in  a  repub¬ 
lican  manner  although  it  may  still  possess  a  constitution 
grounded  upon  despotic  power.  And  this  may  go  on 
until  the  people  gradually  become  capable  of  being  influ¬ 
enced  by  the  mere  idea  of  the  authority  of  the  law,  as  if 
it  possessed  the  physical  power  of  the  State,  and  in  con¬ 
sequence  come  to  be  capable  of  legislating  for  themselves, 
which  is  the  mode  of  government  originally  founded 
upon  right.  But  if,  through  the  violence  of  a  revolution 
caused  by  the  evils  in  the  constitution,  a  more  lawful  con¬ 
stitution  were  attained  even  in  a  wrong  way,  it  would 
no  longer  be  proper  to  hold  it  permissible  to  bring  back 
the  people  again  to  the  old  constitution,  although  every 
one  who  took  part  in  the  revolution  by  violence  or  in¬ 
trigue  may  have  been  subjected  by  law  to  the  penalties 


108 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


attached  to  rebels.  As  regards  the  external  relations  of 
the  States,  however,  one  State  cannot  be  called  upon  by 
another  to  give  up  its  constitution,  although  it  may  be 
a  despotic  one  and  is  likely  therefore  to  be  the  stronger 
in  relation  to  external  enemies,  so  long  at  least  as  that 
State  runs  a  danger  of  being  suddenly  swallowed  up  by 
other  States.  Hence,  when  any  such  proposal  is  made, 
it  must  at  least  be  allowed  to  defer  the  execution  of  it 
till  a  more  opportune  time.12 

It  may  well  be  that  those  moralists  who  are  inclined 
to  despotism  and  who  are  deficient  in  practice  may  often 
come  into  opposition  with  political  prudence  by  measures 
which  have  been  precipitately  adopted  and  overesti¬ 
mated  ;  but  experience  will  gradually  bring  them  from 
this  position  of  antagonism  to  nature  into  a  better 
groove.  On  the  other  hand,  politicians  guided  by  moral¬ 
ity  may  make  improvement  impossible  by  extenuating 
principles  of  government  that  are  contrary  to  law,  on 
the  pretext  that  human  nature  is  not  capable  of  realiz¬ 
ing  good  according  to  the  idea  prescribed  by  reason ; 
and  thus  they  may  do  their  best  to  perpetuate  violations 
of  law. 

Instead  of  dealing  with  practice  in  this  prudential  way, 
they  take  up  certain  practical  measures  and  consider  only 
how  these  are  to  be  impressed  upon  the  ruling  power  in 
order  that  their  private  interest  may  not  be  balked,  and 
how  the  people  and,  if  possible,  the  whole  world  may  be 
delivered  up  to  this  interest.  This  is  the  manner  of  the 
mere  professional  jurists  (acting  after  the  fashion  of  a 
tradesman  rather  than  of  a  legislator)  when  they  aspire 
to  politics.  For,  as  it  is  not  their  business  to  refine  upon 
legislation  itself  but  only  to  carry  out  the  existing  laws 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


109 


of  the  country,  every  legal  constitution  as  it  exists  and 
any  subsequent  one  taking  its  place,  when  it  is  altered 
by  the  higher  power,  will  always  appear  to  them  to  be 
the  best ;  and  everything  will  be  regarded  as  in  proper 
mechanical  order.  This  dexterity  of  being  able  to  sit 
upright  on  any  saddle  may  till  them  with  the  conceit 
that  they  are  likewise  able  to  judge  about  the  principles 
of  a  political  constitution  which  will  be  in  accordance 
with  the  ideas  of  right  and  which,  therefore,  will  be 
rational  and  not  merely  empirical  in  itself.  And,  in 
addition  to  this,  they  may  put  much  importance  upon 
their  knowledge  of  men,  which  may  indeed  be  expected, 
because  they  have  to  do  with  many  of  them,  without 
their  yet  truly  knowing  the  nature  of  man  and  what  can 
be  made  of  it,  for  which  a  higher  standpoint  of  human 
observation  is  required.  Now,  if,  provided  with  such 
ideas,  they  address  themselves  to  the  subject  of  national 
and  international  law  as  prescribed  by  reason,  they  can¬ 
not  do  otherwise  than  carry  the  spirit  of  chicane  with 
them  in  thus  stepping  beyond  their  sphere.  For  they 
will  naturally  continue  to  follow  their  usual  method  of 
mechanically  applying  compulsory  laws  that  have  been 
despotically  laid  down,  whereas  the  conceptions  of  rea¬ 
son  will  only  recognize  a  lawful  compulsion  which  is  in 
accordance  with  principles  of  freedom  and  by  which  a 
legally  existing  political  constitution  only  becomes  pos¬ 
sible.  Which  problem  the  ostensibly  practical  politician, 
disregarding  the  fundamental  idea  of  right,  thinks  he 
can  solve  empirically,  by  reference  to  experience  only, 
since  the  constitutions  which  have  been  most  permanent 
in  the  past  have  been  established  in  this  way,  even  though 
they  have  been  in  contradiction  with  right. 


110 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


The  maxims  which  he  adopts  for  his  guidance,  although 
he  may  not  give  them  open  expression  or  avowal,  run 
out  into  something  like  the  following  sophistical  propo¬ 
sitions  : 

1.  Fac  et  excusa.  Seize  the  favorable  opportunity  for 
taking  into  your  own  possession  what  is  either  a  right  of 
the  State  over  the  people  or  over  a  neighboring  State ; 
and  the  justification  of  the  act  will  be  much  more  easily 
and  gracefully  presented  after  the  fact  and  will  palliate 
its  violence.  This  holds  especially  in  the  first  case,  where 
the  supreme  power  in  the  State  is  also  the  legislative 
authority  which  must  be  obeyed  without  reasoning  about 
it.  It  is  not  held  that  it  is  desirable  to  think  out  convinc¬ 
ing  reasons  first  and  then  to  await  the  counter  arguments 
afterward.  This  very  boldness  gives  a  certain  appear¬ 
ance  of  internal  conviction  of  the  rightfulness  of  the  act, 
and  the  god  of  success  (bonus  eventus )  becomes  then  the 
best  advocate  of  the  cause. 

2.  Si  fecisti ,  nega.  What  you  may  have  wrongly  done 
yourself,  such  as  may  even  bring  the  people  to  despair 
and  to  rebellion,  should  be  denied  as  being  any  fault  of 
yours ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  assert  that  it  was  owing 
to  the  refractoriness  of  the  subjects ;  or,  in  the  case  of 
an  aggression  upon  a  neighboring  State,  say  that  it  was 
the  fault  of  human  nature ;  for,  if  others  are  not  antici¬ 
pated  by  violence,  we  may  safely  calculate  that  they  will 
anticipate  us  and  appropriate  what  is  ours. 

3.  Divide  et  imp  era.  That  is  to  say,  there  are  certain 
privileged  heads  among  the  people  who  have  chosen  you 
merely  for  their  sovereign  as  primus  inter  pares.  See, 
then,  that  you  embroil  them  with  each  other  and  put 
them  at  variance  with  the  people ;  next,  work  upon  the 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


111 


latter  by  holding  out  the  prospect  of  greater  liberty ; 
and  everything  will  then  depend  upon  your  absolute 
will.  Or,  again,  if  it  be  a  question  about  other  States, 
then  exciting  suspicion  and  disagreement  among  them  is 
a  pretty  safe  means  of  subjecting  them  to  yourself,  one 
after  the  other,  under  the  pretense  of  assisting  the 
weaker. 

It  is  true  that  nobody  is  now  taken  in  by  these  polit¬ 
ical  maxims,  for  they  are  universally  understood.  This 
is  not  so  because  men  have  become  ashamed  of  them, 
as  if  their  injustice  were  jnuch  too  evident.  The  great 
powers  are  never  put  to  shame  before  the  judgment  of 
the  common  people,  as  they  are  concerned  only  about 
one  another.  And,  as  regards  these  principles,  it  is  not 
the  fact  of  their  becoming  known  but  only  their  fail¬ 
ing  of  success  that  causes  shame ;  for,  as  regards  the 
morality  of  their  maxims,  they  are  all  at  one.  Hence 
there  is  nothing  left  but  the  standpoint  of  political 
honor  upon  which  they  can  safely  count ;  and  this 
merely  amounts  to  a  question  of  the  increase  of  their 
power  in  whatever  way  they  may  be  able  to  obtain  it.13 

With  all  these  serpentine  windings  of  this  immoral 
doctrine  of  expediency  to  educe  a  state  of  peace  among 
men  from  the  warlike  elements  of  the  state  of  nature, 
so  much  at  least  becomes  clear :  That  men  can  as  little 
escape  from  the  conception  of  right  in  their  private  as  in 
their  public  relations ;  and  that  they  do  not  venture  to 
found  politics  openly  on  the  mere  manipulations  of  ex¬ 
pediency,  nor  to  renounce  all  obedience  to  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  public  right,  as  is  most  strikingly  seen  in  the 
sphere  of  international  law.  On  the  contrary,  they  allow 


112 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


all  proper  honor  to  this  conception  in  itself,  although 
they  may  have  to  devise  a  hundred  evasions  and  pallia¬ 
tions  in  order  to  escape  from  it  in  practice  and  to  attrib¬ 
ute  to  a  subtle  statecraft  the  authority  of  the  origin 
and  the  bond  of  all  right.  It  will  be  well  to  put  an  end 
to  this  sophistry,  if  not  to  the  injustice  it  veneers,  and  to 
bring  the  false  advocates  of  the  mighty  ones  of  the  world 
to  confess  that  it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  right  but  of 
might  that  they  speak,  and  in  a  tone,  too,  as  if  they  had 
themselves  acquired  the  right  to  command.  In  order  to 
do  so,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  the  deception  by  which 
they  mislead  themselves  and  others.  In  their  attempt  to 
discover  and  exl libit  the  supreme  principle  from  which 
the  tendency  toward  a  perpetual  peace  takes  its  rise, 
they  try  to  show  that  all  the  evil  which  comes  in  the  way 
of  it  springs  from  the  fact  that  the  political  moralist 
begins  just  where  the  moral  politician  properly  ends ; 
and  thus  by  subordinating  their  principles  to  their  end  — 
or,  as  the  common  saying  goes,  by  putting  the  cart  before 
the  horse  —  the  politician  frustrates  his  own  intention  of 
bringing  politics  into  accordance  with  morals. 

But,  in  order  to  bring  practical  philosophy  into  har¬ 
mony  with  itself,  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  decide 
a  preliminary  question.  That  question  is,  whether,  in 
dealing  with  problems  of  the  practical  reason,  we  ought 
to  begin  from  its  material  principle,  as  the  end  which 
is  the  object  of  the  activity  of  the  will,  or  from  its  for¬ 
mal  principle,  as  that  which  is  founded  merely  upon 
freedom  in  its  external  relation.  This  formal  principle 
is  expressed  as  follows :  "  Act  so  that  you  can  will  that 
your  maxim  shall  become  a  universal  law,  whatever  may 
be  its  end.” 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


113 


It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  latter  principle  must 
take  the  precedence  ;  for,  as  a  principle  of  law,  it  is  an 
unconditional  necessity,  whereas  the  former  is  obligatory 
only  under  the  presupposition  of  the  empirical  conditions 
of  the  proposed  end  so  existing  that  it  can  be  realized; 
and  if  the  end,  as  in  the  case  of  perpetual  peace,  should 
also  be  a  duty,  the  duty  would  itself  have  to  be  deduced 
from  the  formal  principle  which  regulates  external  action. 
Now  the  material  principle  is  the  principle  of  the  political 
moralist,  and  it  reduces  the  questions  of  national,  inter¬ 
national  and  universal  law  to  the  level  of  a  mere  tech¬ 
nical  problem.  On  the  other  hand,  the  formal  principle 
is  the  principle  of  the  moral  politician,  and  the  question 
of  right  becomes  with  him  a  moral  problem.  Their  dif¬ 
ferent  methods  of  procedure  are  thus  wide  as  the  poles 
asunder  in  regard  to  the  problem  of  bringing  about  per¬ 
petual  peace  which,  in  the  view  of  the  moralist,  is  not 
merely  to  be  desired  as  a  physical  good  but  also  as  a 
state  of  things  arising  out  of  the  recognition  of  duty. 

The  solution  of  the  problem  in  question  by  the  method 
of  political  expediency  requires  much  knowledge  of  nature 
in  order  to  be  able  to  employ  her  mechanical  arrange¬ 
ments  for  bringing  about  the  end  in  view,  and  yet  the 
result  of  them  is  wholly  uncertain  so  far  as  regards  the 
realization  of  perpetual  peace.  This  holds  true  which¬ 
ever  of  the  three  departments  of  public  law  we  consider. 
It  is  uncertain  whether  under  any  circumstances  the 
people  would  be  better  kept  in  obedience,  and  at  the 
game  time  in  prosperity,  by  severe  treatment  or  by  allur¬ 
ing  baits  of  vanity ;  whether  they  would  be  better  kept 
in  order  by  the  sovereignty  of  a  single  individual  or  by 
a  combination  of  several  heads ;  whether  this  would  be 


114 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


best  secured  merely  by  an  official  nobility  or  by  the 
exercise  of  popular  power  within  the  constitution  ;  and 
also  whether  any  such  result,  if  attained,  could  be  upheld 
for  long.  There  are  examples  of  the  opposite  result  pre¬ 
sented  in  history  by  all  the  different  forms  of  govern¬ 
ment,  with  the  exception  of  genuine  republicanism  only, 
which  system,  however,  can  alone  be  accepted  by  a  moral 
politician.  A  form  of  international  law  professedly  estab¬ 
lished  upon  statutes  devised  by  foreign  ministers  is  still 
more  uncertain ;  for  it  is  in  fact  but  a  thing  of  words 
without  substantial  reality  and  it  rests  upon  compacts 
which,  in  the  very  act  of  their  ratification,  admit  the 
secret  reservation  of  the  right  to  transgress  them.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  solution  of  the  problem  by  the  method 
of  true  political  wisdom  presses  forward,  so  to  speak,  of 
itself ;  it  becomes  apparent  to  every  one ;  it  brings  all 
artifice  to  nought ;  and  it  leads  straight  to  the  proper  end. 
H  owever,  it  must  be  accompanied  with  a  prudent  warn¬ 
ing  that  it  is  not  to  be  brought  about  in  a  precipitate 
manner  nor  with  violence,  but  it  must  be  unceasingly 
approached  as  the  favor  of  circumstances  will  allow. 

All  this  may  be  summed  up  in  the  exhortation  :  dSeek 
ye  first  the  kingdom  of  pure  practical  reason  and  its 
righteousness,  and  then  will  your  object,  the  benefit  of 
perpetual  peace,  be  added  unto  you  .A*  For  morality  — 
and  the  same  is  also  true  with  regard  to  the  moral  prin¬ 
ciples  of  public  law  and  consequently  in  relation  to 
politics  knowable  a  priori  —  has  this  innate  peculiarity: 
the  less  it  makes  conduct  depend  on  the  proposed  phys¬ 
ical  or  moral  advantage  the  individual  sets  as  his  end, 
the  more  does  it,  in  general,  conform  to  this  end.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  it  is  just  the  general  a  priori  will 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


115 


either  in  one  people  or  in  the  relations  of  different  peoples 
to  each  other  which  alone  determines  what  is  just  and 
right  among  men.  This  union  of  the  will  of  all,  how- 
ever,  when  it  proceeds  in  practice  consistently  and  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  mechanism  of  nature,  may  at  the  same 
time  he  the  cause  of  bringing  about  the  effect  intended, 
and  of  thus  realizing  the  ideas  of  law.  s^Tlms,  it  is  a  prin¬ 
ciple  of  moral  politics  that  a  people  ought  to  unite  into 
a  State  solely  according  to  the  only  valid  conceptions  of 
liberty  and  equality  ;  and  this  principle  is  founded  not 
upon  expediency  but  upon  duty.  Political  moralists,  on 
the  other  hand,  deserve  no  hearing,  however  much  they 
may  reason  about  the  natural  mechanism  of  a  multitude 
of  men  joined  in  society,  which,  if  a  fact,  would  weaken 
those  principles  and  frustrate  their  purpose  ;  or  however 
much  they  may  seek  to  prove  their  assertion  by  adduc¬ 
ing  examples  of  badly  organized  constitutions  in  ancient 
and  modern  times,  such  as  democracies  without  a  system 
of  representation.  And  this  has  to  be  particularly  noted, 
since  such  a  pernicious  theory  tends  of  itself  to  bring  about 
the  evil  which  it  foretells ;  for,  according  to  it,  man  is 
thrown  into  one  class  with  the  other  living  machines, 
which  only  need  the  consciousness  of  their  not  being  free 
creatures  to  become,  in  their  own  judgment,  the  most 
miserable  of  all  beings. 

Fiat  justitia ,  per  eat  mundus.  This  proverbial  saying 
may  sound  somewhat  pompous,  but  yet  it  is  true.  It  may 


be  popularly  rendered  thus :  j  Let  righteousness  prevail 
though  all  the  knaves  in  the  world  should 


It  is  thus  a  bold  principle  of  right  cutting  through  all 
the  crooked  ways  that  are  shaped  by  intrigue  or  force. 
It  must  not,  however,  be  misunderstood  as  allowing  any 


116 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


one  to  exercise  his  own  right  with  the  utmost  severity, 
which  would  be  contrary  to  ethical  duty.  It  is  to  be 
understood  as  signifying  the  obligation  incumbent  upon 
those  in  power,  not  to  refuse  any  one  his  right,  or  to  take 
from  it  out  of  favor  or  sympathy  toward  others.  This  re¬ 
quires,  above  all,  an  internal  political  constitution,  ar¬ 
ranged  according  to  pure  principles  of  right,  and  further, 
the  union  of  it  with  other  neighboring  or  distant  States 
so  as  to  attain  a  legal  settlement  of  their  disputes  by  a 
constitution  that  would  be  analogous  to  a  universal  State. 
This  proposition  means  nothing  more  than  that  political 
maxims  must  not  start  from  the  prosperity  and  happi¬ 
ness  that  are  to  be  expected  in  each  State  from  follow¬ 
ing  them,  nor  from  the  end  which  each  of  them  makes 
the  object  of  its  will  as  the  highest  empirical  principle 
of  politics ;  but  they  must  proceed  from  the  pure  con¬ 
ception  of  the  duty  of  right  or  justice  as  an  obligatory 
principle  given  a  priori  by  pure  reason.)  And  this  is  to 
he  held,  whatever  may  be  the  physical  consequences 
which  follow  from  adopting  these  political  principles. 
The  world  will  certainly  not  perish  from  the  fact  that 
the  number  of  the  wicked  thus  becomes  less.  Moral 
evil  has  inherent  in  its  nature  this  quality  that,  in 
carrying  out  its  purposes,  it  is  antagonistic  and  destruc¬ 
tive  to  itself,  especially  in  relation  to  such  others  as  are 
also  under  its  sway ;  and  hence  it  must  give  place  to 
the  moral  principle  of  goodness,  although  the  progress 
to  this  may  be  slow. 

There  is,  therefore,  objectively  in  theory  no  antago¬ 
nism  at  all  between  morals  and  politics.  But  subjectively, 
in  consequence  of  the  selfish  propensity  of  men  (which, 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


117 


however,  as  not  founded  upon  rational  maxims  cannot 
properly  be  called  practice),  such' an  antagonism  is  found 
and  it  will  perhaps  always  continue  to  exist,  because  it 
serves-as-a-whet  to  virtue.  According  to  the  principle 
tu  ne  cede  malis  sed  contra  audentior  ito ,  the  true  courage 
of  virtue  in  this  case  does  not  consist  so  much  in  setting 
itself  with  fixed  purpose  to  meet  the  evils  and  sacrifices 
which  must  thus  be  encountered,  but  rather  in  facing  and 
overcoming  the  wiles  of  the  far  more  dangerous,  lying, 
treacherous,  yet  sophistical,  principle  of  evil  in  ourselves 
which  holds  up  the  weakness  of  human  nature  as  a 
justification  of  every  transgression  of  right. 

In  fact,  the  political  moralist  may  say  that  the  ruler 
and  people,  or  nations  and  nations,  do  no  wrong  to  each 
other  if  they  enter  on  a  mutual  war  by  violence  or  cun¬ 
ning,  although  they  do  wrong  generally  in  refusing  to 
respect  the  conception  of  right  and  justice  which  ‘alone 
could  establish  peace  for  all  time.  For  since  the  one 
transgresses  his  duty  toward  the  other,  who  cherishes  as 
equally  wrong  a  sentiment  toward  him,  it  may  be  said 
that  nothing  but  what  is  just  happens  to  both  of  them 
when  they  exhaust  each  other,  yet  so  that  there  still 
remains  some  of  their  race  to  carry  on  this  play  of  force 
to  the  most  distant  times  that  the  latest  posterity  may 
take  a  warning  example  from  them.  In  all  this,  indeed, 
there  is  a  justification  of  the  Providence  that  rules  the 
course  of  the  world ;  for  the  moral  principle  in  man  is 
never  extinguished,  and  his  reason,  pragmatically  trained 
to  realize  the  ideas  of  right  according  to  this  principle, 
grows  without  ceasing  through  its  constantly  advancing 
culture,  while  the  guilt  of  such  transgressions  also  comes 
more  clearly  into  light.  Yet  the  process  of  creation,  by 


118 


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which  such  a  brood  of  corrupt  beings  has  been  put  upon 
the  earth,  can  apparently  be  justified  by  no  theodicy  or 
theory  of  Providence,  if  we  assume  that  it  never  will  be 
better,  nor  can  be  better,  with  the  human  race.  But  such 
a  standpoint  of  judgment  is  really  much  too  high  for  us 
to  assume,  and  is  as  if  we  could  be  entitled  theoretically 
to  apply  our  notions  of  wisdom  to  the  supreme  and  un¬ 
fathomable  Power.  We  shall  thus  be  inevitably  driven 
to  a  position  of  despair  in  consequence  of  such  reason¬ 
ings  if  we  do  not  admit  that  the  pure  principles  of  right 
and  justice  have  objective  reality  and  that  they  can  be 
realized  in  fact.  Accordingly,  we  must  hold  that  these 
principles  are  to  be  treated  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
people  in  the  State  and  likewise  from  the  relations  of 
the  States  to  one  another,  let  the  advocates  of  empirical 
politics  object  to  this  view  as  they  may.  A  true  political 
philosophy,  therefore,  cannot  advance  a  step  without  first 
paying  homage  to  the  principles  of  morals  ;  and,  although 
politics  taken  by  itself  is  a  difficult  art,  yet  its  union  with 
morals  removes  it  from  the  difficulties  of  arty  For  this 
combination  of  them  cuts  in  two  the  knots  which  poli¬ 
tics  alone  cannot  untie,  whenever  they  come  into  conflict 
with  each  other.  The  rights  of  men  must,  therefore,  be 
regarded  as  holy,  however  great  may  be  the  sacrifice 
which  the  maintenance  of  them  lays  upon  the  ruling 
power.  We  cannot  divide  right  into  halves  or  devise  a 
modified  condition  of  right  intermediate  between  jus¬ 
tice  and  utility.  Rather,  must  all  politics  bow  the  knee 
before  the  principle  of  right ;  but  in  doing  so  it  may 
well  cherish  the  hope  that  it  will  yet  attain,  however 
slowly,  to  that  stage  of  progress  at  which  it  will  shine 
forth  with  lasting  splendor. 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


119 


II 


OF  THE  AGREEMENT 
ACCORDING  TO  THE 


OF  POLITICS  WITH  MORALS 
TRANSCENDENTAL  CONCEP¬ 


TION  OF  PUBLIC  LAAV 


W e  may  think  of  public  law  in  a  formal  way  after  ab¬ 
stracting  from  it  all  the  matters  to  which  it  is  applied  in 
detail,  such  as  the  different  relations  of  men  in  the  State 
or  of  the  States  to  each  other,  as  presented  in  experience  ; 
and  this  is  the  way  in  which  jurists  usually  think  of  it. 
But  apart  from  the  matter  of  public  law,  there  remains 
only  the  form  of  publicity,  the  possibility  of  which  is 
implied  in  every  legal  claim ;  for  without  such  publicity 
there  would  be  no  justice,  this  being  thinkable  only  as 
what  is  publicly  declarable,  and  hence  without  this  pub¬ 
licity  there  would  be  no  right,  as  law  is  administered  or 
distributed  only  by  it. 

This  character  of  publicity  must  belong  to  every  legal 
title ;  and,  as  it  can  easily  be  judged  whether  it  accom¬ 
panies  any  particular  case  and  whether  it  can  therefore 
be  combined  with  the  principles  of  an  agent,  it  furnishes 
a  criterion  which  is  at  once  presented  a  priori  in  reason 
and  which  it  is  easy  to  use  in  experience.  Where  it 
cannot  be  combined  with  the  principles  of  an  agent,  the 
falsity  (illegality)  of  a  legal  claim  ( praetensio  juris )  can 
thus  be  immediately  recognized,  as  if  by  an  experiment 
of  the  pure  reason. 

Abstraction  being  thus  made  from  everything  empir¬ 
ical  that  is  contained  in  the  conceptions  of  national  and 
international  law  (such  as  the  evil  disposition  of  human 
nature  which  makes  coercion  necessary),  the  following 


120 


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proposition  arises,  and  it  may  be  called  the  transcenden¬ 
tal  formula  of  public  law  : 

f  All  actions  relating  to  the  rights  of  other  men  are 
unjust  if  the  maxims  on  which  they  are  based  are  not 
compatible  with  publicity.” 

This  principle  is  not  merely  to  be  regarded  as  ethical 
and  as  belonging  only  to  the  doctrine  of  virtue,  but  it  is 
also  to  be  regarded  as  juridical  and  as  pertaining  to  the 
rights  of  men.  For  a  maxim  cannot  be  correct  if  it  is 
such  that  I  cannot  allow  it  to  be  published  without 
thereby  at  the  same  time  frustrating  my  own  intention, 
which  would  necessarily  have  to  be  kept  entirely  secret 
in  order  that  it  might  succeed,  and  which  I  could  not 
publicly  confess  to  be  mine  without  thereby  inevitably 
arousing  the  resistance  of  all  men  against  my  purpose. 
1 1  is  clear  that  this  necessary  and  universal  opposition  of 
all  against  me  on  self-evident  grounds  can  arise  from 
nothing  else  than  the  injustice  which  such  a  maxim 
threatens  to  every  one.  Further,  it  is  a  merely  negative 
maxim  in  so  far  as  it  serves  only  as  a  means  of  making 
known  what  is  not  right  and  just  toward  others.  It  is 
like  an  axiom  which  is  certain  without  demonstration. 
And,  besides  all  this,  it  is  easily  applicable  ;  as  may  be 
seen  from  the  following  examples  and  illustrations  of 
public  law. 

1.  Public  law  of  the  State.  As  regards  the  law  of  the 
State,  and  in  particular  its  internal  law,  we  may  look  at 
the  application  of  this  formulated  principle  to  a  question 
which  many  hold  it  difficult  to  answer,  but  which  the 
transcendental  principle  of  publicity  quite  easily  resolves. 
The  question  we  refer  to  is  whether  insurrection  is  a 
right  means  for  a  people  to  adopt  in  order  to  throw  off 


ETERNAL  EE  ACE 


121 


the  oppressive  power  of  a  so-called  tyrant.  Non  titulo 
sed  exercitio  tails.  fhhe  rights  of  the  people  are  violated 
in  the  case  supposed,  and  no  wrong  would  be  done  to  the 
tyrant  by  his  dethronement./  Of  this  latter  position  there 
may  be  no  doubt,  and  yet  it  is  wrong  in  the  highest  de¬ 
gree,  on  the  part  of  the  subjects,  to  pursue  their  rights 
in  this  way ;  and  if  they  did  so,  they  would  have  as  little 
right  on  their  side  to  complain  of  injustice  should  they 
fail  in  this  conflict  and  were  afterward  subjected  to  the 
severest  punishment  in  consequence. 

In  this  case  much  may  indeed  be  advanced  for  and 
against  either  position  if  the  attempt  is  made  to  estab¬ 
lish  it  by  a  dogmatic  deduction  of  the  principles  of  right. 


The  transcendental  principle  of  the  publicity  of  public 
right  can  alone  spare  us  all  this  prolixity  of  discussion. 
For  according  to  that  principle  the  people  would  have 
to  ask  themselves  before  the  institution  of  the  civil  con¬ 
tract  whether  they  would  dare  to  make  the  maxim  of  the 
proposal  of  an  occasional  insurrection  publicly  known. 
We  easily  see  that  were  it  made  a  condition  at  the 
founding  of  a  political  constitution  that  force  was  in 
certain  circumstances  to  be  exercised  against  the  supreme 
authority,  the  people  would  have  to  arrogate  to  them¬ 
selves  the  right  of  power  over  that  authority.  But,  were 
it  so,  that  would  no  longer  be  the  supreme  authority  ;  or, 
if  both  powers  were  made  a  condition  in  the  constitution 
of  the  State,  the  establishment  of  such  an  authority 
would  really  not  be  possible,  although  this  was  the  inten¬ 
tion  of  the  people.  ( The  wrongness  of  rebellion  therefore 
appears  plain  from  fche  fact  that  the  maxim  upon  which 
it  would  proceed,  were  it  to  be  publicly  professed  as 
such,  would  make  its  own  purpose  impossible.  It  would 


122 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


therefore  necessarily  have  to  be  kept  secret.  This  latter  con¬ 
dition,  however,  would  not  be  at  all  necessary  on  the  part 
of  the  head  of  the  State.  The  sovereign  power  may  freely 
announce  that  every  form  of  insurrection  or  revolt  will 
be  punished  with  the  death  of  the  ringleaders,  however 
the  latter  may  believe  that  it  was  the  sovereign  who  first 
violated  the  fundamental  law.  For  if  the  sovereign  is 
conscious  of  possessing  irresistible  supreme  power  (and 
this  must  be  assumed  in  every  civil  constitution,  because 
he  who  has  not  power  enough  to  protect  any  member  of 
the  people  against  every  other  has  no  right  to  command 
him),  he  need  have  no  anxiety  about  frustrating  his  own 
purpose  by  the  publication  of  his  maxim.  And  it  is  quite 
consistent  with  this  position  to  hold  that,  if  the  people 
succeed  in  a  rebellion,  the  sovereign  must  then  return  to 
the  position  of  a  subject.  But  he  will  not  then  be  en¬ 
titled  to  begin  a  new  rebellion  with  a  view  to  his  own 
restoration ;  and  neither  should  he  have  to  fear  that  he 
will  be  called  to  account  for  his  former  administration. 

2.  International  law.  There  can  only  be  a  system  of 
international  law  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  really 
a  legal  condition  as  the  external  condition  under  which 
right  can  become  real  among  men.  And  this  is  so  be¬ 
cause,  as  public  law,  it  already  implies  the  publication 
of  a  common  will  assigning  to  every  one  what  is  his  own. 
This  status  juridicus  must  arise  out  of  some  sort  of  com¬ 
pact  which,  unlike  that  from  which  a  State  springs,  can¬ 
not  be  founded  upon  compulsory  laws  ;  but  it  may  in  all 
cases  assume  the  form  of  a  permanent  free  association ; 
and  this  we  have  already  indicated  as  assuming  the  form 
of  a  federation  of  the  different  States.  Without  some 
legal  organization  to  connect  the  different  persons,  moral 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


123 


or  physical,  in  an  active  form,  and  therefore  in  the  state 
of  nature,  there  can  be  no  other  law  than  private  law. 

the  latter  is  regarded  as  a  doctrine  of  right ;  and  the 
criterion  of  the  publicity  of  maxims  again  finds  an  easy 
application  to  it,  but  only  on  the  condition  that  the 
States  are  bound  by  a  compact  with  the  object  only  of 
maintaining  themselves  in  peace  with  each  other,  and 
not  at  all  in  the  intention  of  acquiring  new  possessions. 
The  following  instances  of  antinomies  arising  between 
politics  and  morals  may  be  here  given,  along  with  their 
solution. 

a.  "  If  one  State  has  promised  something  to  another, 
assistance  or  a  cession  of  territory  or  subsidies  or  such 
like,  the  question  may  arise  as  to  whether,  in  a  case  on 
which  the  well-being  of  the  State  is  dependent,  it  may 
withdraw  from  keeping  its  promise  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  have  itself  to  be  regarded  as  a  double  person  :  first, 
as  a  sovereign,  from  being  responsible  to  no  one  in  the 
State,  and,  secondly,  merely  as  the  highest  political  offi¬ 
cial,  from  having  to  give  account  to  the  State  ;  and  then 
the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  what  it  had  become  respon¬ 
sible  for  in  the  first  quality,  it  may  be  discharged  from 
in  the  second.”  But,  if  the  sovereign  of  a  State  should 
proclaim  openly  such  a  maxim,  it  is  evident  that  every 
other  State  would  naturally  avoid  it,  or  would  unite  with 
others  to  resist  such  pretensions ;  and  this  proves  that 
politics,  with  all  its  craftiness,  would  frustrate  its  own 
purpose  by  such  an  application  of  the  principle  of  pub¬ 
licity  ;  and  consequently  any  such  maxim  must  be  wrong. 

b.  "  If  a  neighboring  power  that  has  grown  in  strength 
to  a  formidable  extent  excites  anxiety,  it  may  be  asked 


Here  again  comes  a  conflict  of  politics  with  morals  when 


124 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


whether,  because  it  is  able,  it  will  also  resolve  to  op¬ 
press  others  and  whether  this  gives  to  the  less  power¬ 
ful  States  a  right  to  make  a  united  attack  upon  it, 
although  it  may  as  yet  have  committed  no  injury.” 
A  State  which  would  affirmatively  proclaim  such  a 
maxim  would  only  more  certainly  and  rapidly  bring 
about  the  evil  that  is  dreaded.  For  the  greater  power 
would  anticipate  the  lesser  ones  ;  and  their  union  would 
be  but  a  weak  bundle  of  reeds  against  it,  if  it  knew  how 
to  practice  the  rule  of  divide  et  impera.  Such  a  maxim 
of  political  prudence,  if  publicly  declared,  would  there¬ 
fore  necessarily  frustrate  its  own  purpose ;  and  it  is  con¬ 
sequently  wrong. 

c.  ”  If  a  small  State  by  its  geographical  position  breaks 
the  continuity  of  a  greater  State  which  requires  this  con¬ 
nection  for  its  own  preservation,  is  such  a  State  not  en¬ 
titled  to  subject  the  smaller  State  to  itself  and  unite  it 
to  its  own  territory  ?  ”  Here  again  it  is  easily  seen  that 
the  greater  State  cannot  possibly  let  the  maxim  of  such 
a  procedure  be  previously  known ;  for  either  the  lesser 
States  would  combine  early  against  it  or  other  power¬ 
ful  States  would  contend  with  it  for  this  prize,  and 
so  the  maxim  would  make  itself  impracticable  by  its 
very  publicity.  This  would  be  a  sign  of  the.  wrong¬ 
ness  of  the  maxim  and  it  would  be  so  in  a  very  high 
degree ;  for  the  smallness  of  the  object  of  an  injustice 
does  not  prevent  the  injustice  manifested  by  it  from 
being  very  great. 

3.  Cosmopolitical  law.  As  regards  cosmopolitical  law, 
I  may  pass  it  over  in  silence  here,  because  on  account  of 
its  analogy  with  international  law  its  maxims  may,  in  a 
similar  manner,  be  easily  indicated  and  estimated. 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


125 


T1  le  principle  of  the  incompatibility  of  certain  maxims 
of  international  law  with  their  publicity  thus  furnishes 
us  with  a  good  criterion  relative  to  the  nonagreement  of 
politics  with  morals  viewed  as  a  science  of  right.  But 
it  is  necessary  to  know  the  condition  under  which  its 
maxims  agree  with  the  right  of  nations.  For  it  cannot 
be  inferred  conversely  that  those  maxims  which  are  com¬ 
patible  with  publicity  are  also  right  on  that  account, 
because  he  who  has  a  decided  supremacy  does  not  need 
to  conceal  his  maxims.  The  condition  of  the  possibility 
of  a  law  of  nations  generally  is  that  there  does  exist  a 
prior  juridic  state  of  society.  For  without  this  there  is  no 
public  law,  but  every  kind  of  law  which  could  be  thought 
as  existing  without  it  (as  in  the  state  of  nature)  is  merely 
private  law.  Now  we  have  seen  above  that  a  federative 
union  of  States,  having  for  its  sole  object  the  removal  of 
war,  is  the  only  condition  compatible  with  their  freedom 
and  the  only  one  in  which  their  rights  can  have  existence 
in  common.  » Hence  the 
is  possible  only  in  this  connection  by  means  of  a  federa¬ 
tive  union,  a  union  which  is  necessarily  and  really  in¬ 
volved  a  priori  in  the  principles  of  right ;  And  all  public 
policy  can  have  a  juridic  basis  only  by  the  establishment 
of  such  a  union  in  its  greatest  possible  extent ;  and, 
apart  from  this  end,  all  their  sophistry  is  but  unwisdom 
and  disguised  injustice.  Yet  there  is  such  a  sophistry, 
and  its  bastard  policy  has  a  casuistry  of  its  own  that  might 
defy  the  best  Jesuit  school  to  outrival.  It  has  its  men¬ 
tal  reservation  ( reservatio  mentalis )  as  in  the  negotiation 
of  public  treaties  by  using  such  expressions  as  may  at 
will  be  interpreted  to  suit  the  occasion,  such  as  the  dis¬ 
tinction  between  the  status  quo  de  facto  and  the  status  quo 


agreement  of  politics  with  morals 


1 


126 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


de  jure.  Again  it  has  its  probabilism,  when  it  construes 
evil  intentions  in  others  or  even  the  probabilities  of  their 
possible  superiority  into  a  justifiable  reason  for  under¬ 
mining  other  peaceful  States.  And,  finally,  it  has  its 
philosophical  sin  ( peccadillo  or  bagatelle)  when  it  main¬ 
tains  that  the  absorption  of  a  small  State  is  an  easily 
pardonable  triviality,  if  a  much  larger  State  thereby  gains 
to  the  supposed  greater  advantage  of  the  whole.14 

A  pretext  for  all  this  is  furnished  by  the  double¬ 
dealing  of  politics  in  relation  to  morals,  employing  one 
or  the  other  for  its  own  purposes.  Now,  in  fact,  both  phi¬ 
lanthropy  and  respect  for  the  rights  of  men  are  obligatory 
as  duties.  But  the  former  is  only  a  conditional  duty ; 
while  the  latter  is  unconditioned  and  absolutely  impera¬ 
tive  ;  and  he  who  would  give  himself  up  to  the  sweet 
feeling  of  well-doing  must  first  be  fully  assured  that  he 
has  not  transgressed  it.  Now  politics  easily  accords  with 
morals  in  the  former  sense  (as  ethics)  by  making  it  in¬ 
cumbent  on  men  to  give  up  their  right  to  their  superiors  ; 
but  it  is  otherwise  when  morals  is  taken  in  the  second 
sense  (as  jurisprudence  or  the  science  of  right)  before 
which  politics  must  bow  the  knee.  (  Here  politics  finds 
it  advisable  not  to  trust  at  all  to  any  compact,  but  rather 
to  take  away  from  right  all  reality  and  to  reduce  all 
duties  to  mere  benevolence.  This  artifice  of  a  mode  of 
.  policy  that  shuns  the  light  would  be  easily  frustrated  by 
publicity  being  given  to  such  maxims,  if  it  only  dared 
allow  the  philosophers  to  give  publicity  to  their  maxims. 

From  this  point  of  view,  I  shall  now  propose  another 
principle  of  public  right,  which  is  at  once  transcen¬ 
dental  and  affirmative,  and  whose  formula  would  be  as 
follows : 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


127 


All  maxims  which  require  publicity  in  order  that 
they  may  not  fail  of  their  end  are  in  accordance  with 

both  right  and  politics.  y  ,  „ . 

1  or,  if  these  maxims  can  only  attain  their  end  by  pub¬ 
licity,  they  must  be  conformable  to  the  common  end  of 
the  public,  which  is  happiness ;  and  it  is  the  true  prob¬ 
lem  of  politics  to  put  itself  into  agreement  with  the 
public  and  to  make  the  people  contented  with  their  con¬ 
dition.  But  if  this  end  is  to  be  attained  only  by  publicity, 
as  the  means  of  removing  all  distrust  of  political  maxims, 
these  maxims  must  also  be  in  harmony  with  the  right  of 
the  public ;  for  the  union  of  the  ends  of  all  is  possible 
only  in  the  harmony  established  by  right.  I  must,  how¬ 
ever,  defer  the  further  development  and  explanation  of 
this  principle  to  another  occasion.  But  it  may  be  already 
seen  that  it  is  a  transcendental  formula  from  the  fact  that 
all  the  empirical  conditions  of  happiness,  such  as  the 
subject  matter  of  the  law,  are  removed  from  it ;  and  it 
merely  has  regard  to  the  form  of  a  universal  legislation. 


If  it  is  a  duty  to  realize  a  state  of  public  law,  and  if  at 
the  same  time  there  is  a  well-grounded  hope  of  its  being 
realized  —  although  it  may  only  be  by  approximation  to 
it  that  advances  ad  infinitum  —  then  perpetual  peace  is 
a  fact  that  is  destined  historically  to  follow  the  falsely 
so-called  treaties  of  peace  which  have  been  but  cessations 
of  hostilities,  (perpetual  peace  is,  therefore,  no  empty 
idea,  but  a  practical  thing  which,  through  its  gradual 
solution,  is  coming  always  nearer  its  final  realization  ; 
and  it  may  well  be  hoped  that  progress  toward  it  will 
be  made  at  more  rapid  rates  of  advance  in  the  times 
to  come. 


PUBLIC  LAW 


PASSAGES  FROM  THE  SECOND  PART  OF 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LAW 


AS  CONTAINED  IN 

THE  METAPHYSICS  OF  MORALS 


1796-1797 


PUBLIC  LAW 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  RIGHT  IN  CIVIL  SOCIETY 
Relation  of  Public  to  Private  Law 

From  the  conditions  of  private  law  in  the  natural  state 
there  arises  the  postulate  of  public  law.  It  may  be  thus 
expressed :  "  In  the  relation  of  unavoidable  coexistence 
with  others,  thou  shalt  pass  from  the  state  of  nature  into 
a  juridical  union  constituted  under  the  condition  of  a  dis¬ 
tributive  justice.”  The  principle  of  this  postulate  may  be 
unfolded  analytically  from  the  conception  of  right  in  the 
external  relation,  contradistinguished  from  mere  might 
as  violence. 

No  one  is  under  obligation  to  abstain  from  interfering 
with  the  possession  of  others  unless  they  give  him  a  re¬ 
ciprocal  guaranty  for  the  observance  of  a  similar  absten¬ 
tion  from  interference  with  his  possessions.  Nor  does  he 
require  to  wait  for  proof  by  experience  of  the  need  of  this 
guaranty,  in  view  of  the  antagonistic  disposition  of  others. 
He  is  therefore  under  no  obligation  to  wait  till  he  acquires 
practical  prudence  at  his  own  cost ;  for  he  can  perceive 
in  himself  evidence  of  the  natural  inclination  of  men  to 
play  the  master  over  others,  and  to  disregard  the  claims 
of  the  right  of  others,  when  they  feel  themselves  their 
superiors  by  might  or  fraud.  And  thus  it  is  not  necessary 
to  wait  for  the  melancholy  experience  of  actual  hostility  ; 
the  individual  is  from  the  first  entitled  to  exercise  a 


131 


132 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


rightful  compulsion  toward  those  who  already  threaten 
him  by  their  very  nature.  Quilibet praesumitur  malus ,  donee 
securitatem  dederit  oppositio. 

So  long  as  the  intention  to  live  and  continue  in  this 
state  of  externally  lawless  freedom  prevails,  men  may  be 
said  to  do  no  wrong  or  injustice  at  all  to  one  another,  even 
when  they  wage  war  against  each  other.  For  what  seems 
good  for  the  one  is  equally  valid  for  the  other,  as  if  it 
were  so  by  mutual  agreement.  Uti  partes  de  jure  suo  dis- 
ponunt ,  ita  jus  est.  But  generally  they  must  be  considered 
as  being  in  the  highest  state  of  wrong,  as  being  and  will- 

O  O  o 1  O 

ing  to  be  in  a  condition  which  is  not  juridical ;  and  in 
which,  therefore,  no  one  can  be  secured  against  violence 
in  the  possession  of  his  own. 

Definition  and  Division  of  Public  Law 

Public  law  embraces  the  whole  of  the  laws  that  re¬ 
quire  to  be  universally  promulgated  in  order  to  produce 
a  juridical  state  of  society.  It  is  therefore  a  system  of 
those  laws  that  is  requisite  for  a  people  as  a  multitude 
of  men  forming  a  nation,  or  for  a  number  of  nations 
in  their  relations  to  each  other.  Men  and  nations,  on 
account  of  their  mutual  influence  on  one  another,  require 
a  juridical  constitution  uniting  them  under  one  will,  in 
order  that  they  may  participate  in  what  is  right.  This 
relation  of  the  individuals  of  a  nation  to  each  other 
constitutes  the  civil  union  in  the  social  state;  and, 
viewed  as  a  whole  in  relation  to  its  constituent  members, 
it  forms  the  political  State  ( civitas ). 

(1)  The  State,  as  constituted  by  the  common  interest 
of  all  to  live  in  a  juridical  union,  is  called,  in  view  of  its 


PUBLIC  LAW 


133 


form,  the  commonwealth  or  the  republic  in  the  wider 
sense  of  the  term  ( res  publica  lathis  sic  dicta').  The 
principles  of  right  in  this  sphere  thus  constitute  the 
first  department  of  public  law  as  the  right  of  the  State 
(jus  civitatis ),  or  national  law.  (2)  The  State,  again, 
viewed  in  relation  to  other  peoples,  is  called  a  power 
( potentia ),  whence  arises  the  idea  of  potentates.  Viewed 
in  relation  to  the  supposed  hereditary  unity  of  the  people 
composing  it,  the  State  constitutes  a  nation  (gens). 
Under  the  general  conception  of  public  law,  in  addition 
to  the  right  of  the  individual  State,  there  thus  arises 
another  department  of  law,  constituting  the  law  of  nations 
(jus  gentium),  or  international  law.  (3)  Further,  as  the 
surface  of  the  earth  is  not  unlimited  in  extent  but  is  cir¬ 
cumscribed  in  its  extent,  national  law  and  international 
law  necessarily  culminate  in  the  idea  of  a  universal  law 
of  mankind,  which  may  be  called  cosmopolitical  law  (jus 
cosmopoliticum).  And  national,  international  and  cosmo¬ 
political  law  are  so  interconnected  that,  if  any  one  of  these 
three  possible  forms  of  the  juridical  relation  fails  to  em¬ 
body  the  essential  principles  that  ought  to  regulate  exter¬ 
nal  freedom  by  law,  the  structure  of  legislation  reared 
by  the  others  will  also  be  undermined,  and  the  whole 
system  would  at  last  fall  to  pieces. 


/ 


l  — T — 

A 

I  I  ,  1  ' 

\  l  1  .1  U  a  j  a A  Aa  ,1 

I 

VV\  |  \y  'r  VV  ▼  / 

UM- 


(XaT 


v 


PUBLIC  LAW 


I.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 
Origin  of  the  Civil  Union 

It  is  not  from  any  experience  prior  to  the  appearance 
of  an  external  authoritative  legislation  that  we  learn  of 
the  maxim  of  natural  violence  among  men,  and  their 
J  evil  tendency  to  engage  in  war  with  each  other.  Nor 
is  it  assumed  here  that  it  is  merely  some  particular  his¬ 
torical  condition  or  fact  that  makes  public  legislative 
constraint  necessary  ;  for,  however  well  disposed  or  -fair- 
minded  men  may  be  considered  to  be  of  themselves,  <thg 
rational  idea  of  a  state  of  society  not  yet  regulated  by 
law  must  be  taken  as  our  starting  point.  This  idea  im¬ 
plies  that,  before  a  legal  state  of  society  can  be  publicly 
established,  individual  men,  nations  and  States  can  never 
be  safe  against  violence  from  eacli  other  ;  and  this  is  evi¬ 
dent  from  the  consideration  that  every  one  of  his  own 
will  naturally  does  what  seems  good  and  right  in  his 
own  eyes,  entirely  independent  of  the  opinion  of  others. 
Hence,  unless  the  institution  of  law  is  to  be  renounced, 
the  first  thing  incumbent  on  men  is  to  accept  the  princi¬ 
ple  that  it  is  necessary  to  leave  the  state  of  nature,  in 
which  every  one  follows  his  own  inclinations,  and  to 
form  a  union  of  all  those  who  cannot  avoid  coming1  into 
reciprocal  communication,  and  thus  subject  themselves 
in  common  to  the  external  restraint  of  public  compulsory 

134 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


135 


laws.  Men  thus  enter  into  a  civil  union  in  which  every 
one  haVft  determined  by  law  what  shall  be  recognized 
as  his ;  and  this  is  secured  to  him  by  a  competent  exter¬ 
nal  power  distinct  from  his  own  individuality.  Such  is 
the  primary  obligation,  on  the  part  of  all  men,  to  enter 
into  the  relations  of  a  civil  state  of  society. 

The  natural  condition  of  mankind  need  not,  on  this 
ground,  be  represented  as  a  state  of  absolute  injustice, 
as  if  there  could  have  been  no  other  relation  originally 
among  men  but  what  was  merely  determined  by  force. 
But  this  natural  condition  must  be  regarded,  if  it  ever 
existed,  as  a  state  of  society  that  was  void  of  regulation 
by  law  (status  justitiae  vacuus ),  so  that  if  a  matter  of  law 
came  to  be  in  dispute  (jus  contr  over  sum),  no  competent 
judge  was  found  to  give  an  authorized  legal  decision 
upon  it.  Tt  is  therefore  reasonable  that  any  one  should 
constrain  another  by  force  to  pass  from  such  a  non- 
juridical  state  of  life  and  enter  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  a  civil  state  of  society*/  For,  although  some  external 
power  may  be  acquired  through  usurpation  or  compact, 
according  to  the  conceptions  of  right  of  the  individual, 
yet  such  acquisition  is  only  provisory  so  long  as  it  has 
not  yet  obtained  the  sanction  of  a  public  law.  Till  this 
sanction  is  explicit,  the  condition  of  possession  is  not 
determined  by  any  public  distributive  justice,  nor  is  it 
secured  by  any  power  exercising  public  right. 


The  Three  Powers  in  the  State 


A  State  (civitas')  is  the  union  of  a  number  of  men 
under  juridical  laws^/  These  laws  as  such  are  to  be  re¬ 
garded  as  necessary  a  priori ,  that  is,  as  following  of 


136 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


v 


themselves  from  the  conceptions  of  external  law  generally, 
and  not  as  merely  established  by  statute.  The  form  of 
the  State  is  thus  involved  in  the  idea  of  the  State,  viewed 
as  it  ought  to  be  according  to  pure  principles  of  law ; 
and  this  ideal  form  furnishes  the  normal  criterion  of 
every  real  union  that  constitutes  a  commonwealth. 

Every  State  contains  in  itself  three  powers,  the  uni¬ 
versal  united  will  of  the  people  being  thus  personified 
in  a  political  triad.  These  are  the  legislative  power, 
the  executive  power  and  the  judicial  power:  (1)  the 
legislative  power  of  the  sovereignty  in  the  State  is 
embodied  in  the  person  of  the  lawgiver;  (2)  the  execu¬ 
tive  power  is  embodied  in  the  person  of  tnB  ruler  who 
administers  the  law ;  and  (3)  the  judicial  power,  em¬ 
bodied  in  the  person  of  the  judge,  is  the  function  of 
assigning  every  one  what  is  his  own,  according  to  the 
law  (potestas  legislatoria ,  rectoria  et  judiciaria ).  'These 
three  powers  may  be  compared  to  the  three  propositions 
in  a  practical  syllogism  —  the  major  as  the  sumption 
laying  down  the  universal  law  of  a  will,  the  minor  pre¬ 
senting  the  command  applicable  to  an  action  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  law  as  the  principle  of  the  subsumption,  and 
the  conclusion  containing  the  sentence  or  legal  judgment 
in  the  particular  case  under  consideration. 


The  Legislative  Power  and  the  People 

The  legislative  power,  viewed  in  its  rational  principle, 
can  belong  only  to  the  united  will  of  the  people.  For, 
as  all  right  ought  to  proceed  from  this  power,  it  is  neces¬ 
sary  that  its  laws  should  be  unable  to  do  wrong  to  any 
one  whatever.  Now,  if  any  one  individual  determines 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


ion 

anything  in  the  State  in  contradistinction  to  another,  it  is 
always  possible  that  he  may  perpetrate  a  wrong  on  that 
other ;  bnt  this  is  never  possible  when  all  determine  and 
decree  what  is  to  be  law  to  themselves.  Volenti  non  fit 
injuria.  Hence,  it  is  only  the  united  and  consenting  will 
of  all  the  people  —  in  so  far  as  each  of  them  determines 
the  same  thing  about  all,  and  all  determine  the  same 
thing  about  each  —  that  ought  to  have  the  power  of 
enacting  law  in  the  State. 

O 

The  members  of  a  civil  society  thus  united  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  legislation,  and  thereby  constituting  a  State,  are 
called  its  citizens ;  and  there  are  three  juridical  attri¬ 
butes  that  inseparably  belong  to  them  by  right.  These 
are  :  (1)  constitutional  freedom,  as  the  right  of  every  citi¬ 
zen  to  “have  to  obey  no  other  law  than  that  to  which  he 
has  given  his  consent  or  approval;  (2)  civil  equality,  as 
the  right  of  the  citizen  to  recognize  no  one  as  a  superior 
among  the  people  in  relation  to  himself,  except  in  so  far 
as  such  a  one  is  as  subject  to  his  moral  power  to  impose 
obligations  as  that  other  has  power  to  impose  obligations 
upon  him  ;  and  (3)  political  independence,  as  the  right  to 
owe  his  existence  and  continuance  in  society  not  to  the 
arbitrary  will  of  another,  but  to  his  own  rights  and  powers 
as  a  member  of  the  commonwealth;  and,  consequently, 
the  possession  of  a  civil  personality,  which  cannot  be 
represented  by  any  other  than  himself. 

(Only  the  capability  of  casting  the  ballot  decides  the 
qualification  of  a  citizen  of  the  State.  This  presupposes 
the  independence  of  the  citizen  among  the  people,  not  as 
an  incidental  part  of  the  commonwealth  but  as  a  member 
thereof,  so  that  lie  is  a  part  of  it,  acting  of  his  own  free 
will  in  common  with  others.  The  last  quality  necessarily 


138 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


constitutes  the  distinction  between  active  and  passive 
citizenship,  notwithstanding  that  this  conception  seems 
generally  to  stand  in  contradiction  with  the  definition  of 
the  conception  of  a  citizen.  .  .  .) 

The  State  and  the  Original  Contract 

All  these  three  powers  in  the  State  are  dignities  ;  and, 
as  necessarily  arising  out  of  the  idea  of  the  State  and 
essential  generally  to  the  foundation  of  its  constitution, 
they  are  to  be  regarded  as  political  dignities.  They  imply 
the  relation  between  a  universal  sovereign  as  head  of  the 

o 

State  —  which,  according  to  the  laws  of  freedom,  can  be 
none  other  than  the  people  itself  united  into  a  nation  — 
and  the  mass  of  tl  le  individuals  of  the  nation  as  subjects. 
T1  le  former  member  of  the  relation  is  the  ruling  power, 
whose  function  is  to  govern  ( bnperans )  ;  the  latter  is  tl  le 
ruled  constituents  of  the  State,  whose  function  is  to  obey 
( subditi ). 

The  act  by  which  a  people  is  represented  as  consti¬ 
tuting  itself  into  a  State  is  termed  the  original  contract. 

O  O 

This  is  properly  only  an  outward  mode  of  representing 
the  idea  by  which  the  legality  of  the  process  of  organizing 
the  constitution  may  be  made  conceivable.  According  to 
this  representation,  all  and  each  of  the  people  give  up 
their  external  freedom  in  order  to  receive  it  immediately 
again  as  members  of  a  commonwealth.  The  common¬ 
wealth  is  the  people  viewed  as  united  all  together  into  a 
State.  And  thus  it  is  not  to  be  said  that  the  individual 
in  the  State  lias  sacrificed  a  part  of  his  inborn,  external 
freedom  for  a  particular  purpose ;  but  he  has  wholly 
abandoned  his  wild,  lawless  freedom  in  order  to  find  all 


CONST  IT UT IONAL  LAW 


139 


his  proper  freedom  again  entire  and  undiminished,  but  in 
the  form  of  a  regulated  order  of  dependence,  that  is,  in  a 
civil  state  regulated  by  laws.  This  relation  of  dependence 
thus  arises  out  of  his  own  regulative  law-giving  will. 


The  Three  Powers  Coordinate 


The  three  powers  in  the  State,  as  regards  their  rela¬ 
tions  to  each  other,  are  therefore  (1)  coordinate  with 
one  another  as  so  many  moral  persons,  and  the  one  is 
thus  the  complement  of  the  other  in  the  way  of  com¬ 
pleting  the  constitution  of  the  State;  (2)  they  are  like¬ 
wise  subordinate  to  one  another,  so  that  the  one  cannot 
at  the  same  time  usurp  the  function  of  the  other  by  whose 
side  it  moves,  each  having  its  own  principle  and  main¬ 
taining  its  authority  in  a  particular  person,  but  under 
the  restriction  of  the  will  of  a  superior ;  and,  further, 
(3)  by  the  union  of  both  these  relations,  they  assign  dis- 
tributively  to  every  subject  in  the  State  his  own  rights. 

Considered  as  to  their  respective  dignity,  the  three 
powers  may  be  thus  described.  The  will  of  the  sovereign 
legislator,  in  respect  of  what  constitutes  the  external  mine 
and  thine,  is  to  be  regarded  as  irreprehensible ;  the  execu¬ 
tive  function  of  the  supreme  ruler  is  to  be  regarded  as 
irresistible;  and  the  judicial  sentence  of  the  supreme  judge 
is  to  be  regarded  as  irreversible,  being  beyond  appeal. 


Distinct 


Functions  of  the 


Three 


Powers 


The  executive  power  belongs  to  the  governor  or 
regent  of  the  State,  a  moral  or  individual  person,  as  the 
king  or  prince  (rex,  princeps).  This  executive  author¬ 
ity,  as  the  supreme  agent  of  the  State,  appoints  the 


140 


fit? 

■'PC)  r 


CAMS 


L AW 
ETERNAL  PEACE 


magistrates  and  prescribes  the  rules  to  the  people,  in 
accordance  with  which  individuals  may  acquire  anything 
or  maintain  what  is  their  own  conformably  to  the  law, 
each  case  being  brought  under  its  application.  Regarded 
as  a  moral  person,  this  executive  authority  constitutes  the 
government.  The  orders  issued  by  the  government  to 
the  people  and  the  magistrates  as  well  as  to  the  higher 
ministerial  administrators  of  the  State  ( gubematio )  are 
rescripts  or  decrees,  and  not  laws ;  for  they  terminate  in 
the  decision  of  particular  cases  and  are  given  forth  as 
unchangeable.  A  government  acting  as  an  executive 
and  at  the  same  time  laying  down  the  law  as  the  legis¬ 
lative  power  would  be  a  despotic  government  and  would 
have  to  be  contradistinguished  from  a  patriotic  govern¬ 
ment.  A  patriotic  government  again  is  to  be  distin¬ 
guished  from  a  paternal  government  ( regimen  patemale ) 
which  is  the  most  despotic  government  of  all,  the  citi¬ 
zens  being  dealt  with  by  it  as  mere  children.  A  patri¬ 
otic  government,  however,  is  one  in  which  the  State, 
while  dealing  with  the  subjects  as  if  they  were  mem¬ 
bers  of  a  family,  still  treats  them  likewise  as  citizens  and 
according  to  laws  that  recognize  their  independence,  each 
individual  possessing  himself  and  not  being  dependent 
on  the  absolute  will  of  another  beside  him  or  above  him. 

The  legislative  authority  ought  not  at  the  same  time 
to  be  the  executive  or  governor;  for  the  governor,  as 
administrator,  should  stand  under  the  authority  of  the 
law,  and  is  bound  by  it  under  the  supreme  control  of 
the  legislator.  The  legislative  authority  may  therefore 
deprive  the  governor  of  his  power,  depose  him  or  re¬ 
form  his  administration,  but  not  punish  him.  This  is 
the  proper  and  only  meaning  of  the  common  saying  in 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


141 


England,  "  The  king  —  as  the  supreme  executive  power 

—  can  do  no  wrong.”  For  any  such  application  of  punish¬ 
ment  would  necessarily  be  an  act  of  that  very  executive 
power  to  which  the  supreme  right  to  compel  according 
to  law  pertains  and  which  would  itself  be  thus  subjected 
to  coercion  ;  which  is  self -contradictory. 

Further,  neither  the  legislative  power  nor  the  executive 
power  ought  to  exercise  the  judicial  function,  but  only 
appoint  judges  as  magistrates.  It  is  the  people  who  ought 
to  judge  themselves  through  those  of  the  citizens  who 
are  elected  by  free  choice  as  their  representatives  for  this 
purpose,  and  even  specially  for  every  process  or  cause. 
For  the  judicial  sentence  is  a  special  act  of  public  dis¬ 
tributive  justice,  performed  by  a  judge  or  court  as  a 
constitutional  administrator  of  the  law,  to  a  subject  as 
one  of  the  people.  Such  an  act  is  not  invested  inherently 
with  the  power  to  determine  and  assign  to  any  one  what 
is  his.  Every  individual  among  the  people  being  merely 
passive  in  this  relation  to  the  supreme  power,  either  the 
executive  or  the  legislative  authority  might  do  him  wrong 
in  their  determinations  in  cases  of  dispute  regarding  the 
property  of  individuals.  It  would  not  be  the  people 
themselves  who  thus  determined  or  who  pronounced  the 
judgments  of  "  guilty  ”  or  "  not  guilty  ”  regarding  their 
fellow  citizens.  For,  it  is  to  the  determination  of  this 
issue  in  a  cause  that  the  court  has  to  apply  the  law ; 
and  it  is  by  means  of  the  executive  authority  that  the 
judge  holds  power  to  assign  to  every  one  his  own.  Hence 
it  is  only  the  people  that  properly  can  judge  in  a  cause 

—  although  indirectly  —  by  representatives  elected  and 
deputed  by  themselves,  as  in  a  jury.  It  would  even  be 
beneath  the  dignity  of  the  sovereign  head  of  the  State  to 


142 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


play  the  judge ;  for  this  would  be  to  put  himself  into  a 
position  in  which  it  would  be  possible  to  do  wrong,  and 
thus  to  subject  himself  to  the  demand  for  an  appeal  to 
a  still  higher  power  (a  rege  male  informato  ad  regem 
melius  informandum ) . 

It  is  by  the  cooperation  of  these  three  powers  —  the 
legislative,  the  executive  and  the  judicial  —  that  the 
State  realizes  its  autonomy.  This  autonomy  consists  in 
its  organizing,  forming  and  maintaining  itself  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  laws  of  freedom.  In  their  union  the  wel¬ 
fare  of  the  State  is  realized.  Solus  reipublieae  suprema 
lex  est.  By  this  is  not  to  be  understood  merely  the  indi¬ 
vidual  well-being  and  happiness  of  the  citizens  of  the 
State  ;  for  —  as  Rousseau  asserts  —  this  end  may  per¬ 
haps  be  more  agreeably  and  more  desirably  attained  in 
the  state  of  nature  or  even  under  a  despotic  government. 
But  the  welfare  of  the  State  as  its  own  highest  good 
signifies  that  condition  in  which  the  greatest  harmony 
is  attained  between  its  constitution  and  the  principles 
of  right,  —  a  condition  of  the  State  which  reason  by 
a  categorical  imperative  makes  it  obligatory  ’upon  us  to 
strive  after. 

******** 

Juridical  Relations  of  the  Citizen  to  his 
Country  and  to  other  Countries 

T1  le  land  or  territory  whose  inhabitants  —  in  virtue 
of  its  political  constitution  and  without  the  necessary 
intervention  of  a  special  juridical  act  —  are,  by  birth, 
fellow  citizens  of  one  and  the  same  commonwealth  is 
called  their  country  or  fatherland.  A  foreign  country 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


143 


is  one  in  which  they  would  not  possess  this  condition, 
but  would  be  living  abroad.  If  a  country  abroad  forms 
part  of  the  territory  under  the  same  government  as  at 
home,  it  constitutes  a  province,  according  to  the  Roman 
usage  of  the  term.  It  does  not  constitute  an  incorporated 
portion  of  the  empire  ( imperii )  so  as  to  be  the  abode 
of  equal  fellow  citizens,  but  is  only  a  possession  of  the 
government,  like  a  lower  house  ;  and  it  must  therefore 
honor  the  domain  of  the  ruling  State  as  the  "  mother 
country  ”  (regio  domino). 

1.  A  subject,  even  regarded  as  a  citizen,  has  the 
right  of  emigration ;  for  the  State  cannot  retain  him  as 
if  he  were  its  property.  But  he  may  only  carry  away 
with  him  his  movables  as  distinguished  from  his  fixed 
possessions.  However,  he  is  entitled  to  sell  his  im¬ 
movable  property  and  take  the  value  of  it  in  money 
with  him. 

2.  The  supreme  power  as  master  of  the  country  has 
the  right  to  favor  immigration  and  the  settlement  of 

O  O 

strangers  and  colonists.  This  will  hold  even  although 

o  o 

the  natives  of  the  country  may  be  unfavorably  disposed 
to  it,  if  their  private  property  in  the  soil  is  not  diminished 
or  interfered  with. 

3.  In  the  case  of  a  subject  who  has  committed  a 
crime  that  renders  all  intercourse  by  his  fellow  citizens 
with  him  prejudicial  to  the  State,  the  supreme  power 
has  also  the  right  of  inflicting  banishment  to  a  country 
abroad.  By  such  deportation  he  does  not  acquire  any 
share  in  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the  territory  to  which 
he  is  banished. 

4.  The  supreme  power  has  also  the  right  of  imposing 
exile  (Jus  exilii ),  by  which  a  citizen  is  sent  abroad 


144 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


generally,  into  the  wide  world,  the  "  out-land.”  *  And 
because  the  supreme  authority  thus  withdraws  all  legal 
protection  from  the  citizen,  this  amounts  to  making  him 
an  "  outlaw  ”  within  the  territory  of  his  own  country. 


The  Three  Forms  of  the  State 


T1  ie  three  powers  in  the  State  involved  in  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  a  commonwealth  generally  Qres  publica  latius  dicta ) 
are  only  so  many  relations  of  the  united  will  of  the  peo¬ 
ple  which  emanates  from  the  a  priori  reason  y  and,  viewed 
as  such,  it  is  the  objective  practical  realization  of  the  pure 
idea  of  a  supreme  head  of  the  State.  This  supreme  head 
is  the  sovereign  ;  but,  conceived  only  as  a  representation 
of  the  whole  people,  the  idea  still  requires  physical  em¬ 
bodiment  in  a  person  who  may  exhibit  the  supreme  power 
of  the  State  and  bring  the  idea  actively  to  bear  upon  the 
popular  will.  The  relation  of  the  supreme  power  to  the 
people  is  conceivable  in  three  different  forms :  either  one 
in  the  State  rules  over  all ;  or  some,  united  in  a  relation 
of  equality  with  each  other,  rule  over  all  the  others ;  or 
all  together  rule  over  each  and  all  individually,  including 
themselves.  The  form  of  the  State  is  therefore  either 
autocratic  or  aristocratic  or  democratic.^  (The  expression 
"monarchic”  is  not  so  suitable  as  "autocratic”  for  the 
conception  here  intended ;  for  a  monarch  is  one  who 
has  the  highest  power,  an  autocrat  is  one  who  has  all 
power,  so  that  this  latter  is  the  sovereign,  whereas  the 
former  merely  represents  the  sovereignty.) 

It  is  evident  that  an  autocracy  is  the  simplest  form 
of  government  in  the  State,  being  constituted  by  the 


*  In  the  old  German  language  Elend,  which  in  its  modern  use  means 
"  misery.” 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


145 


relation  of  one,  as  king,  to  the  people,  so  that  there  is  one 
only  who  is  the  lawgiver.  An  aristocracy,  as  a  form  of 
government,  is,  however,  compounded  of  the  union  of  two 
relations :  that  of  the  nobles  in  relation  to  one  another 
as  the  lawgivers,  thereby  constituting  the  sovereignty, 
and  that  of  this  sovereign  power  to  the  people.  A 
democracy,  again,  is  the  most  complex  of  all  the  forms 
of  the  State,  for  it  has  to  begin  by  uniting  the  will  of  all 
so  as  to  form  a  people ;  and  then  it  has  to  appoint  a 
sovereign  over  this  common  union,  which  sovereign  is 
no  other  than  the  united  will  itself.* 

As  regards  the  administration  of  law  in  the  State, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  simplest  mode  is  also  the  best ; 
but,  as  regards  its  bearing  on  law  itself,  it  is  also  the 
.  most  dangerous  for  the  people,  in  view  of  the  despotism 
to  which  simplicity  of  administration  so  naturally  gives 
rise.  Undoubtedly  the  rational  maxim  is  to  aim  at  sim¬ 
plification  in  the  machinery  uniting  the  people  under 
compulsory  laws,  and  this  would  be  secured  were  all 
the  people  to  be  passive  and  to  obey  only  one  person 
over  them ;  but  that  method  does  not  give  us  subjects 
who  are  also  citizens  of  the  State.  It  is  sometimes  said 
that  the  people  should  be  satisfied  with  the  reflection 
that  monarchy,  regarded  as  an  autocracy,  is  the  best 
political  constitution,  if  the  monarch  is  good,  that  is,  if 
he  has  the  judgment  as  well  as  the  will  to  do  right ; 
but  this  is  a  mere  evasion  and  belongs  to  the  common 
class  of  wise  tautological  phrases.  It  only  amounts  to 

*  The  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  these  forms  are  adulterated 
by  the  intrusion  of  violent  and  illegitimate  usurpers  of  power,  as  in  oligarchy 
and  ochlocracy,  as  well  as  the  discussion  of  the  so-called  mixed  constitu¬ 
tions  may  he  passed  over  here  as  not  essential  and  as  leading  into  too 
much  detail. 


146 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


saying  that  "  the  best  constitution  is  that  by  which  the 
supreme  administrator  of  the  State  is  made  the  best 
ruler  ” ;  that  is,  that  the  best  constitution  is  the  best ! 

Historical  Origin  and  Changes 

It  is  vain  to  inquire  into  the  historical  origin  of  the 
political  mechanism ;  for  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  dis¬ 
cover  historically  the  point  of  time  at  which  civil  society 
took  its  beginning.  Savages  do  not  draw  up  a  docu¬ 
mentary  record  of  their  having  submitted  themselves  to 
law ;  and  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  nature  of  uncivi¬ 
lized  men  that  they  must  have  set  out  from  a  state  of 
violence.  To  prosecute  such  an  inquiry  with  the  inten¬ 
tion  of  finding  a  pretext  for  altering  the  existing  con¬ 
stitution  by  violence  is  no  less  than  penal.  For  such  a 
mode  of  alteration  would  amount  to  a  revolution  that 
could  only  be  carried  out  by  an  insurrection  of  the 
people  and  not  by  constitutional  modes  of  legislation. 
But  insurrection  against  an  already  existing  constitution 
is  an  overthrow  of  all  civil  and  juridical  relations  and  of 
law  generally ;  and  lienee  it  is  not  a  mere  alteration  of 
the  civil  constitution  but  a  dissolution  of  it.  It  would 
thus  form  a  mode  of  transition  to  a  better  constitution 
by  palingenesis  and  not  by  mere  metamorphosis ;  and  it 
would  require  a  new  social  contract,  upon  which  the 
former  original  contract,  as  then  annulled,  would  have 
no  influence. 

It  must,  however,  be  possible  for  the  sovereign  to 
change  the  existing  constitution  if  it  is  not  actually 
consistent  with  the  idea  of  the  original  contract.  In 
doing  so  it  is  essential  to  give  existence  to  that  form  of 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


14T 


government  which  will  properly  constitute  the  people 
into  a  State.  Such  a  change  cannot  be  made  by  the 
State’s  deliberately  altering  its  constitution  from  one  of 
the  three  forms  to  one  of  the  other  two.  For  example, 
political  changes  should  not  be  carried  out  by  the 
aristocrats  combining  to  subject  themselves  to  an  autoc¬ 
racy,  or  resolving  to  fuse  all  into  a  democracy,  or  con¬ 
versely  ;  as  if  it  depended  on  the  arbitrary  choice  and 
liking  of  the  sovereign  what  constitution  he  may  impose 
on  the  people.  For,  even  if  as  sovereign  he  resolved  to 
alter  the  constitution  into  a  democracy,  he  might  be  doing 
wrong  to  the  people,  because  they  might  hold  such  a 
constitution  in  abhorrence  and  regard  either  of  the  other 
two  as  more  suitable  to  them  in  the  circumstances. 

The  forms  of  the  State  are  only  the  letter  ( littera )  of 
the  original  constitution  in  the  civil  union ;  and  they 
may  therefore  remain  so  long  as  they  are  considered, 
from  ancient  and  long  habit  (and  therefore  only  sub¬ 
jectively),  to  be  necessary  to  the  machinery  of  the  politi¬ 
cal  constitution.  But  the  spirit  of  that  original  contract 
(cinima  pacti  originarii)  contains  and  imposes  the  obliga¬ 
tion  on  the  constituting  power  to  make  the  mode  of  the 
government  conformable  to  its  idea ;  and,  if  this  cannot 
be  effected  at  once,  to  change  it  gradually  and  continu¬ 
ously  till  it  harmonize  in  its  working  with  the  only  right¬ 
ful  constitution,  which  is  that  of  a  pure  republic.  Thus 
the  old  empirical  and  statutory  forms  which  serve  only 
to  effect  the  political  subjection  of  the  people  will  be 
resolved  into  the  original  and  rational  forms,  which  alone 
take  freedom  as  their  principle  and  even  as  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  all  compulsion  and  constraint.  Compulsion  is  in 
fact  requisite  for  the  realization  of  a  juridical  constitution, 


148 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


according  to  the  proper  idea  of  the  State ;  and  it  will 
lead  at  last  to  the  realization  of  that  idea,  even  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  letter.  This  is  the  only  enduring  political 
constitution,  as  in  it  the  law  is  itself  sovereign  and  is 
no  longer  attached  to  a  particular  person.  This  is  the 
ultimate  end  of  all  public  law,  the  state  in  which  every 
citizen  can  have  what  is  his  own  peremptorily  assigned 
to  him.  But  so  long  as  the  form  of  the  State  has  to  be 
represented,  according  to  the  letter,  by  many  different 
moral  persons  invested  with  the  supreme  power,  there 
can  only  be  a  provisory  internal  law,  and  not  an  abso¬ 
lutely  juridical  state  of  civil  society. 

Every  true  republic  is  and  can  only  be  constituted  by 
a  representative  system  of  the  people.  Such  a  repre¬ 
sentative  system  is  instituted  in  name  of  the  people  and 
is  constituted  by  all  the  citizens  being  united  together, 
in  order,  by  means  of  their  deputies,  to  protect  and  secure 
their  rights.  But  as  soon  as  a  supreme  head  of  the  State 
in  person  —  be  it  as  king  or  nobility  or  the  whole  body 
of  the  people  in  a  democratic  union — becomes  also  rep¬ 
resentative,  then  the  united  people  do  not  merely  repre¬ 
sent  the  sovereignty  but  are  themselves  sovereign.  It  is 
in  the  people  that  the  supreme  power  originally  resides 
and  it  is  accordingly  from  this  power  that  all  the  rights 
of  individual  citizens  as  mere  subjects,  and  especially 
as  officials  of  the  State,  must  be  derived.  When  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people  themselves  is  thus  realized,  the 
republic  is  established  ;  and  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to 
give  up  the  reins  of  government  into  the  hands  of  those 
by  whom  they  have  been  hitherto  held,  especially  as  they 
might  again  destroy  all  the  new  institutions  by  their 
arbitrary  and  absolute  will. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 


149 


(It  was  therefore  a  great  error  in  judgment  on  the  part 
of  a  powerful  ruler  in  our  time  when  he  tried  to  extricate 
himself  from  the  embarrassment  arising  from  great  pub¬ 
lic  debts  by  transferring  this  burden  to  the  people,  and 
leaving  them  to  undertake  and  distribute  them  among 
themselves  as  they  might  think  fit.  It  thus  became  nat¬ 
ural  that  the  legislative  power,  not  only  in  respect  to 
the  taxation  of  the  subjects  but  in  respect  to  the  govern¬ 
ment,  should  come  into  the  hands  of  the  people.  It  was 
requisite  that  they  should  be  able  to  prevent  the  incurring 
of  new  debts  by  extravagance  or  war;  and  in  consequence 
the  supreme  power  of  the  monarch  entirely  disappeared, 
not  by  being  merely  suspended,  but  by  passing  over  in 
fact  to  the  people,  to  whose  legislative  will  the  property 
of  every  subject  thus  became  subjected.  .  .  .) 


PUBLIC  LAW 


II.  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

Nature  and  Division  of  the  Law  of  Nations 

The  individuals  who  make  up  a  people  may  be  re¬ 
garded  as  natives  of  the  country  sprung  by  natural 
descent  from  a  common  ancestry  ( congeniti ),  although 
this  may  not  hold  entirely  true  in  detail.  Again,  they 
may  be  viewed  according  to  the  intellectual  and  juridi¬ 
cal  relation,  as  born  of  a  common  political  mother,  the 
republic,  so  that  they  constitute,  as  it  were,  a  public 
family  or  nation  ( gens, ,  natio )  whose  members  are  all 
related  to  each  other  as  citizens  of  the  State.  As  mem¬ 
bers  of  a  State,  they  do  not  mix  with  those  who  live 
beside  them  in  the  state  of  nature,  considering  such  to 
be  ignoble.  Yet  these  savages,  on  account  of  the  law¬ 
less  freedom  they  have  chosen,  regard  themselves  as 
superior  to  civilized  peoples ;  and  they  constitute  tribes 
and  even  races,  but  not  States.  The  rights  of  nations 
in  their  relations  with  one  another  are  what  we  have  to 
consider  under  the  term  "  law  of  nations,”  which  is  not 
quite  happily  called  international  law  in  Germany,  where  it 
should  rather  be  public  state  law  (ius  publicum  civitatum). 
Wherever  a  State,  viewed  as  a  moral  person,  acts  in  re¬ 
lation  to  another  existing  in  the  condition  of  natural 
freedom  and  consequently  in  a  state  of  continual  war, 

150 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


151 


such  law  takes  its  rise.  The  law  of  nations  in  this  rela¬ 
tion  may  be  divided  into :  (1)  the  law  of  going  to  war ; 
(2)  the  law  during  war ;  and  (3)  the  law  after  war,  the 
object  of  which  is  to  constrain  the  nations  mutually  to 
pass  from  this  state  of  war  and  to  found  a  common  con¬ 
stitution  establishing  perpetual  peace.  The  difference  be¬ 
tween  the  law  of  individual  men  or  families  as  related  to 
each  other  in  the  state  of  nature  and  the  law  of  the 
nations  among  themselves  consists  in  this,  that  in  the 
law  of  nations  we  have  to  consider  not  merely  a  relation 
of  one  State  to  another  as  a  whole,  but  also  the  relation 
of  the  individual  persons  in  one  State  to  the  individuals  of 
another  State,  as  well  as  to  that  State  as  a  whole.  This 
difference,  however,  between  the  law  of  nations  and  the 
law  of  individuals  in  the  mere  state  of  nature  requires 
to  be  determined  by  elements  which  can  easily  be  deduced 
from  the  conception  of  the  latter. 

Elements  of  the  Law  of  Nations 

The  elements  of  the  law  of  nations  are  as  follows : 

1.  States,  viewed  as  nations,  in  their  external  relations 
to  one  another  —  like  lawless  savages — are  naturally  in 
a  nonjuridical  condition. 

2.  This  natural  condition  is  a  state  of  war  in  which 
the  law  of  the  stronger  prevails ;  and,  although  it  may 
not  in  fact  be  always  found  as  a  state  of  actual  war 
and  incessant  hostility  and  although  no  real  wrong  is 
done  to  any  one  therein,  yet  the  condition  is  wrong  in 
itself  in  the  highest  degree,  and  the  nations  which  form 

O  O  7 

States  contiguous  to  each  other  are  bound  mutually  to 
pass  out  of  it. 


152 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


3.  An  alliance  of  nations,  in  accordance  with  the 
idea  of  an  original  social  contract,  is  necessary  to  pro¬ 
tect  each  other  against  external  aggression  and  attack, 
without  involving  interference  with  their  several  internal 
difficulties  and  disputes. 

4.  This  mutual  connection  by  alliance  must  dispense 
with  a  distinct  sovereign  power  such  as  is  set  up  in  the 
civil  constitution ;  it  can  only  take  the  form  of  a  federa¬ 
tion,  which  as  such  may  be  revoked  on  any  occasion  and 
must  consequently  be  renewed  from  time  to  time.  This 
is  therefore  a  right  accessory  (in  subsidium )  of  another 
original  right,  to  prevent  the  nations  from  falling  away 
and  lapsing  into  the  state  of  actual  war  with  each  other. 
It  thus  issues  in  the  idea  of  a  foedus  amphictionum. 


War  as  related  to  Subjects  of  the  State  - 

We  have  then  first  to  consider  the  original  right  of 
free  States  in  a  state  of  nature  to  go  to  war  with  each 
other,  exercising  this  right  in  order  to  establish  some 
condition  of  society  approaching  the  juridical  state. 
And,  first  of  all,  the  question  arises  as  to  what  right 
the  State  has  in  relation  to  its  own  subjects ;  whether  it 
may  use  them  to  make  war  against  other  States,  employ 
their  property  and  even  their  lives  for  this  purpose  or  at 
least  expose  them  to  hazard  and  danger.  And  all  this 
in  such  a  way  that  it  does  not  depend  upon  their  own 
judgment  whether  they  will  march  into  the  field  of  war, 
but  upon  the  supreme  command  of  the  sovereign  who 
claims  to  settle  and  dispose  of  them  thus. 

This  right  appears  capable  of  being  easily  established. 
It  may  be  grounded  upon  the  right,  which  every  one  has, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


1 

.1  Oo 

to  do  as  he  will  with  what  is  his  own.  Whatever  one  has 
made  substantially  for  himself  he  holds  as  his  incontest¬ 
able  property.  The  following,  then,  is  such  a  deduction 
as  a  mere  jurist  would  put  forward. 

There  are  various  natural  products  in  a  country  which, 
as  regards  the  number  and  quantity  in  which  they  exist, 
must  be  considered  as  specially  produced  ( artefacta )  by 
the  work  of  the  State ;  for  the  country  would  not  yield 
them  to  such  an  extent  were  it  not  under  the  constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  State  and  its  regular  administrative  govern¬ 
ment  or  if  the  inhabitants  were  still  living  in  the  state 
of  nature.  Sheep,  cattle,  domestic  fowl,  —  the  most  use¬ 
ful  of  their  kind,  —  swine  and  such  like  would  either  be 
used  up  as  necessary  food  or  destroyed  by  beasts  of  prey 
in  the  district  in  which  I  live,  so  that  they  would  entirely 
disappear  or  be  found  in  very  scant  supplies,  were  it  not 
for  the  government’s  securing  to  the  inhabitants  their  ac- 
quisitions  and  property.  This  holds  likewise  of  the  popu¬ 
lation  itself,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  the  American  deserts; 
and  even  were  the  greatest  industry  applied  in  those 
regions  —  which  is  not  yet  done  —  there  might  be  but 
a  scanty  population.  The  inhabitants  of  any  country 
would  be  but  sparsely  sown  here  and  there  were  it  not 
for  the  protection  of  government,  because  without  it 
they  could  not  spread  themselves  with  their  households 
upon  a  territory  which  was  always  in  danger  of  being 
devastated  by  enemies  or  by  wild  beasts  of  prey;  and, 
further,  so  great  a  multitude  of  men  as  now  live  in  any 
one  country  could  not  otherwise  obtain  sufficient  means 
of  support.  Hence,  as  it  can  be  said  of  vegetable  growths, 
such  as  potatoes,  as  well  as  of  domesticated  animals, 
that  because  the  abundance  in  which  they  are  found  is 


154 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


a  product  of  human  labor,  they  may  be  used,  destroyed 
and  consumed  by  man ;  so,  it  seems,  it  may  be  said  of 
the  sovereign  as  the  supreme  power  in  the  State  that 
he  has  the  right  to  lead  his  subjects,  as  being  for  the 
most  part  productions  of  his  own,  to  war,  as  if  it  were 
to  the  chase,  and  even  to  march  them  to  the  field  of 
battle,  as  if  it  were  on  a  pleasure  excursion. 

This  legal  title  may  be  supposed  to  float  dimly  before 
the  mind  of  the  monarch,  and  it  certainly  holds  true  at 
least  of  the  lower  animals  which  may  become  the  property 
of  man.  But  such  a  principle  will  not  at  all  apply  to  men, 
especially  when  viewed  as  citizens  regarded  as  members 
of  the  State  with  a  share  in  the  legislation  and  not  merely 
as  means  for  others  but  as  ends  in  themselves.  As  such 
they  must  give  their  free  consent,  through  their  repre¬ 
sentatives,  not  only  to  the  carrying  on  of  war  generally, 
but  to  every  separate  declaration  of  war ;  and  it  is  only 
under  this  limiting  condition  that  the  State  has  a  right  to 
demand  their  services  in  undertakings  so  full  of  danger. 

We  would  therefore  deduce  this  right  rather  from 
the  duty  of  the  sovereign  to  the  people  than  conversely. 
Under  this  relation  the  people  must  be  regarded  as  having 
given  their  consent ;  and,  having  the  right  of  voting,  they 
may  be  considered,  although  thus  passive  in  reference 
to  themselves  individually,  to  be  active  in  so  far  as  they 
represent  the  sovereignty  itself. 

Right  of  War  in  relation  to  Hostile  States 

Viewed  as  in  the  state  of  nature,  the  right  of  nations 
to  go  to  war  and  to  carry  on  hostilities  is  the  legitimate 
way  by  which  they  prosecute  their  rights  by  their  own 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


155 

power  when  they  regard  themselves  as  injured  ;  and  this 
is  done  because  in  that  state  the  method  of  a  juridical 
process,  although  the  only  one  proper  to  settle  such 
disputes,  cannot  be  adopted. 

The  threatening  of  war  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  active  injury  of  a  first  aggression,  which  again  is 
distinguished  from  the  general  outbreak  of  hostilities. 
A  threat  or  menace  may  be  given  by  the  active  prep¬ 
aration  of  armaments  whereby  a  right  of  prevention  (jus 
praeventionisj  is  founded  on  the  other  side,  or  merely 
by  the  formidable  increase  of  the  power  of  another  State 
( potestas  tremendaj  by  acquisition  of  territory.  This  is 
an  injury  of  a  less  powerful  country  merely  from  the 
condition  of  a  more  powerful  neighbor  prior  to  any 
action  at  all,  and  in  the  state  of  nature  an  attack  under 
such  circumstances  would  be  warrantable.  This  inter¬ 
national  relation  is  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  the 
balance  of  power  among  all  the  States  that  are  in  active 
contiguity  to  each  other. 

The  right  to  go  to  war  is  constituted  by  any  overt  act 
of  injury.  This  includes  any  arbitrary  retaliation  or  act 
of  reprisal  ( retorsioj  as  a  satisfaction  taken  by  one  people 
for  an  offense  committed  by  another,  without  any  attempt 
being  made  to  obtain  reparation  in  a  peaceful  way.  Such 
an  act  of  retaliation  is  similar  in  kind  to  an  outbreak  of 
hostilities  without  a  previous  declaration  of  war.  For  if 
there  is  to  be  any  right  at  all  during  the  state  of  war, 
something  analogous  to  a  contract  must  be  assumed,  in¬ 
volving  acceptance  on  the  one  side  of  the  declaration  of 
the  other,  and  amounting  to  the  fact  that  they  both  will 
to  seek  their  right  in  this  way. 


156 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Right  during  War 

The  determination  of  what  constitutes  right  in  war 
is  the  most  difficult  problem  of  international  law.  It  is 
very  difficult  even  to  form  a  conception  of  such  a  right 
or  to  think  of  any  law  in  this  lawless  state  without  fall¬ 
ing  into  a  contradiction.  Inter  arma  silent  leges.  It  must, 
then,  be  only  the  right  to  carry  on  war  according  to  such 
principles  as  render  it  still  possible  always  to  pass  out  of 
that  natural  condition  of  the  states  in  their  external  rela¬ 
tions  to  each  other  and  to  enter  into  a  condition  of  law. 

No  war  of  independent  States  against  each  other  can 
rightly  be  a  war  of  punishment  (helium  punitivurn).  For 
punishment  is  only  in  place  under  the  relation  of  a 
superior  (imp er antis')  to  a  subject  ( subditum ),  and  this 
is  not  the  relation  of  the  States  to  one  another.  Neither 
can  an  international  war  be  a  war  of  extermination 
(helium  internicmuni)  nor  even  a  war  of  subjugation 
(helium  suhjugatorium)  ;  for  this  would  result  in  the 
moral  extinction  of  a  State  through  its  people  either 
being  fused  into  one  mass  with  the  conquering  State 
or  being  reduced  to  slavery.  Not  that  this  necessary 
means  of  attaining  to  a  condition  of  peace  is  itself  con¬ 
tradictory  to  the  right  of  a  State  ;  but  because  the  idea 
of  international  law  includes  merely  the  conception  of 
an  antagonism  in  accordance  with  principles  of  external 
freedom,  in  order  that  the  State  may  maintain  what  is 
properly  its  own  but  not  that  it  may  attain  a  condition 
which,  from  the  aggrandizement  of  its  power,  might 
become  threatening  to  other  States. 

Defensive  measures  of  all  kinds  are  allowable  to  a 
State  that  is  forced  to  war,  except  such  as  by  their  use 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


157 


would  make  the  subjects  using  them  unfit  to  be  citizens ; 
for  the  State  would  thus  make  itself  unfit  to  be  regarded 
as  a  person  capable  of  participating  in  equal  rights  in  the 
international  relations  according  to  the  law  of  nations. 
Among  these  forbidden  means  are  to  be  reckoned  the 
appointment  of  subjects  to  act  as  spies,  or  engaging  sub¬ 
jects  or  even  strangers  to  act  as  assassins  or  poisoners 
(in  which  class  might  well  be  included  the  so-called 
sharpshooters  who  lurk  in  ambush  for  individuals), 
or  even  employing  agents  to  spread  false  news.  In  a 
word,  it  is  forbidden  to  use  any  such  malignant  and 
perfidious  means  as  would  destroy  the  confidence 
which  would  be  requisite  to  establish  a  lasting  peace 
thereafter. 

It  is  permissible  in  war  to  impose  exactions  and  con¬ 
tributions  upon  a  conquered  enemy ;  but  it  is  not  legiti¬ 
mate  to  plunder  the  people  in  the  way  of  forcibly 
depriving  individuals  of  their  property.  For  this  would 
be  robbery,  seeing  it  was  not  the  conquered  people  but 
the  State  under  whose  government  they  were  placed  that 
carried  on  the  war  by  means  of  them.  All  exactions 
should  be  raised  by  regular  requisition,  and  receipts 
ought  to  be  given  for  them,  in  order  that  when  peace 
is  restored  the  burden  imposed  on  the  country  or  the 
province  may  be  proportionately  borne. 

Right  after  War 

The  right  that  follows  after  war  begins  at  the  moment 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  refers  to  the  consequences  of 
the  war.  The  conqueror  lays  down  the  conditions  under 
which  he  will  agree  with  the  conquered  power  to  the 


158 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


conclusion  of  peace.  Treaties  are  drawn  up,  not  indeed 
according  to  any  law  that  it  pertains  to  him  to  protect 
on  account  of  an  alleged  injury  by  his  opponent,  but, 
while  taking  this  question  upon  himself,  he  bases  the 
right  to  decide  it  upon  his  own  power.  Hence  the  con¬ 
queror  may  not  demand  restitution  of  the  cost  of  the 
war,  because  he  would  then  have  to  declare  the  war  of 
his  opponent  to  be  unjust.  And,  even  though  he  should 
adopt  such  an  argument,  he  is  not  entitled  to  apply  it 
because  he  would  have  to  declare  the  war  to  be  punitive, 
and  he  would  thus  in  turn  inflict  an  injury.  In  the  same 
category  belongs  also  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  which 
is  to  be  carried  out  without  ransom  and  without  regard 
to  equality  of  numbers. 

Neither  the  conquered  State  nor  its  subjects  lose  their 
political  liberty  by  conquest  of  the  country  to  the  extent 
that  the  former  should  be  degraded  to  a  colony  or  the 
latter  to  slaves ;  for  otherwise  it  would  have  been  a 
penal  war,  which  is  contradictory  in  itself.  A  colony  or 
a  province  is  constituted  by  a  people  which  has  its  own 
constitution,  legislation  and  territory,  where  persons  be¬ 
longing  to  another  State  are  merely  strangers  but  which 
is  nevertheless  subject  to  the  supreme  executive  power 
of  another  State.  This  other  State  is  called  the  mother 
country.  The  colony  is  ruled  as  a  daughter,  but  has  at 
the  same  time  its  own  form  of  government,  as  in  a  sepa¬ 
rate  parliament  under  the  presidency  of  a  viceroy  ( civitas 
hybriday  Such  was  Athens  in  relation  to  different 
islands;  and  such  is  at  present  [1796]  the  relation  of 
Great  Britain  to  Ireland. 

Still  less  can  slavery  and  its  legality  be  deduced  from 
the  conquest  of  a  people  in  war ;  for  this  would  assume 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


159 


that  the  war  was  of  a  punitive  nature.  And  least  of  all 
can  a  basis  be  found  in  war  for  a  hereditary  slavery, 
which  is  absurd  in  itself  since  guilt  cannot  be  inherited 
from  the  criminality  of  another. 

Further,  that  an  amnesty  is  involved  in  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  of  peace  is  already  implied  in  the  very  idea 
of  a  peace. 

The  Rights  of  Peace 

The  rights  of  peace  are : 

1.  The  right  to  be  in  peace  when  war  is  in  the 
neighborhood,  or  the  right  of  neutrality. 

2.  The  right  to  have  peace  secured  so  that  it  may 
continue  when  it  has  been  concluded,  that  is,  the  right 
of  guaranty. 

3.  The  right  of  the  several  States  to  enter  into  a  mutual 
alliance  so  as  to  defend  themselves  in  common  against  all 
external  or  even  internal  attacks.  This  right  of  federation, 
however,  does  not  extend  to  the  formation  of  any  league 
for  external  aggression  or  internal  aggrandizement. 

Right  as  against  an  Unjust  Enemy 

The  right  of  a  State  against  an  unjust  enemy  has  no 
limits,  at  least  in  respect  of  quality  as  distinguished  from 
quantity  or  degree.  In  other  words,  the  injured  State 
may  use  not,  indeed,  any  means,  but  yet  all  those  means 
that  are  permissible  and  in  reasonable  measure  in  so  far 
as  they  are  in  its  power,  in  order  to  assert  its  right  to 
what  is  its  own.  But  what  then  is  an  unjust  enemy 
according  to  the  conceptions  of  the  law  of  nations,  when, 
as  holds  generally  of  the  state  of  nature,  every  State  is 


160 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


judge  in  its  own  cause  ?  It  is  one  whose  publicly  ex¬ 
pressed  will,  whether  in  word  or  deed,  betrays  a  maxim 
which,  if  it  were  taken  as  a  universal  rule,  would  make 
a  state  of  peace  among  the  nations  impossible  and  would 
necessarily  perpetuate  the  state  of  nature.  Such  is  the 
violation  of  public  treaties,  with  regard  to  which  it  may 
be  assumed  that  any  such  violation  concerns  all  nations 
by  threatening  their  freedom  and  that  they  are  thus  sum¬ 
moned  to  unite  against  such  a  wrong  and  to  take  away 
the  power  of  committing  it.  But  this  does  not  include 
the  right  to  partition  and  appropriate  the  country  so  as 
to  make  a  State,  as  it  were,  disappear  from  the  earth ; 
for  this  would  be  an  injustice  to  the  people  of  that  State, 
who  cannot  lose  their  original  right  to  unite  into  a  com- 
monwealth  and  to  adopt  such  a  new  constitution  as  by  its 
nature  would  be  unfavorable  to  the  inclination  for  war. 

Further,  it  may  be  said  that  the  expression  "  an  unjust 
enemy  in  the  state  of  nature  ”  is  pleonastic  ;  for  the  state 
of  nature  is  itself  a  state  of  injustice.  A  just  enemy  would 
be  one  to  whom  I  would  do  wrong  in  offering  resistance  ; 
but  such  a  one  would  really  not  be  my  enemy. 

Peace  and  a  Permanent  Congress  of  Nations 

The  natural  state  of  nations  as  well  as  of  individual 
men  is  a  state  out  of  which  it  is  a  duty  to  pass  in  order 
to  enter  into  a  legal  state.  Hence,  before  this  transition 
occurs,  all  the  law  of  nations  and  all  the  external  meum 
and  tuum  of  States  acquirable  or  maintainable  by  war 
are  merely  provisional ;  and  they  can  only  become  per¬ 
emptory  in  a  universal  union  of  States  analogous  to  that 
by  which  a  nation  becomes  a  State.  It  is  thus  only  that 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


1(31 


a  real  state  of  peace  could  be  established.  But  with  the 
too  great  extension  of  such  a  union  of  States  over  vast 

O 

regions  the  management  of  it,  and  consequently  the  pro¬ 
tection  of  its  individual  members,  must  at  last  become 
impossible ;  and  thus  a  multitude  of  such  corporations 
would  again  bring  round  a  state  of  war.  -Hence  the 
perpetual  peace,  which  is  the  ultimate  end  of  all  the 
law  of  nations,  becomes  in  fact  an  impracticable  ideiu 
The  political  principles,  however,  which  aim  at  such  an 
end  and  which  enjoin  the  formation  of  such  unions 
among  the  States  as  may  promote  a  continuous  approxi¬ 
mation  to  a  perpetual  peace,  are  not  impracticable ; 
they  are  as  practicable  as  this  approximation  itself, 
which  is  a  practical  problem  involving  a  duty  and 
founded  upon  the  rights  of  individual  men  and  States, 
e  Such  a  union  of  States  in  order  to  maintain  peace 
may  be  called  a  permanent  congress  of  nations;  and  it 
is  free  to  every  neighboring  State  to  join  in  it.  A  union 
of  this  kind,  so  far  at  least  as  regards  the  formalities  of 
the  law  of  nations  in  respect  of  the  preservation  of  peace, 
was  presented  in  the  first  half  of  this  century  in  the 
assembly  of  the  States- General  at  The  Hague.  In  this 
assembly  most  of  the  European  courts  and  even  the 
smallest  republics  brought  forward  their  complaints 
about  the  hostilities  which  were  carried  on  by  the  one 
against  the  other.  Thus  the  whole  of  Europe  appeared 
like  a  single  federated  State,  accepted  as  umpire  by  the 
several  nations  in  their  public  differences ;  but  in  place 
of  this  agreement,  the  law  of  nations  afterward  survived 
only  in  books.  It  disappeared  from  the  cabinets  or,  after 
force  had  been  already  used,  it  was  relegated  in  the  form 
of  theoretical  deductions  to  the  obscurity  of  archives. 


162 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


By  such  a  congress  is  here  meant  only  a  voluntary 
combination  of  different  States  dissoluble  at  any  time, 
and  not  such  a  union  as  is  embodied  in  the  United 
States  of  America,  which  is  founded  upon  a  political 
constitution  and  therefore  is  indissoluble.  It  is  only  by 
a  congress  of  this  kind  that  the  idea  of  a  public  law  of 
nations  can  be  established  and  that  the  settlement  of  their 
differences  by  the  mode  of  a  civil  process,  rather  than 
by  the  barbarous  means  of  war,  can  be  realized. 


PUBLIC  LAW 


III.  THE  UNIVERSAL  LAW  OF  MANKIND 
Nature  and  Conditions  of  Cosmopolitical  Right 


The  rational  idea  of  a  universal,  peaceful,  if  not  yet 
friendly,  union  of  all  the  nations  upon  the  earth  that  may 
come  into  active  relations  with  each  other  is  a  jurid¬ 
ical  principle,  as  distinguished  from  philanthropic  or 
ethical  principles.  Nature  has  inclosed  them  altogether 
within  definite  boundaries  in  virtue  of  the  spherical  form 
of  their  abode  as  a  globus  terraqueus  ;  and  the  possession 
of  the  soil  upon  which  an  inhabitant  of  the  earth  may 
live  can  only  be  regarded  as  possession  of  a  part  of  a 
limited  whole,  and  consequently  as  a  part  to  which  every 
one  has  originally  a  right.  Hence  all  nations  originally 
hold  a  community  of  the  soil,  but  not  a  juridical  com¬ 
munity  of  possession  ( communio )  ;  consequently  they  do 
not  hold  a  community  of  the  use  or  proprietorship  of  the 
soil,  but  only  of  a  possible  physical  intercourse  (com- 
mercium)  by  means  of  it.  In  other  words,  each  is  placed 
in  such  thoroughgoing  relations  to  all  the  rest  that  they 
may  claim  to  enter  into  intercourse  with  one  another,  and 
they  have  a  right  to  make  an  attempt  in  this  direction, 
while  a  foreign  nation  would  not  be  entitled  to  treat 
them  on  this  account  as  enemies.  This  law,  in  so  far 
as  it  relates  to  a  possible  union  of  all  nations  in  respect 
of  certain  universal  laws  regulating  their  possible 


103 


1G4 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


intercourse  with  each  other,  may  be  called  cosmopolitical 
law,  or  jus  cosmopoliticum  in  the  Roman  jurisprudence. 

It  may  appear  that  seas  put  nations  out  of  all  com¬ 
munion  with  each  other.  But  this  is  not  so ;  for  by 
means  of  commerce  seas  form  the  happiest  natural  pro¬ 
vision  for  their  intercourse.  And  the  more  there  are  of 
neighboring  coast  lands,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean  Sea,  the  more  animated  this  intercourse  becomes. 
And  hence  communications  with  such  lands,  especially 
where  there  are  settlements  upon  them  connected  with 
the  mother  countries  giving  occasion  for  such  communi¬ 
cations,  bring  it  about  that  evil  and  violence  committed 
in  one  place  of  our  globe  are  felt  in  all.  Such  possible 
abuse  cannot,  however,  annul  the  right  of  man  as  a  citizen 
of  the  world  to  attempt  to  enter  into  communion  with 
all  others,  and  for  this  purpose  to  visit  all  the  regions 
of  the  earth,  although  this  does  not  constitute  a  right  of 
settlement  upon  the  territory  of  another  people  (Jus 
incolatus'),  for  which  a  special  contract  is  required. 

But  the  question  is  raised  as  to  whether,  in  the  case 
of  newly  discovered  countries,  a  people  may  claim  the 
right  to  settle  ( accolatus )  and  to  occupy  possessions  in 
the  neighborhood  of  another  people  already  settled  in 
that  region,  and  to  do  this  without  their  consent. 

Such  a  right  is  indubitable  if  the  new  settlement 
takes  place  at  such  a  distance  from  the  seat  of  the 
former  that  neither  would  restrict  or  injure  the  other  in 
the  use  of  their  territory.  But  in  the  case  of  nomadic 
peoples  or  tribes  of  shepherds  and  hunters  (such  as  the 
Hottentots,  the  Tungusi  and  most  of  the  American 
Indians),  whose  support  is  derived  from  wide  desert 
tracts,  such  occupation  should  never  take  place  by  force, 


UNIVERSAL  LAW 


165. 


but  only  by  contract ;  and  any  such  contract  ought  never 
to  take  advantage  of  the  ignorance  of  the  original 
dwellers  in  regard  to  the  cession  of  their  lands.  Yet 
it  is  commonly  alleged  that  such  acts  of  violent  appro¬ 
priation  may  be  justified  as  subserving  the  general  good 
of  the  world.  It  appears  as  if  sufficient  grounds  of  justi¬ 
fication  were  furnished  for  them,  partly  by  reference  to 
the  civilization  of  barbarous  peoples  (as  by  a  pretext 
of  this  kind  even  Busching  tries  to  excuse  the  bloody 
introduction  of  the  Christian  religion  into  Germany), 
and  partly  by  the  necessity  of  purging  one’s  own  coun¬ 
try  from  depraved  criminals  and  the  hope  of  their  im¬ 
provement  or  that  of  their  posterity  in  another  continent 
like  New  Holland.  But  all  these  alleged  good  purposes 
cannot  wash  out  the  stain  of  injustice  in  the  means 
employed  to  attain  them. 

It  may  be  objected  that,  had  such  scrupulousness 
about  making  a  beginning  in  founding  a  legal  State  with 
force  been  always  maintained,  the  whole  earth  would 
still  have  been  in  a  state  of  lawlessness.  But  such  an 
objection  would  as  little  annul  the  legal  conditions  in 
question  as  does  the  pretext  of  the  political  revolution¬ 
aries,  that  when  a  constitution  has  become  degenerate 
it  belongs  to  the  people  to  transform  it  by  force.  This 
would  amount  generally  to  being  unjust  once  and  for 
all,  in  order  thereafter  to  found  justice  the  more  surely 
and  to  make  it  flourish. 


CONCLUSION 


If  one  cannot  prove  that  a  thing  is,  he  may  try  to 
prove  that  it  is  not.  And  if  he  succeeds  in  doing 
neither  (as  often  occurs),  lie  may  still  ask  whether  it  is 
in  his  interest  to  accept  either  of  the  alternatives  hypo¬ 
thetically,  from  the  theoretical  or  the  practical  point  of 
view.  In  other  words,  a  hypothesis  may  be  accepted 
either  to  explain  a  certain  phenomenon  (as  in  astronomy 
to  account  for  the  retrogression  and  stationariness  of  the 
planets),  or  to  attain  a  certain  end,  which  again  may  be 
either  pragmatic  as  belonging  merely  to  the  sphere  of 
art,  or  moral  as  involving  a  purpose  which  it  is  a  duty 
to  adopt  as  a  maxim  of  action.  Now  it  is  evident  that 
the  assumption  (suppositio )  of  the  practicability  of  such 
an  end,  though  presented  merely  as  a  theoretical  and 
problematical  judgment,  may  be  regarded  as  constitut¬ 
ing  a  duty ;  and  hence  it  is  so  regarded  in  this  case. 
For,  although  there  may  be  no  positive  obligation  to  be¬ 
lieve  in  such  an  end,  yet  even  if  there  were  not  the 
least  theoretical  probability  of  action  being  carried  out 
in  accordance  with  it,  so  long  as  its  impossibility  cannot 
be  demonstrated,  there  still  remains  a  duty  incumbent 
upon  us  with  regard  to  it. 

Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  moral-practical  reason 
utters  within  us  its  irrevocable  veto  :  "  There  shall  be  no 
war.”  So  there  ought  to  be  no  war,  neither  between 
you  and  me  in  the  condition  of  nature,  nor  between  us 


CONCLUSION 


167 


as  members  of  States  which,  although  internally  in  a 
condition  of  law,  are  still  externally  in  their  relation  to 
each  other  in  a  condition  of  lawlessness :  for  this  is  not 
the  way  by  which  any  one  should  prosecute  his  right. 
Hence  the  question  no  longer  is  as  to  whether  perpetual 
^peace  is  "a  real  thing  or  not  a  real  thing,  or  as  to  whether 
we  may  not  be  deceiving  ourselves  when  we  adopt  the 
former  alternative ;  but  we  must  act  on  the  supposition 
of  its  being  real.  -We  must  work  for  what  may  perhaps 
not  bfTrealized  and  establish  that  constitution  which  yet 
seems  best  adapted  to  bring  it  about  (mayhap  republi¬ 
canism  in  all  States,  together  and  separately).  And  thus 
we  may  put  an  end  to  the  evil  of  wars,  which  have  been 
the  chief  interest  of  the  internal  arrangements  of  all  the 
States  without  exception.  And,  although  the  realization 
of  this  purpose  may  always  remain  but  a  pious  wish,  yet 
we  do  certainly  not  deceive  ourselves  in  adopting  the 
maxim  of  action  that  will  guide  us  in  working  inces¬ 
santly  for  it;  for  it  is  a  duty  to  do  this.  To  suppose 
that  the  moral  law  within  us  is  itself  deceptive  would 
be  sufficient  to  excite  the  horrible  wish  rather  to  be 
deprived  of  all  reason  than  to  live  under  such  decep¬ 
tion,  and  even  to  see  one’s  self,  according  to  such  princi¬ 
ples,  degraded  like  the  lower  animals  to  the  level  of  the 
mechanical  play  of  nature. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  universal  and  lasting  establish¬ 
ment  of  peace  constitutes  not  merely  a  part  but  the 
whole  final  purpose  and  end  of  the  science  of  law  as 
viewed  within  the  limits  of  reason.  The  condition  of 
peace  is  alone  the  certain  condition  of  assuring  the 
legally  secure  recognition  of  meum  and  tuum  in  the 'rela¬ 
tions  of  men  living  in  numbers  contiguous  to  each  other 


168 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


and  who  are  bound  together  in  a  constitution,  whose 
rule  is  derived  not  from  the  mere  experience  of  those 
who  have  found  it  the  best  as  a  normal  guide  for  others, 
but  which  must  be  taken  by  the  reason  a  priori  from  the 
ideal  of  a  juridical  union  of  men  under  public  laws 
generally.  For  all  particular  examples  or  instances,  be¬ 
ing  able  only  to  furnish  illustration  but  not  proof,  are 
deceptive  and  at  all  events  require  a  metaphysics  to 
establish  them  by  its  necessary  principles.  And  this  is 
conceded  indirectly  even  by  those  who  turn  metaphysics 
into  ridicule  when  they  say,  as  they  often  do,  "  The  best 
constitution  is  that  in  which  laws,  not  men,  exercise  the 
power.”  For  what  can  be  more  metaphysically  sublime 
in  its  own  way  than  this  very  idea  of  theirs,  which  accord¬ 
ing  to  their  own  assertion  has,  notwithstanding,  the  most 
objective  reality  ?  This  may  be  easily  shown  by  reference 
to  actual  instances.  And  it  is  this  very  idea  which  alone 
can  be  carried  out  practically,  if  it  is  not  forced  on  in  a 
revolutionary  and  sudden  way  by  violent  overthrow  of 
the  existing  defective  constitution,  which  would  produce 
for  the  time  the  momentary  annihilation  of  the  whole 
juridical  state  of  society.  But  if  the  idea  is  carried  for¬ 
ward  by  gradual  reform  and  in  accordance  with  fixed 
principles,  it  may  lead  by  a  continuous  approximation 
to  the  highest  political  good,  and  to  perpetual  peace. 


NOTES 


The  following  are  the  lengthy  footnotes  appended  by  Kant  to  the  essay 
on  Eternal  Peace.  They  are  indicated  in  the  text  by  figures  :  1,  page  75  ; 
2,  page  76  ;  3,  page  77  ;  4,  page  79  ;  5,  page  80  ;  6,  page  86  ;  7,  page  88  ; 
8,  page  90  ;  9,  page  92  ;  10,  page  93  ;  11,  page  98  ;  12,  page  108  ;  13,  page 

111  ;  14,  page  126. 

1.  It  lias  been  hitherto  doubted,  not  without  reason,  whether  there 
can  be  laws  of  permission  ( leges  permissivae)  of  pure  reason  as  well 
as  commands  (leges  praeceptivcie)  and  prohibitions  (leges  prohibitivae) . 
For  law  in  general  has  a  basis  of  objective  practical  necessity  ;  per¬ 
mission,  on  the  other  hand,  is  based  upon  the  contingency  of  certain 
actions  in  practice.  It  follows  that  a  law  of  permission  would  enforce 
what  cannot  be  enforced  ;  and  this  would  involve  a  contradiction,  if 
the  object  of  the  law  should  be  the  same  in  both  cases.  Here,  how¬ 
ever,  in  the  present  case  of  a  law  of  permission,  the  presupposed 
prohibition  is  aimed  merely  at  the  future  manner  of  acquisition  of  a 
right  —  for  example,  acquisition  through  inheritance;  the  exemption 
from  this  prohibition  (i.e.  the  permission)  refers  to  the  present  state 
of  possession.  In  the  transition  from  a  state  of  nature  to  the  civil 
state,  this  holding  of  property  can  continue  as  a  bona  fide,  if  usurpa- 
tory,  ownership  under  the  new  social  conditions,  in  accordance  with 
a  permission  of  the  law  of  nature.  Ownership  of  this  kind,  as  soon  as 
its  true  nature  becomes  known,  is  seen  to  be  mere  nominal  possession 
( possessio  putativa)  sanctioned  by  opinion  and  customs  in  a  natural 
state  of  society.  After  the  transition  stage  is  passed,  such  modes  of 
acquisition  are  likewise  forbidden  in  the  subsequently  evolved  civil 
state  ;  and  this  power  to  remain  in  possession  would  not  be  admitted 
if  the  supposed  acquisition  had  taken  place  in  the  civilized  commu¬ 
nity.  It  would  be  bound  to  come  to  an  end  as  an  injury  to  the  right 
of  others  the  moment  its  legality  became  patent. 

I  have  wished  here  only  incidentally  to  draw  the  attention  of 
teachers  of  the  law  of  nature  to  the  idea  of  a  lex  permissiva  which 
presents  itself  spontaneously  in  any  system  of  rational  classification. 
I  do  so  chiefly  because  use  is  often  made  of  this  concept  in  civil  law 

169 


170 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


with  reference  to  statutes  ;  with  this  difference,  that  the  law  of  pro¬ 
hibition  stands  alone  by  itself,  while  permission  is  not,  as  it  ought  to 
be,  introduced  into  that  law  as  a  limiting  clause,  but  is  thrown  among 
the  exceptions.  Thus  "  this  or  that  is  forbidden,”  —  say,  Nos.  1,  2,  3, 
and  so  on  in  an  infinite  progression,  —  while  permissions  are  only 
added  to  the  law  incidentally  ;  they  are  not  reached  by  the  applica¬ 
tion  of  some  principle,  but  only  by  groping  about  among  cases  which 
have  actually  occurred.  Were  this  not  so,  qualifications  would  have 
had  to  be  brought  into  the  formula  of  laws  of  prohibition  which  would 
have  immediately  transformed  them  into  laws  of  permission.  Count 
von  Windischgratz,  a  man  whose  wisdom  was  equal  to  his  discrimina¬ 
tion,  urged  this  very  point  in  the  form  of  a  question  propounded  by 
him  for  a  prize  essay.  One  must  therefore  regret  that  this  ingen¬ 
ious  problem  has  been  so  soon  neglected  and  left  unsolved.  For  the 
possibility  of  a  formula  similar  to  those  of  mathematics  is  the  sole 
real  test  of  a  legislation  that  would  be  consistent.  Without  this,  the 
so-called  jus  certum  will  remain  forever  ’a  mere  pious  wish  :  we  can 
have  only  general  laws  valid  on  the  whole ;  no  general  laws  pos¬ 
sessing  the  universal  validity  which  the  concept  of  a  law  seems  to 
demand. 

2.  It  is  usually  accepted  that  a  man  may  not  take  hostile  steps 
against  any  one  unless  the  latter  has  already  injured  him  by  act. 
This  is  quite  accurate  if  both  are  citizens  of  a  law-governed  state. 
For,  in  becoming  a  member  of  this  community,  each  gives  the  other 
the  security  he  demands  against  injury,  by  means  of  the  supreme 
authority  exercising  control  over  them  both.  However,  the  individual 
(or  nation)  who  remains  in  a  mere  state  of  nature  deprives  me  of  this 
security  and  does  me  injury  by  mere  proximity.  There  is  perhaps  no 
active  (facto)  molestation,  but  there  is  a  state  of  lawlessness  ( status 
injustus)  which,  by  its  very  existence,  offers  a  continual  menace  to  me. 
I  can  therefore  compel  him,  either  to  enter  with  me  into  relations 
under  which  we  are  both  subject  to  law,  or  to  withdraw  from  my 
neighborhood.  So  that  the  postulate  upon  which  the  following  arti¬ 
cles  are  based  is:  ”  All  men  who  have  the  power  to  exert  a  mutual 
influence  upon  one  another  must  be  under  a  civil  government  of 
some  kind.” 

A  legal  constitution  is,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  individuals 
who  compose  the  state  : 

(1)  A  constitution  formed  in  accordance  with  the  right  of  citizen¬ 
ship  of  the  individuals  who  constitute  a  nation  ( jus  civitatis). 


NOTES 


m 


(2)  A  constitution  whose  principle  is  international  law,  which  de¬ 
termines  the  relations  of  states  ( jus  gentium). 

(3)  A  constitution  formed  in  accordance  with  cosmopolitan  law,  in 
so  far  as  individuals  and  states,  standing  in  an  external  relation  of 
mutual  reaction,  may  be  regarded  as  citizens  of  one  world-state  ( jus 
cosmopoliticurn) . 

This  classification  is  not  an  arbitrary  one,  but  is  necessary  with 
reference  to  the  idea  of  perpetual  peace.  For,  if  even  one  of  these 
units  of  society  were  in  a  position  physically  to  influence  another 
while  yet  remaining  a  member  of  a  primitive  order  of  society,  then 
a  state  of  war  would  be  joined  with  these  primitive  conditions  ;  and 
from  this  it  is  our  present  purpose  to  free  ourselves. 

3.  Legal,  that  is  to  say  external,  freedom  cannot  properly  be  de¬ 
fined,  as  it  so  often  is,  as  the  power  "to  do  whatever  one  likes,  so 
long  as  this  does  not  wrong  any  one  else.”  For  what  is  this  right 
( Befugniss )  ?  It  is  the  possibility  of  actions  which  do  not  lead  to  the 
injury  of  others.  So  the  explanation  of  a  "right”  would  be  some¬ 
thing  like  this  :  "  Freedom  is  the  possibility  of  actions  which  do  not 
injure  any  one.  A  man  does  not  wrong  another  —  whatever  his  action 
—  if  he  does  not  wrong  another”  ;  which  is  empty  tautology.  My 
external  (legal)  freedom  is  rather  to  be  explained  in  this  way  :  it  is 
the  right  through  which  I  require  not  to  obey  any  external  laws  ex¬ 
cept  those  to  which  I  could  have  given  my  consent.  In  exactly  the 
same  way,  external  (legal)  equality  in  a  state  is  that  relation  of  the 
subjects  in  consequence  of  which  no  individual  can  legally  bind  or 
oblige  another  to  anything,  without  at  the  same  time  submitting  him¬ 
self  to  the  law  which  insures  that  he  can,  in  his  turn,  be  bound  and 
obliged  in  like  manner  by  this  other. 

The  principle  of  lawful  independence  requires  no  explanation,  as 
it  is  involved  in  the  general  concept  of  a  constitution.  The  validity 
of  this  hereditary  and  inalienable  right,  which  belongs  of  necessity  to 
mankind,  is  affirmed  and  ennobled  by  the  principle  of  a  lawful  rela¬ 
tion  between  man  himself  and  higher  beings,  if  indeed  he  believes  in 
such  beings.  This  is  so,  because  he  thinks  of  himself,  in  accordance 
with  these  very  principles,  as  a  citizen  of  a  transcendental  world  as 
well  as  of  the  world  of  sense.  For,  as  far  as  my  freedom  goes,  I  am 
bound  by  no  obligation  even  with  regard  to  divine  laws  —  which  are 
apprehended  by  me  only  through  my  reason  —  except  in  so  far  as  I 
could  have  given  my  assent  to  them  ;  for  it  is  through  the  law  of 
freedom  of  my  own  reason  that  I  first  form  for  myself  a  concept  of  a 


172 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


divine  will.  As  for  the  principle  of  equality,  in  so  far  as  it  applies  to 
the  most  sublime  being  in  the  universe  next  to  God  —  a  being  1  might 
perhaps  figure  to  myself  as  a  mighty  emanation  of  the  divine  spirit, — 
there  is  no  reason  why,  if  1  perform  my  duty  in  the  sphere  in  which 
I  am  placed,  as  that  vEon  does  in  his,  the  duty  of  obedience  alone 
should  fall  to  my  share,  the  right  to  command  to  him.  That  this 
principle  of  equality  (unlike  the  principle  of  freedom)  does  not  apply 
to  our  relation  to  God  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  to  this  Being  alone,  the 
idea  of  duty  does  not  belong. 

As  for  the  right  to  equality  which  belongs  to  all  citizens  as  sub¬ 
jects,  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  admissibility  of  an  hereditary 
nobility  hinges  on  the  following  question:  Does  social  rank  —  ac¬ 
knowledged  by  the  state  to  be  higher  in  the  case  of  one  subject  than 
another— stand  above  desert,  or  does  merit  take  precedence  of  social 
standing  ?  ”  Now  it  is  obvious  that,  if  high  position  is  combined  with 
good  family,  it  is  quite  uncertain  whether  merit,  that  is  to  say,  skill 
and  fidelity  in  office,  will  follow  as  well.  This  amounts  to  granting 
the  favored  individual  a  commanding  position  without  any  question 
of  desert ;  and  to  that,  the  universal  will  of  the  people  —  expressed  in 
an  original  contract  which  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  all  right  — 
would  never  consent.  For  it  does  not  follow  that  a  nobleman  is  a 
man  of  noble  character.  In  the  case  of  the  official  nobility,  as  one 
might  term  the  rank  of  higher  magistracy  —  which  one  must  acquire 
by  merit  —  the  social  position  is  not  attached  like  property  to  the 
person  but  to  his  office,  and  equality  is  not  thereby  disturbed  ;  for, 
if  a  man  gives  up  office,  he  lays  down  with  it  his  official  rank  and 
falls  back  into  the  rank  of  his  fellows. 

4.  The  lofty  appellations  which  are  often  given  to  a  ruler  —  such  as 
the  Lord’s  anointed,  the  administrator  of  the  divine  will  upon  earth 
and  vicar  of  God  —  have  been  many  times  censured  as  flattery  gross 
enough  to  make  one  giddy.  But  it  seems  to  me  without  cause.  Far 
from  making  a  prince  arrogant,  names  like  these  must  rather  make 
him  humble  at  heart,  if  he  has  any  intelligence,  —  which  we  take  for 
granted  he  has,  —  and  reflects  that  he  has  undertaken  an  office  which 
is  too  great  for  any  human  being.  For,  indeed,  it  is  the  holiest  which 
God  has  on  earth  —  namely,  the  right  of  ruling  mankind;  and  he 
must  ever  live  in  fear  of  injuring  this  treasure  of  God  in  some  respect 
or  other. 

5.  Mallet  du  Pan  boasts  in  his  seemingly  brilliant  but  shallow  and 
superficial  language  that,  after  many  years’  experience,  he  has  come 


NOTES 


173 

at  last  to  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  well-known  saying  of  Pope 
(ff  Essays  on  Man,”  III,  303)  : 

For  Forms  of  Government  let  fools  contest ; 

Whate’er  is  best  administered  is  best. 

If  this  means  that  the  best-administered  government  is  best  adminis¬ 
tered,  then,  in  Swift’s  phrase,  he  has  cracked  a  nut  to  find  a  worm 
in  it.  If  it  means,  however,  that  the  best-conducted  government  is 
also  the  best  kind  of  government,  —  that  is,  the  best  form  of  political 
constitution,  —  then  it  is  utterly  false  ;  for  examples  of  wise  admin¬ 
istration  are  no  proof  of  the  kind  of  government.  Who  ever  ruled 
better  than  Titus  and  Marcus  Aurelius  ?  and  yet  the  one  left  Domitian, 
the  other  Commodus,  as  his  successor.  This  could  not  have  happened 
where  the  constitution  was  a  good  one,  for  their  absolute  unfitness  for 
the  position  was  early  enough  known,  and  the  power  of  the  emperor 
was  sufficiently  great  to  exclude  them. 

6.  On  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  the  end  of  a  war,  it  might  not  be 
unseemly  for  a  nation  to  appoint  a  day  of  humiliation,  after  the  fes¬ 
tival  of  thanksgiving,  on  which  to  invoke  the  mercy  of  Heaven  for 
the  terrible  sin  of  which  the  human  race  is  guilty  in  its  continued 
unwillingness  to  submit  (in  its  relations  with  bther  states)  to  a  law- 
governed  constitution,  preferring  rather  in  the  pride  of  its  inde¬ 
pendence  to  use  the  barbarous  method  of  war,  which  after  all  does 
not  really  settle  what  is  wanted,  namely,  the  right  of  each  state  in 
a  quarrel.  The  feasts  of  thanksgiving  during  a  war  for  a  victorious 
battle,  the  hymns  which  are  sung  —  to  use  the  Jewish  expression  — 
ff  to  the  Lord  of  Hosts,”  are  not  in  less  strong  contrast  to  the  ethical 
idea  of  a  father  of  mankind  ;  for,  apart  from  the  indifference  these 
customs  show  to  the  way  in  which  nations  seek  to  establish  their 
rights,  —  sad  enough  as  it  is,  —  these  rejoicings  bring  in  an  element  of 
exultation  that  a  great  number  of  lives,  or  at  least  the  happiness  of 
many,  has  been  destroyed. 

7.  In  order  to  call  this  great  empire  by  the  name  which  it  gives 
itself  —  namely, ff  China,”  not  ”  Sina  ”  or  a  word  of  similar  sound  —  we 
have  only  to  look  at  Giorgi’s  "Alphab.  Tibet..,”*  pp.  051-054,  par¬ 
ticularly  note  5,  below.  According  to  the  observation  of  Professor 

*  Giorgi,  Antonio  Agostino,  "  Alphabetum  Tibetanum  Missionum  Apos- 
tolicarmn  commodo  editum,”  Rome,  4to,  Part  1, 1759  ;  Part  II,  1762.  Part  IT 
treats  "  de  vario  litterarum  ac  regionis  nomine,  gentis  origine,  moribus, 
superstitione  ac  Manicliaeismo  fuse.” 


174 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


Fischer  of  St.  Petersburg,  there  is  really  no  particular  name  which 
it  always  goes  by :  the  most  usual  is  the  word  Kin ,  that  is,  gold,  which 
the  inhabitants  of  Tibet  call  Ser.  Hence  the  emperor  is  called  the 
king  of  gold,  that  is,  the  king  of  the  most  splendid  country  in  the 
world.  This  word  Kin  may  probably  be  Chin  in  the  empire  itself,  but 
be  pronounced  Kin  by  the  Italian  missionaries  on  account  of  the  gut¬ 
turals.  Thus  we  see  that  the  country  of  the  Seres,  so  often  mentioned 
by  the  Romans,  was  China :  the  silk,  however,  was  dispatched  to 
Europe  across  Greater  Tibet,  probably  through  Smaller  Tibet  and 
Bokhara,  through  Persia  and  then  on.  This  leads  to  many  reflections 
as  to  the  antiquity  of  this  wonderful  state,  as  compared  with  Hindu¬ 
stan,  at  the  time  of  its  union  with  Tibet  and  thence  with  Japan.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  name  ff  Sina”  or  fr  Tschina,”  which  is  said  to  be 
given  to  this  land  by  neighboring  peoples,  leads  to  nothing. 

Perhaps  we  can  explain  the  ancient  intercourse  of  Europe  with 
Tibet — a  fact  at  no  time  widely  known — by  looking  at  what  Hesychiusf 
has  preserved  on  the  matter.  I  refer  to  the  shout,  Konx  Ompax 
(Koy£  6/U.7 ra£),  the  cry  of  the  hierophants  in  the  Eleusinian  mysteries 
(cf.  fr  Travels  of  Anacharsis  the  Younger,”  f  Chap.  LX VIII,  note  3, 
end).  For,  according  to  Giorgi’s  ”  Alphab.  Tibet.,”  the  word  Concioa , 
which  bears  a  striking ‘resemblance  to  Konx ,  means  ffGod.”  Pah-cio 
(ibid.,  p.  520),  which  might  easily  be  pronounced  by  the  Greeks  like 
pax,  means  promulgator  legis ,  the  divine  principle  permeating  nature 
(called  also,  on  p.  177,  Cencresi).  Om ,  however,  which  La  Croze  trans¬ 
lates  by  benedictus,  that  is,  ”  blessed,”  can,  when  applied  to  the  deity, 
mean  nothing  but  ff  beatified”  (p.  507).  Now  P.  Franz.  Horatius, 
when  he  asked  the  Lamas  of  Tibet,  as  he  often  did,  what  they 
understood  by  God  ( Concioa )  always  got  the  answer  :  ”  It  is  the  as¬ 
sembly  of  all  the  saints,”  that  is,  the  assembly  of  those  blessed  ones 
who  have  been  born  again  according  to  the  faith  of  the  Lama  and, 
after  many  wanderings  in  changing  forms,  have  at  last  returned  to 


f  Hesychius  of  Alexandria,  'Havxlov  A Qikov  ;  numerous  editions  from 
1514  on. 

f  Barthelemy,  Abbe  Jean  Jacques,  "  Travels  of  Anacharsis  the  Younger 
in  Greece  during  the  Middle  of  the  Fourth  Century  before  the  Christian 
Era,”  Paris,  ca.  1789.  A  work  written  from  1757  to  1788  and  presenting  a 
consecutive  account  of  Greek  life  and  customs  during  the  classical  period, 
drawn  from  Greek  writers.  Numerous  editions  in  the  original  French,  in 
German,  and  in  English,  as  follows:  Dublin,  1795;  Philadelphia,  1804; 
London,  1817 ;  in  abridged  form,  London,  1798,  1800,  1806  and  1810. 


NOTES 


175 


God,  to  Burchane  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  are  beings  to  be  worshiped, 
souls  which  have  undergone  transmigration  (p.  223).  So  the  mys¬ 
terious  expression  Koiix  Ompax  ought  probably  to  mean  "  the  holy 
(Konx),  blessed  (dm),  and  wise  ( Pax )”  supreme  being  pervading  the 
universe,  the  personification  of  nature.  Its  use  in  the  Greek  mysteries 
probably  signified  monotheism  for  the  epoptes ,  in  distinction  from  the 
polytheism  of  the  people,  although  elsewhere  P.  Horatius  scented 
atheism  here.  How  that  mysterious  word  came  by  way  of  Tibet  to 
the  Greeks  may  be  explained  as  above ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
this  way  is  made  probable  an  early  intercourse  of  Europe  with 
China  across  Tibet,  earlier  perhaps  than  the  communication  with 
Hindustan. 

8.  In  the  mechanical  system  of  nature  to  which  man  belongs  as  a 
sentient  being  there  appears,  as  the  underlying  ground  of  its  existence, 
a  certain  form  which  we  cannot  make  intelligible  to  ourselves  except 
by  thinking  into  the  physical  world  the  idea  of  an  end  preconceived 
by  the  author  of  the  universe  ;  this  predetermination  of  nature  on 
the  part  of  God  we  generally  call  divine  providence.  In  so  far  as 
this  providence  appears  in  the  origin  of  the  universe,  we  speak  of 
providence  as  founder  of  the  world  (providentia  conditrix ;  semeljussit , 
semper  parent.  —  Augustine).  As  it  maintains  the  course  of  nature, 
however,  according  to  universal  laws  of  adaptation  to  preconceived 
ends  (that  is,  teleological  laws),  we  call  it  a  ruling  providence  ( provi¬ 
dentia  gubernatrix) .  Further,  we  name  it  the  guiding  providence 
(providentia  directrix ),  as  it  appears  in  the  world  for  special  ends, 
which  we  could  not  foresee,  but  suspect  only  from  the  result.  Finally, 
regarding  particular  events  as  divine  purposes,  we  speak  no  longer 
of  providence,  but  of  dispensation  ( directio  extraordinaria) .  As  this 
term,  however,  really  suggests  the  idea  of  miracles,  although  the 
events  are  not  spoken  of  by  this  name,  the  desire  to  fathom  dispen¬ 
sation,  as  such,  is  a  foolish  presumption  in  men.  For,  from  one  single 
occurrence,  to  jump  at  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  particular  prin¬ 
ciple  of  efficient  causes  and  that  this  event  is  an  end  and  not  merely 
the  natural  ( naturmechanische )  sequence  of  a  design  quite  unknown  to 
us  is  absurd  and  presumptuous,  in  however  pious  and  humble  a  spirit 
we  may  speak  of  it.  In  the  same  way,  to  distinguish  between  a  uni¬ 
versal  and  a  particular  providence  when  regarding  it  mater ialiter ,  in 
its  relation  to  actual  objects  in  the  world  (to  say,  for  instance,  that 
there  may  be,  indeed,  a  providence  for  the  preservation  of  the  different 
species  of  creation,  but  that  individuals  are  left  to  chance),  is  false  and 


176 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


contradictory.  For  providence  is  called  universal  for  the  very  reason 
that  no  single  thing  may  be  thought  of  as  shut  out  from  its  care. 
Probably  the  distinction  of  two  kinds  of  providence,  formaliter  or 
subjectively  considered,  had  reference  to  the  manner  in  which  its 
purposes  are  fulfilled.  So  that  we  have  ordinary  providence  (for 
example,  the  yearly  decay  and  awakening  to  new  life  in  nature  with 
change  of  season)  and  what  we  may  call  unusual  or  special  provi¬ 
dence  (for  example,  the  bringing  of  timber  by  ocean  currents  to  arctic 
shores  where  it  does  not  grow,  and  where  without  this  aid  the  inhab¬ 
itants  could  not  live).  Here,  although  we  can  quite  well  explain  the 
physico-mechanical  cause  of  these  phenomena,  —  in  this  case,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  the  banks  of  the  rivers  in  temperate  countries  are  overgrown 
with  trees,  some  of  which  fall  into  the  water  and  are  carried  along, 
probably  by  the  Gulf  Stream,  —  we  must  not  overlook  the  teleological 
cause  which  points  to  the  providential  care  of  a  ruling  wisdom  above 
nature.  But  the  concept,  commonly  used  in  the  schools  of  philosophy, 
of  a  cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  deity  or  a  concurrence  (concursus) 
in  the  operations  going  on  in  the  world  of  sense,  must  be  dropped. 
For  it  is,  firstly,  self-contradictory  to  couple  the  like  and  the  unlike 
together  (gryphes  jungere  equis)  and  to  let  Him  who  is  Himself  the 
entire  cause  of  the  changes  in  the  universe  make  good  any  short¬ 
comings  in  Ili.s  own  predetermining  providence  (which  to  require  this 
must  be  defective)  during  the  course  of  the  world  ;  for  example,  to 
say  that  the  physician  has  restored  the  sick  with  the  help  of  God  — 
that  is  to  say,  that  He  has  been  present  as  a  support.  For  causa 
solitaria  non  juvat.  God  created  the  physician  as  well  as  his  means 
of  healing  ;  and  we  must  ascribe  the  result  wholly  to  Him,  if  we  will 
go  back  to  the  supreme  first  cause  which,  theoretically,  is  beyond 
our  comprehension.  Or  we  can  ascribe  the  result  entirely  to  the  phy¬ 
sician,  in  so  far  as  we  follow  up  this  event,  as  explicable  in  the  chain 
of  physical  causes,  according  to  the  order  of  nature.  Secondly,  more¬ 
over,  such  a  way  of  looking  at  this  question  destroys  all  the  fixed 
principles  by  which  we  judge  an  effect.  But,  from  the  ethico-practical 
point  of  view  which  looks  entirely  to  the  transcendental  side  of  things, 
the  idea  of  a  divine  concurrence  is  quite  proper  and  even  necessary  ; 
for  example,  in  the  faith  that  God  will  make  good  the  imperfection 
of  our  human  justice,  if  only  our  feelings  and  intentions  are  sincere  ; 
and  that  He  will  do  this  by  means  beyond  our  comprehension, 
and  therefore  we  should  not  slacken  our  efforts  after  what  is  good. 
Whence  it  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  no  one  must  attempt 


NOTES 


ITT 


to  explain  a  good  action  as  a  mere  event  in  time  by  this  concursus ; 
for  that  would  be  to  pretend  a  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  super¬ 
sensible,  and  hence  be  absurd. 

9.  Of  all  modes  of  livelihood  the  life  of  the  hunter  is  undoubtedly 
most  incompatible  with  a  civilized  condition  of  society.  Because,  to 
live  by  hunting,  families  must  isolate  themselves  from  their  neighbors, 
soon  becoming  estranged  and  spread  over  widely  scattered  forests,  to 
be  before  long  on  terms  of  hostility,  since  each  requires  a  great  deal 
of  space  to  obtain  food  and  raiment. 

God’s  command  to  Noah  not  to  shed  blood  (Genesis  ix,  4-G), 

But  flesh  with  the  life  thereof,  which  is  the  blood  thereof,  shall  ye  not  eat. 

And  surely  your  blood,  the  blood  of  your  lives,  will  I  require  ;  at  the 
hand  of  every  beast  will  I  require  it;  and  at  the  hand  of  man,  even  at 
the  hand  of  every  man’s  brother,  will  1  require  the  life  of  man. 

Whoso  sheddeth  man’s  blood,  by  man  shall  his  blood  be  shed  ;  for  in  the 
image  of  God  made  he  man, 

is  frequently  quoted,  and  was  afterward  —  in  another  connection  it  is 
true  —  made  by  the  baptized  Jews  a  condition  to  which  Christians, 
newly  converted  from  heathendom,  had  to  conform.  (Cf.  Acts  xv, 
20  ;  xxi,  25.)  This  command  seems  originally  to  have  been  nothing 
else  than  a  prohibition  of  the  life  of  the  hunter  ;  for  here  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  eating  raw  flesh  must  often  occur,  and,  in  forbidding  the  one 
custom,  we  condemn  the  other. 

10.  The  question  might  be  put :  fr  If  it  is  nature’s  will  that  these 
arctic  shores  should  not  remain  unpopulated,  what  will  become  of 
their  inhabitants,  if,  as  is  to  be  expected,  at  some  time  or  other  no 
more  driftwood  should  be  brought  to  them  ?  For  we  may  believe  that, 
with  the  advance  of  civilization,  the  inhabitants  of  temperate  zones 
will  utilize  better  the  wood  which  grows  on  the  banks  of  their  rivers, 
and  not  let  it  fall  into  the  stream  and  so  be  swept  away.”  I  answer  : 
the  inhabitants  of  the  shores  of  the  River  Obi,  the  Yenisei,  the  Lena 
will  supply  them  with  it  through  trade,  and  take  in  exchange  the 
animal  produce  in  which  the  seas  of  arctic  shores  are  so  rich  —  that 
is,  if  nature  has  first  of  all  brought  about  peace  among  them. 

11.  Diffei  •ence  of  religion  !  A  strange  expression,  as  if  one  were  to 
speak  of  different  kinds  of  morality.  There  may  indeed  be  different 
historical  forms  of  belief, —  that  is  to  say,  the  various  means  which 
have  been  used  in  the  course  of  time  to  promote  religion, —  but  they 


178 


ETERNAL  PEACE 


are  mere  subjects  of  learned  investigation,  and  do  not  really  lie  within 
the  sphere  of  religion.  In  the  same  way  there  are  many  religious 
works,  —  the  Zendavesta,  Veda,  Koran,  etc.,  —  but  there  is  only  one 
religion,  binding  for  all  men  and  for  all  times.  These  books  are  each 
no  more  than  the  accidental  mouthpiece  of  religion,  and  may  be 
different  according  to  differences  in  time  and  place. 

12.  These  are  'permissive  laws  of  reason  which  allow  us  to  leave  a 
system  of  public  law,  when  it  is  tainted  by  injustice,  to  remain  just 
as  it  is,  until  everything  is  entirely  revolutionized  through  an  internal 
development,  either  spontaneous  or  fostered  and  matured  by  peace¬ 
ful  influences.  For  any  legal  constitution  whatsoever,  even  although 
it  conforms  only  slightly  with  the  spirit  of  law,  is  better  than  none  at 
all  —  that  is  to  say,  anarchy,  which  is  the  fate  of  a  precipitate  reform. 
Hence,  as  things  now  are,  the  wise  politician  will  look  upon  it  as  his 
duty  to  make  reforms  on  the  lines  marked  out  by  the  ideal  of  public 
law.  He  will  not  use  revolutions,  when  these  have  been  brought  about 
by  natural  causes,  to  extenuate  still  greater  oppression  than  caused 
them,  but  will  regard  them  as  the  voice  of  nature,  calling  upon  him 
to  make  such  thorough  reforms  as  will  bring  about  the  only  lasting 
constitution,  a  lawful  constitution  based  on  the  principles  of  freedom. 

13.  It  is  still  sometimes  denied  that  we  find,  in  members  of  a  civi¬ 
lized  community,  a  certain  depravity  rooted  in  the  nature  of  man  ; 
and  it  might,  indeed,  be  alleged  with  some  show  of  truth  that  not  an 
innate  corruptness  in  human  nature,  but  the  barbarism  of  men,  the 
defect  of  a  not  yet  sufficiently  developed  culture,  is  the  cause  of  the 
evident  antipathy  to  law  which  their  attitude  indicates.  In  the  ex¬ 
ternal  relations  of  states,  however,  human  wickedness  shows  itself 
incontestably,  without  any  attempt  at  concealment.  Within  the  state, 
it  is  covered  over  by  the  compelling  authority  of  civil  laws.  For, 
working  against  the  tendency  every  citizen  has  to  commit  acts  of 
violence  against  his  neighbor,  there  is  the  much  stronger  force  of  the 
government  which  not  only  gives  an  appearance  of  morality  to  the 
whole  state  {causae  non  causae),  but,  by  checking  the  outbreak  of  law¬ 
less  propensities,  actually  aids  the  moral  qualities  of  men  considerably, 
in  their  development  of  a  direct  respect  for  the  law.  For  every  indi¬ 
vidual  thinks  that  lie  himself  would  hold  the  idea  of  right  sacred  and 
follow  faithfully  what  it  prescribes,  if  only  he  could  expect  that 
every  one  else  would  do  the  same.  This  guarantee  is  in  part  given  to 
him  by  the  government ;  and  a  great  advance  is  made  by  this  step, 
which  is  not  deliberately  moral,  toward  the  ideal  of  fidelity  to  the 


NOTES 


179 


concept  of  duty  for  its  own  sake  without  thought  of  return.  As, 
however,  every  man’s  good  opinion  of  himself  presupposes  an  evil 
disposition  in  every  one  else,  we  have  an  expression  of  their  mutual 
judgment  of  one  another,  namely,  that  when  it  comes  to  hard  facts, 
none  of  them  are  worth  much  ;  but  whence  this  judgment  comes 
remains  unexplained,  as  we  cannot  lay  the  blame  on  the  nature  of 
man,  since  he  is  a  being  in  the  possession  of  freedom.  The  respect  for 
the  idea  of  right,  of  which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  man  to  divest 
himself,  sanctions  in  the  most  solemn  manner  the  theory  of  our  power 
to  conform  to  its  dictates.  And  hence  every  man  sees  himself  obliged 
to  act  in  accordance  with  what  the  idea  of  right  prescribes,  whether 
his  neighbors  fulfill  their  obligation  or  not. 

14.  We  can  find  the  voucher  for  maxims  such  as  these  in  Herr 
Hofrichter  Garve’s  essay,  "On  the  Connection  of  Morals  with  Politics,” 
1788.  This  worthy  scholar  confesses  at  the  very  beginning  that  he  is 
unable  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  this  question.  But  his  sanction 
of  such  maxims,  even  when  coupled  with  the  admission  that  he  cannot 
altogether  clear  away  the  arguments  raised  against  them,  seems  to  be 
a  greater  concession  in  favor  of  those  who  show  considerable  incli¬ 
nation  to  abuse  them  than  it  might  perhaps  be  wise  to  admit. 

Acknowledgment.  The  notes  to  "Eternal  Peace”  printed  herewith 
have  been  taken  from  the  translation  by  Miss  Mary  Campbell  Smith, 
M.  A.,  published  originally  by  Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  and  now  by 
George  Allen  &  Co.,  London. 


. 


Date  Due 

*** 

h  8  ’43 

FACULTY 

may  e 

1945 

iY  2  7  '54 

FACULTY 

MliULlf 

• 

liHti  -r* 

Sri 

I  I.  ■'  ■  ' 

rrrm 

P^r  JV  X  ^ 

9  v 

<§) 

